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Abstract 
 
 
This thesis will explain what an appropriate process for dispute resolution 
in a retirement village should look like. It will also evaluate how close to 
that ideal the model contained in the Retirement Villages Act 2003 (RVA) 
is. It will conclude that the Act model fails because at both steps in its 
dispute resolution process, it places one of the parties, the operator, in the 
position of selecting, ensuring independence and paying for a mediator and 
a disputes panel.  This thesis also finds the lack of legal status for residents’ 
committees deprives residents of a source of support and representation. 
The linchpin role in the Act, the statutory supervisor, also has a disputes 
resolution function. This thesis finds the role of statutory supervisor also 
lacks independence because the selection and payment for the role is placed 
with the operator. Evidence suggests a large share of the market is  
‘captured’ by one Trustee Company that does not maintain independence 
from operators and may not communicate with residents at a level 
appropriate to the age of the resident population; the average age of 
retirement village residents in New Zealand is 83 years. The thesis also 
finds that mediation is not a suitable process for people in their later years, 
especially older women   when the contested matters surround contractual 
rights and include on-going fees.  The key finding in the thesis is that the 
Act is not fair or independent for residents.   
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in the context of conflict that develops into disputes between residents and operators. 
The Act provides the statutory oversight of this rapidly growing industry: this thesis 
includes insights into the dynamics of conflict in retirement village settings, early 
impressions of the Act’s dispute resolution mechanism and an analysis of the linchpin 
role of statutory supervision under the Act.  
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Dispute Resolution and the Retirement Villages Act 
2003: A fair process? 
 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
Formal processes are prescribed for dispute resolution in the Retirement Villages 
Act 2003. This thesis evaluates that model and asks if it represents an independent 
and fair process. Retirement villages are largely privately run. The competing 
interests of residents and those of capital business interests often lead to tensions; 
some will demand dispute resolution.   
 
The Act was introduced principally to protect the interests and financial assets of 
older New Zealanders entering into complex legal contracts. Focussed as it is on 
dispute resolution, this thesis does not concentrate on resident satisfaction with 
retirement village living nor necessarily dwell on operators who manage their 
businesses in a principled, consultative and fair manner, though the existence of 
such operators is acknowledged, appreciated and respected.  
 
The thesis examines the theory and research informing dispute resolution 
processes. After referring to a number of dispute resolution models it proposes an 
ideal model and adaptations to the Act model1  if the ideal model is not accepted. 
The Act model is deficient in certain respects. The thesis will show that the 
unequal position of residents and operators has not been adequately addressed 
within the Act and is the primary cause of the Act’s deficiencies.  The model has 
also received criticism about its independence. Independence impacts on fairness 
of process which must also be fair in the experience of retirement village residents 
whose average age is around 83 years. The following question will guide the 
thesis. 
 
Does the dispute resolution model contained in the Retirement Villages Act 
2003 represent a fair and independent process and is it a process that is 
responsive to the needs of retirement village residents?   
 
                                                 
1 The Act model refers to the model contained in the Retirement Villages Act 2003. 
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This thesis aims to explain what an appropriate process for dispute resolution in a 
retirement village would look like. It will also evaluate how close to that ideal the 
model contained in the Retirement Villages Act 2003 (RVA) is. It will conclude 
that the Act model fails because at both steps in its dispute resolution process, it 
places one of the parties, the operator, in the position of selecting, ensuring 
independence and paying for a mediator and a disputes panel.  The linchpin role in 
the Act; the statutory supervisor also has a disputes resolution function. This 
thesis finds the role of statutory supervisor also lacks independence; selection and 
payment for the role being placed with the operator. Evidence suggests the role is 
‘captured’ by one Trustee Company that does not maintain independence from 
operators and may not communicate with residents at a level appropriate to the 
age of the resident population. The average age of retirement village residents in 
New Zealand is 83 years. It will be shown that mediation is not a suitable process 
for people in their later years, especially older women when the contested matters 
surround contractual rights and include on-going fees. Mediation is a confidential, 
non transparent process where power imbalance and mediator perspective can 
impact on outcome. Mediators differ in their practice style and philosophy about 
redressing power imbalance which can leave residents in a seriously 
disadvantaged position.  
  
This thesis addresses both the ‘complaints facility’ and the ‘disputes panel’ model 
and includes the experience of the first New Zealand resident to participate in its 
process. It also considers the issues behind conflict and disputes in retirement 
villages and how residents respond to living with an overarching structure.  
 
1.2 Thesis structure 
 
Chapter One describes the demographic context of ageing; it also discusses the 
accommodation choices people will make in their later years. The discussion 
includes the evolution of retirement communities; a literature review on life-style 
choices to enter retirement villages; the costs attached; the need for protective 
legislation and identification of the key stakeholders in retirement villages in New 
Zealand. This leads to the discussion in Chapter Two on residents’ needs. 
 
Chapter Two discusses the needs of older people who have made retirement 
village living their life-style choice and governments’ responses to protecting their 
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interests. Elder abuse is discussed, also the international arena including studies 
undertaken specifically addressing conflict in retirement villages. Australian 
sector group and tribunal responses to conflict and disputes in this setting are 
included.  
 
Chapter Three considers the Retirement Villages Act 2003, its background and 
disputes process and its perceived flaws. A particular focus of the discussion is the 
key legislative roles of the statutory supervisor and the Retirement Commissioner. 
This will be followed by the Retirement Villages Association of New Zealand’s 
(RVANZ) approach to complaints and disputes in the pre and post Act 
environment.  
 
Chapter Four searches for the key principles that underpin dispute resolution 
processes; especially those that guide processes involving less powerful groups. It 
discusses the concepts and ideas propounded by key writers and categorises them 
along emerging principles. Drawing from that, ‘Statements of principle’ will be 
formulated showing what might be evident when the principle is present in a 
dispute resolution process.  The principles will be applied to a range of processes 
and evaluated with reference to different groups. These principles will be used 
throughout the thesis. 
 
 Chapter Five will cover the application of the principles from Chapter Four to a 
range of processes that might be suitable for use in retirement village complaints 
and disputes contexts. A dispute ‘process map’ will be used to identify processes 
that might be appropriate for conflict and dispute resolution in retirement villages. 
These processes will be evaluated using the ‘statements of principle’ that emerged 
from Chapter Four. Initial impressions from the first disputes hearing under the 
Act will be included.  
 
Chapter Six examines statutory and private processes for dispute resolution. It   
considers how different rules and procedures apply to the two contexts, and 
whether fundamental principles are affected by the processes. It identifies contexts 
that include representation and advocacy and examples that could positively 
influence procedures and practices in retirement villages. It includes the statutory 
examples of dispute resolution in the employment context; the Accident 
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Compensation Corporation (ACC) and its company Dispute Resolution Services 
Limited (DRSL) and the Australian National Native Title Tribunal. It also 
includes the broader role of tribunals in administrative decision-making; the 
Ombuds/Commissioner role in the health sector, banking and insurance and 
savings; and the private sector model used by the New Zealand Press Council.  
 
Chapter Seven is about the Queensland and New South Wales experiences of 
retirement village dispute resolution. It includes the role of the NSW and 
Queensland state residents’ associations. It identifies the key differences between 
the Australian and New Zealand legislation highlighting factors that could 
enhance residents’ relative power imbalance. 
 
Chapter Eight analyses the dispute resolution processes examined in the thesis. It   
identifies features that might assist residents of retirement villages. An ideal 
model will emerge from this analysis. 
 
Chapter Nine draws conclusions and offers possibilities for further research in the 
context of New Zealand retirement village living.   
 
 
1.3 Methodological Process 
 
The methodological process undertaken in this study is best represented by the 
‘mixed method’ approach,2 meaning it is both qualitative and quantitative. The 
methodology included theory and a literature review and an examination of the 
New Zealand and Australian models for dispute resolution in retirement villages. 
It also included unstructured interviews conducted face to face and by telephone. 
It was also necessary to gain information by emails. Empirical data was obtained 
from related studies undertaken in New Zealand, Australia and the U.S.A and 
through the provision of information from stake holder groups in New Zealand 
and Australia including document sources. The literature review included a robust 
examination of principles, systems and methods. On the basis of the information 
obtained an ideal model for dealing with disputes in retirement villages in New 
Zealand is proposed.  
                                                 
2 Cresswell, J.W Research Design (2nd ed) 2003; Patton, M Q Qualitative Research & Evaluations 
Methods (3rd ed) 2002. 
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The methodology used in this thesis is directed towards unmasking the principles 
behind dispute resolution (DR)3 and alternative dispute resolution (ADR)4; what is 
known about conflict and disputes in retirement settings; examining processes 
used in Australia (and other locations) to respond to conflict and disputes and 
determining the extent to which the processes reflect the principles of fair and 
proper process and independent adjudication when compared with the model 
contained in the Retirement Villages Act 2003.  
 
 
1.4  Theoretical orientation 
 
1.4.1 The ecology of human development 
 
Dispute resolution is a complex process requiring consideration of issues which 
interact in a complex system of human and structural influences. Such a process is 
best understood through an ecological explanation. The ecological school of 
thinking is best explained by Bronfenbrenner5  and others through the concepts 
from which the theory is founded. The key ideas in this approach are (1) dynamic 
interaction; (2) a systems approach which considers those things closest to a 
person and those furthest away; (3) policy impacts (4) embedded in a societal and 
ideological system. The identifying locations for complex interactions are the 
micro, meso and macro systems that form the context for human development.  
 
When we think about the transference of a person from one setting (their home) to 
another (a retirement village) we need a way of thinking about the complex nature 
of that transference. Dispute resolution is also complex. This study considers the 
complex phenomena of dispute resolution in retirement villages through the lens 
of ecological systems theory. Bronfenbrenner writes about complex phenomena 
using the ecological metaphor. This metaphor draws on an understanding of the 
layers of influence that impact on human development from birth to death. People 
are seen as having the potential to develop through the life span depending on the 
quality of influences from external systems and their sensitivity to the needs of the 
developing person and that person’s supportive network.  
                                                 
3 DR represents the term ‘dispute resolution’ and covers both consensual and adjudicative 
processes. 
4 ADR represents the term ‘alternative dispute resolution’ and generally means alternative to 
adjudication. 
5 Bronfenbrenner, U The Ecology of Human Development  (1979). 
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This conceptual framework considers life-span development from the outside in. 
It takes account of subtle changes in the systems external to the developing person 
as their impact filters through to the developing person in the microsystem setting. 
Each setting in which the person participates provides opportunities for 
enhancement (or detriment) of the developing person. “A mesosystem comprises 
the interrelations among two or more settings in which the developing person 
participates” and can be seen as the relationship or connections between two 
settings in which one person is interacting. Bronfenbrenner’s multi system 
conceptualisation describes interconnectedness this way;   
 
The principle of interconnectedness is seen as applying not only within settings 
but with equal force and consequences to linkages between settings, both those 
that he may never enter but in which events occur that affect what happens in the 
person’s immediate environment. The former constitute what I shall call 
mesosystems and the latter exosystems.   
 
Finally, the complex of nested, interconnected systems is viewed as a 
manifestation of overarching patterns of ideology and organization of the social 
institutions common to a particular culture or subculture. Such generalized 
patterns are referred to as macrosystems. Thus within a given society or social 
group, the structure and substance of micro-, meso-, and exosystems tend to be 
similar, as if they were constructed from the same master model, and the systems 
function in similar ways. Conversely, between different social groups, the 
constituent systems may vary markedly…6 
 
Bronfenbrenner believes by viewing society in this way, it becomes possible to 
evaluate these larger social contexts as “environments for human development”. 
                                                 
6 Ibid, 8. 
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Through analysis and comparison of the cluster of systems characterizing the 
different groups or entire societies we can systematically describe and distinguish 
the properties of the larger social contexts. This is an important claim for it is 
within the context of the macrosystem ideological realms that power is seen to be 
held and transferred to particular groups through the institutions set up by society.  
 
In most developed societies power is held by the dominant class whose dominant 
discourses monopolise decisions about preferred ways of doing things. The 
systemic interconnections transfer the dominant discourse to the settings 
containing the developing person, whether or not there is a compatible fit. 
Synchronising institutions to fit contexts and settings means developing policy 
and programmes that will fit with and respond to the needs of people within their 
microsystem settings. Using an ecological framework to evaluate responsive DR 
processes means seeking processes inclusive of principles that take account of 
culture, class, gender and also age, if age is a significant component of power 
imbalance in a setting.  
 
The ecology of human development incorporates phenomenology and social 
context allowing us to investigate the pluralistic nature of the development of 
humans7 across and within societies. In the area of public policy it has special 
significance; it emphasises the power of public policy to affect the well-being and 
development of human beings by determining the conditions of their lives.8 In the 
case of retirement villages, the Act model can be seen as determining that 
unrepresented residents will remain in a vulnerable position as a vulnerable ‘class’ 
because the Act makes no provision for independent representation or advocacy 
for residents through legal recognition of residents’ committees.  
 
Germane to the question addressed in this thesis is the notion of power and 
interrelatedness. These two concepts are key influences in the ecological 
approach I am taking. The notion of power as it is held by certain groups has been 
documented by earlier writers. Their analysis of power and how it is transferred in 
society also needs to be understood theoretically. A discussion on this topic 
                                                 
7 The ecology of human development considers humans have the potential to ‘develop’ throughout 
the life span – birth till death. 
8 Ibid, xii. 
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follows. The ideas it presents will be applied implicitly and explicitly throughout 
the thesis alongside examination of the mechanics of dispute resolution processes.  
 
 
1.4.2 The silent determinants: ideology, hegemony and 
capital. 
 
Having identified a ‘perspective’ methodology and conceptual framework9  I now 
turn to the ideas of the Italian neo-Marxist Antonio Gramsci and the French 
sociologist Pierre Bourdieu for theories that help to explain how power is held in a 
particular ‘class’ to dominate other ‘classes’.  
 
Gramsci’s thesis views power as residing within the ‘private’ non-state levels of 
the superstructure in the form of ideology; that is the ideal representation of the 
interests of the ruling-class. This ideology is universalized through the process of 
hegemony to become integrated into policy, laws and the social and economic 
conditions that impact on the lives of individuals and groups, without them being 
conscious of the process. Hegemony in this context is the manufacturing of 
consent. Cultural hegemony is seen as the major dimension of this manipulation. 
Cultural hegemony involves the production of ways of thinking and seeing and 
excluding alternative visions and discourses.10 Gramsci determined that bourgeois 
hegemony is civil society.11   The role of the state supports this hegemony in the 
way it operates 
  
…according to a plan, urges, incites, solicits and “punishes”; for, once the 
conditions are created in which a certain way of life is ‘possible’, then “criminal 
action or omission” must have a punitive sanction, with moral implications, and 
not merely be judged generically as “dangerous”.12 
 
 
Simply put, the state becomes the vehicle through which powerful classes gain a 
dominant position over the less powerful, leaving the state to tackle conflict of 
interest through force. 13  A sharp distinction between force, coercion and 
constraint is made which means people act in unintended ways and when force is 
                                                 
9 The ecology of human development provides a conceptual framework through the layering of the 
systems – macro to micro which assists to assess the impact on individuals of the systems that lay 
beyond the immediate context of the person.   
10 Scott, J and Marshall G A Dictionary of Sociology, 2005. 
11 Hoare, O and Nowell-Smith, G (eds)  Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci, 
GBR: ElecBook, 2001, 506. <http://site.ebrary.com/lib/waikato/Doc?id=10015105&ppg=505>  
12 Ibid, 509. 
13 Hoffman, J The Gramscian Challenge: Coercion and Consent in Marxist Political Thinking, 
1984; Hoffman, J Citizenship Beyond the State, 2004.  
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used “no activity is possible since the person cannot be said to exercise the power 
of will at all”. 14 In this tradition the distinctions between state and government are 
linked. “Government is here defined as the settlement of conflict through 
arbitration and negotiation”.15 Yet citizens need to be able to relate to each other 
about their differences but as members of the state they are subject to its forces of 
control; these forces have come about through cultural hegemony and enshrined in 
what is accepted as democratic process, making democracy a form of the state.  
 
Horrendous authoritarian policies have been justified in the name of democracy 
but the problem of this tyranny lies not with democracy but with the state. It is 
the state that seeks abstract sameness and is threatened by difference, not 
democracy.16 
 
The extension of Gramsci’s (neo-Marxist) thesis brings the debates about 
democracy, citizenship and participation into the realm of retirement village 
residents and appropriate DR processes through the expansion of class. Class 
exploitation is said to express itself in a culturally specific form whether national, 
regional, gendered or religious. 17  My intention is to include age in any analysis 
of class.  
 
Another neo-Marxist Pierre Bourdieu has contributed to my understanding of how 
individual effectiveness is either maximised or limited, depending on how a 
person comes to view the world through the inherited knowledge available from 
the social structures that surround them. Their position or habitus in society 
influences their individual effectiveness. Bourdieu’s theory translates 
effectiveness into ‘capital’. A person’s social, economic or cultural ‘capital’ 
within any institutional social ‘field’ determines where they are located in a class 
system; the class in which individuals are located is in turn determined by 
prevailing ideology via the process of hegemony.   
 
Adding sophisticated cultural, lifestyle, and status dimensions to insights from 
Marxism, Bourdieu argued that the cultural capital of the dominant class gave it 
an arbitrary advantage over other groups in gaining educational access and 
credentials.18 Furthermore Bourdieu’s exploration of the legal world adds 
                                                 
14 Ibid, 1984, 31. 
15 Ibid.  
16 Ibid, 46. 
17 Ibid, 2004, 175. 
18 Ibid.  
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additional dimensions to this thesis. He sees “legal culture” as being incomplete 
but having its own “settled autonomy” through its use of rules of legislation, 
regulations and judicial precedent and practices that are “strongly patterned by 
tradition, education, and the daily experience of legal custom and professional 
usage”.19 He says unlike other structures and practices in the “social universe”, 
legal rules and practices have a “life and a profound influence of their own” which 
he asserts derives from power “to determine in part what and how the law will 
decide in any specific instance, case or conflict”. From this perspective the law is 
seen to occupy a particular habitus 20 and from this habitus those who practice in 
the field retain symbolic capital21  thereby being in a position to impose symbolic 
violence on others who have no understanding of their meaning.22  
 
Considering the topic of this thesis and the application of law to resolve disputes 
between two classes of people; the ‘vulnerable old’ and the more ‘powerful 
owners’ leads to the connection with Bourdieu’s concept of miscognition.  
Miscognition refers to induced misunderstanding 
... the process by which power relations come to be perceived not for what they 
objectively are, but in a form which renders them legitimate in the eyes of those 
subject to the power. This induced misunderstanding is obtained not through 
conspiratorial, but structural means. It implies the inherent advantage of the 
holder of power through their capacity to control not only the actions of those 
they dominate, but also the language through which those subjected comprehend 
their domination. Such miscognition is structurally necessary for the 
reproduction of the social order, which would become intolerably conflicted 
without it.23 
 
For the more ‘powerful owners’ who are generally holders of considerable 
economic capital, the need to understand the language of those who occupy legal 
habitus is irrelevant. They simply pay and the legal (language) experts do their 
work. However, for the ‘vulnerable old’ who may be without legal advocacy, 
miscognition may be unrecognised or a source of stress which may even cause 
them to withdraw from a legal dispute.  
 
                                                 
19 Terdiman, R Bourdieu translated in “The Force of Law: Toward a Sociology of the Juridical 
Field” [1987] HLJ, 38, 807. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Symbolic capital according to Bourdieu designates the wealth which an individual or group has 
accumulated through possession of authority, knowledge, prestige, reputation, academic degrees – 
even debts of gratitude owed by those given favours. 
22 Symbolic violence refers to the imposition of any symbolic representations such as language, 
conceptualizations, portrayals, rules on recipients “who have little choice about whether to accept 
or reject them”. Ibid, 812. 
23 Ibid, 813. 
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Integrating the ideas of Gramsci and Bourdieu as a means of understanding the 
relations between residents and operators and residents, operators and the state 
(through the enactment of legislation) in a retirement village context, provides a 
lens through which we can explore the relative power position between these 
actors. It should also assist in determining how accessible a particular dispute 
resolution process may be for residents of retirement villages.   
 
There are several analytical parts involved in this thesis, all of which allows you 
to think about the topic in a complex way.  
 12
Chapter 1 Ageing and the evolution of retirement 
villages 
 
Years have been added to life – now we must ensure that life is added to those 
years. (World Health Organisation, 2002) 
 
 
1.1 Global ageing demographics  
 
Promoting positive ageing has been the catch cry of global commentators over the 
last two decades. This has come about due to the known demographic features of 
global ageing in developed countries which has seen an increase in the numbers of 
people aged over sixty move from around 10 per cent of the total population in 
1998 to a predicted 21 per cent by 2050; that is from around 600 to almost 2000 
million people over 65 years of age.24 In less developed countries, figures are 
expected to quadruple.   
 
New Zealand is no exception with a positive ageing strategy published in 2001 
containing goals directed at securing adequate income for older people; equitable, 
timely, affordable and accessible health services; affordable and appropriate 
housing and transport options. Ageing in place strategies also address safety and 
security; a range of culturally appropriate services for older Maori who generally 
live in rural areas with less accessibility to support services and less knowledge 
about income entitlements; emerging issues around the growing number of older 
Pacific people living with their families and provision of health and social 
services to meet their needs; emerging issues in diverse ethnic communities and 
the unique challenges they face as they age; ensuring older people living in rural 
areas are not disadvantaged when accessing services and creating positive 
attitudes and images of older people in all government agencies, business sectors 
and communities including promotion of intergenerational programmes in schools 
and communities.25  
 
                                                 
24 Minichiello, V and Coulson, I (eds) Contemporary Issues in Gerontology (2005) iii; Atchley R 
C  & Barusch A S,  Social Forces and Aging (2004) 24-43.   
25 Ministry of Social Development, Positive Ageing in New Zealand: Diversity Participation and 
Change, October 2001. 
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Statistics (2001) indicate the fastest growing group of older New Zealanders is the 
group 75 years and over with the number 85 years and older reported to be 
growing at the rate of 5 per cent per year.26 In 2006 it is anticipated the number 
(over 85 years) will have increased by some 33% to reach 62,000 with a further 
increase over the next five years to 79,000 in 2011. This figure will by then 
represent 14% of older New Zealanders. By 2050 it is anticipated the over 65 age 
group will represent 25 per cent of the total population.27 It is predicted and not 
difficult to anticipate, this rapidly growing group of older citizens will pose 
significant challenges at all levels of planning and policy, not the least housing. 
The Ministry’s report informs that in 1996 “almost one in four people over 85 
lived in a residential home”. It seems from this, the ageing in place policy 
favoured by the Ministry takes on heightened importance in terms of its stated 
goal of enhancing independence of older people who may choose (or have 
imposed through lack of adequate capital) to live out their lives in their own 
homes.28 
 
 
1.1.1 2006 - Baby boomers turn 60 
 
The baby boomers identified in the report as those born between 1946 and 1965 is 
the group much of the international and national debate and policy formulation 
has been directed towards. It is believed this group will produce the greatest 
number and possibly longest living cohort of New Zealand (and international) 
citizens identified.29 The associated costs in maintaining income support and 
health and disability services as this cohort ages is predicted to rise substantially 
with NZ superannuation cost projected to increase from 5.3% of Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) in 1996/97 to 10.7% in 2051. Added to this there is a predicted 
rise from 5.9% to 11% of GDP for health and disability care over the same 
period30 which raises key policy issues not within the scope of this research but 
critical to the longer term planning towards positive ageing.  
                                                 
26 Ibid, 8.  
27 Grant B, “Retirement Villages: An Alternative Form of Housing on an Ageing Landscape” 
[2006]  NZSPJ, 27, 101. 
28 Supra at n 25. 
29 Greenbrook S, Village People: The Changing Role of Retirement Villages in New Zealand’s 
Ageing Society (2005); Leonard L, Retirement Villages: Promises of a Lifestyle (2002); Koopman-
Boyden, P G Ageing Society (1993); Hoeflinch, M H Reflections of Elderly Housing [1996].  
30 Dwyer, M and Gray, A “Maintaining Independence in Old Age: Policy Challenges” [1999]. 
SPJNZ Dec, 83.  
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One consequence of this increasingly large ‘grey’ body of (generally) politically 
savvy citizens who grew out of the post-war youth culture31 during the 50’s and 
60’s, will be their collective voting strength. Politicians and age specific business 
interests (including retirement village operators) should be aware not only of the 
possibilities associated with the capital gains associated with consumption in such 
a large ageing cohort, but also the potential of reversal of power relations through 
sheer strength of numbers and diversity of representation within the group 
membership. The Minister of Consumer Protection in Western Australia recently 
described baby boomers and the generation following as “increasingly 
sophisticated, confident and demanding”.32 This group after all contains the 
generation that negatively dubbed the early baby boomers (and possibly their 
parents) as the “greedy generation” and the “lucky generation”33 because they saw 
that group as having benefited from previous generations’ acquisition of universal 
pensions, improved labour conditions and post-war policies resulting in full 
employment, home ownership and other social benefits accrued from welfarism 
generally. It was within this developmental context that retirement became 
institutionalised as the “universal condition of later life”.34 
 
The first cohort of capital advantaged baby boomers includes a group influential 
and instrumental in establishing the ‘new right’ policies of the 1980’s. This 
includes user pay tertiary education which incorporates the highly controversial 
student loan scheme set up in the early 1990’s.35  It is the cohorts that follow 
immediately behind the early baby boomers who are seen as having accumulated 
significant human capital in the form of health and education; enough to provide 
challenges in the social and political relations between ‘classes’ which could 
include owners and residents of retirement villages. These cohorts represent the 
Third Age where the possibility of owning a retirement village and recruiting 
residents from within their own generational field is not an unlikely prospect. The 
first graduates of youth culture have in turn become the proponents of a range of 
                                                 
31 Gilleard, C and Higgs, P Contexts of Ageing: Class, Cohort and Community, (2005)74-76. 
32 Roberts, M Minister of Consumer Protection,  “Opening Address” Retirement Village 
Association Ltd., WA Regional Conference, August 2006.  
33 Supra, n 31 at 76; Boyack, N “The greedy generation’s way with welfare” Book Review 
Evening Post 17th May 1991, p5. 
34 Supra n 31 at 42.  
35 Thomson, D Selfish Generations: How Welfare States Grow Old (1996). 
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products and practices from which has emerged the notion of lifestyle; positioned 
favourably for pursuits of leisure (including health and fitness) and social 
interaction, this group now occupying a position between work and elderly 
decline, can be viewed as having reached life’s pinnacle - the Third Age.36  
 
 
1.2 U.S Retirement Villages: origins and a darker side 
  
Age restricted retirement communities began as a large scale social experiment in 
the US in 1960’s. The first and largest purpose built ‘active adult’ leisure 
retirement community Sun City was built by the Del Webb Company in the state 
of Arizona in 1960. Having survived and thrived for more than forty years, Sun 
City, its concept and residents, have been the subject of much speculation and 
writing but until 1995 its residents had not been subject to any scholarly 
research.37 The idea for such a community is said to have derived from two 
sources, the first being from within the active leisure industry and the second from 
the notion of the old being idle. One way or the other or through a combination of 
both, the founders of Sun City spawned a concept which has proliferated and 
survived stereotypes about older age being a period of rest and decline. Instead, 
retirement communities (including Sun Cities) have on occasions mobilized and 
politicized their members to actively oppose community development initiatives 
taking place within the poorer, working class mostly Latino communities 
inhabiting precincts outside their ‘city’ walls.38  
 
One such initiative was a proposed Martin Luther King, Jr Holiday Camp in 
Arizona.  This was to be a state funded concept but through highly organised 
inter-community publicity and by sheer voting force senior citizens in Phoenix 
retirement communities voted overwhelmingly against the scheme causing defeat. 
Another example of senior power operating (negatively) against the exterior 
community can be found in the school taxes “battles” between 1962 and 200139 
when retirees from two Sun City communities went to extraordinary levels to 
avoid paying school taxes in spite of the poor state of education and school 
attendance of children and potential adult learners living in the wider community.  
                                                 
36 Gilleard & Higgs, supra at n 31,1. For a less positive view of the Third Age see Blackie, 1999.  
37 McHugh, K E and Larson-Keagy “These White Walls: The Dialectic of Retirement 
Communities” [2005] Journal of Ageing Studies [2005] 19, 2 , 241-256. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid,  250. 
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Kausterbaum40 argues racist views that are commonly accepted as “naturalized” 
in segments of society are more to do with pragmatic self-interest than displays of 
“raw racism”. For example in the school taxes context retirees made personal 
comments along the lines of  I came here to get away from the rat race( possibly 
meaning taxes and  issues that don’t concern me)….people can do and be what 
they like (suggesting, but not here).   
 
According to McHugh and Larson-Keagy, the notion of  the dialectic of 
community can be found in the active leisure, self-interested lives of the retirees in 
Sun City communities and simultaneously [in these places] of separation and 
exclusion that speak to the potency of age, social class, ethnicity and lifestyle as 
social borders. The term dialectic in this example refers to the clash of ideas about 
how people want to live their lives within the community in contrast to how lives 
are lived outside the community. The Marxist idea of contradictions clashing and 
producing through sequences a more advanced synthesis out of these clashes 
depends on the way a community sees itself. In a relatively wealthy community 
such as Sun City the contradictions between the wealthy and the poor have 
resulted in separation of communities through the choices of the holders of 
material wealth against the aspirations of the poorer class outside the city walls. 
 
 
1.3 What is a N.Z. Retirement Village and why choose to move 
there? 
 
The New Zealand Retirement Villages Act 2003 defines the term “retirement 
village” in section 6. The definition covers a broad range of village types and 
includes a variety of legal forms which allow residents the purchasing right to live 
in a dwelling; these include a unit title; licence to occupy; or life-time lease or 
tenancy. All types and ranges of occupation rights will be protected by the Act. 
The Act covers any living situation that includes all the following features: 
• Multiple units – The village has two of more residential units. A unit 
might be a villa, an apartment, a studio unit, a kaumatua flat, or even a 
room in a rest home, among other types of dwelling. 
                                                 
40 Kasterbaum in McHugh, ibid, 247. 
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• Accommodation and service/facilities – The village provides residential 
accommodation, together with services or shared facilities, or both. 
• For retirement – The village is mainly for people in their retirement 
(including their spouses or partners). 
• Capital sum – The residents pay a capital sum in return for their right to 
live there. As well as a lump sum, a “capital sum” can also mean 
periodical payments, if they are substantially more than would be paid to 
cover rent and such services or facilities.41 
    
The literature on why people move, and what categories of people move from 
their own homes to retirement villages will now be reviewed. New Zealand adds 
another chapter to what is already known about these questions.  
 
To many older New Zealanders including prospective retirement village dwellers, 
the prospect of worrying about appropriate housing in their later years is not 
something they might see themselves overly concerned about. The combination of 
economic trends, almost universal home ownership and generational savings 
patterns that they were part of, should mean they will not have to rely on 
government assistance with housing. The fact that many have a considerable 
capital investment in owning their homes (which also equates to a form of security 
in New Zealand society) allows them more options about where they will reside 
should their circumstances change. To many in this category, elderly housing 
problems are problems faced by the elderly poor rather than the middle class. The 
rapid growth of the retirement village sector in New Zealand with two hundred 
built since the 1980’s42 suggests this form of retirement living might be as 
attractive to private business entrepreneurs as it is to prospective residents. This 
would seem to be borne out by the New Zealand studies undertaken in retirement 
village settings over the past five years and more than a perception that; 
 
In New Zealand, age-segregated communities which were once the domain of 
the not-for-profit sector are now a serious business venture for entrepreneurs 
trying to capture a niche market and make a profit from the turnover of the aged 
43. 
 
                                                 
41 Guide to the Act, Retirement Commission, May 2007  <www.retirement.org.nz>. 
42 Mansvelt, J Geographies of Consumption (2005) 87. 
43 Blaikie, 1999 in Grant, B “A New Sense of Self and a New Lease of Life: Leisure in a 
Retirement Village” [2004] Annals of Leisure Research 7, 3-4.  
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Leonard’s 2002 study investigated retirement villages as a housing choice for 
older New Zealanders. Her key findings surrounded incentives identified by her 
research participants as reasons for their move from their homes to a retirement 
village. These were; failing health and feelings of insecurity prompted by 
government welfare reforms and privatisation of the health system. The concept 
of ageing in place and promotion of a life care package in the marketing of 
retirement villages was influential in her subjects’ decisions to make the move to 
retirement villages.44 Their choice range and self-perception of where they fit into 
the New Zealand social order are well illustrated in the backgrounds and 
comments of a selection of participants in the Leonard study;  
Lillian – It’s my decision.  
Lillian moved into the village when she became less mobile and was unable to 
take care of her property to the extent she had previously. She had made good 
capital gain on her house when selling due to the timing of when she had bought 
and sold. Lillian had no desire to live in a rest home and saw independent units 
as being a way to having her independence with someone available if necessary. 
She was prepared to make the decision to purchase a unit even though she knew 
little about the legal set up…45.   
Joan: I feel sorry for anyone who has just paid rent all their lives…You need 
more than just the price of your house, especially if it’s an older house. I had to 
pay considerably more than I got for the flat but I never lived in a brand new 
house before…46 
Joe and Hilda married for more than 60 yrs, 5 yrs in retirement village: We’ve 
got our independence but we’re not independent… 
They both suffer from some form of ill health and have found they can remain 
together longer by using the care facilities, both state supported, such as home 
help and those for which they pay especially the cooked mid-day meals. Their 
home has a very private outlook onto a well maintained garden and lawn and has 
a spatial feel much like that of a suburban garden.47 
Marie – I didn’t rush into it 
Nancy – I’ve never asked my family for anything  
Patti – I’ve got my own little corner and I love it 
Rita – People are leaving it too long.48  
 
The comments of these retirement village residents capture an overall sense of 
appreciation for the independence (albeit supported independence in some cases) 
that financial security affords as well as a sense of pride in being able to take 
personal responsibility for their later life living arrangements. The fact that these 
participants are mainly older women is consistent with New Zealand data: women 
outlive their male counterparts by approximately six years on average and the 
                                                 
44 Leonard, L I Retirement Villages: Promises of a Lifestyle, Thesis (2002) 83. 
45 Ibid, 10. 
46 Ibid, 79. 
47 Ibid, 9. 
48 Ibid, 10. 
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gender composition of New Zealand retirement villages has indicted “almost three 
quarters of residents are women”.49   
 
A further New Zealand study by Bowen of forty residents from six villages in four 
geographical locations drew similar conclusions. Bowen’s data collection 
included 40 self-administered questionnaires of which two-thirds were women 
and just over one third were men. Their ages ranged from 60 to over 85. Just 
under half had never married or were widowed and the remainder stated they were 
married. One man stated he was European and his wife Maori. There were no 
Pacific Island respondents and the author stated she did not observe or hear of any 
Pacific Island people living the villages she studied.50 She was aware however of 
one Indian and two Chinese women in a village she visited though these women 
had not become part of her study. 
 
According to Bowen, older people with health and security concerns are more 
likely to want to move house and consider retirement villages a positive and 
appealing choice. Her findings reveal the appeal is based around support services, 
facilities and amenities provided, maintenance-free accommodation, meeting and 
socialising with like-minded others. However her subjects seemed aware that 
retirement village living is restricted by socio-economic status and physical ability 
to live independently with minimal support.51  
 
In terms of problems with village living 82.5% of her subjects claimed not to have 
experienced any problems and those who had, reported theft by staff, management 
increasing charges and poor emergency responses by staff as problems. None 
mentioned whether the problems had been dealt with through a village complaints 
mechanism. The possibility that residents do not want to be considered ‘moaners 
and complainers’ and therefore avoid conflict, has been posed in earlier 
research.52 
 
                                                 
49 Retirement Commission, Retirement Villages Survey, ACNielsen, December 2006. 
50 Bowen, E Retirement Villages: A Lifestyle Choice for Older New Zealanders, Thesis 2003, 94. 
51 Ibid, ii. 
52 Age Concern, 2000 in Bowen, ibid, 113; Streib G F and Metsch, L R “Conflict in Retirement 
Communities: Applying an Analytical Framework” [2002] Research on Aging, 24,1, 67-86 ; 
Streib G F, Folts, W E  and La  Greca, A J, “Autonomy, Power and Decisions Making in Thirty–
six Retirement Communities” [1985] The Gerontologist, 25,4. 
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A study by Graham and Tuffin looked at the discourses of companionship, 
privacy and security in retirement villages.53 The composition of the participants 
in the study appears consistent with the makeup of the previous studies;  
The participants included eight residents who lived alone (six women and two 
men) and two couples. Participants were Pakeha (non-Maori), middle class and 
ranged in age from 70 to 88 years. 
 
The New Zealand retirement village context does not seem to fit the cultural 
values (or perhaps the socio-economic realities) of our indigenous and Pacific 
population. Only one of the New Zealand studies reviewed54 identified Maori or 
Pacific people in the cultural or ethnic composition of their participant villages. 
Consistent with this situation, the international literature indicates that retirement 
living in village or community-like settings, draws from a mainly homogenous 
cohort with respect to age, class, race and ethnic background; the majority of 
residents being from more affluent social classes representing usually the white 
majority.55 A study just released in New Zealand showed 99% of the 173 
residents from 52 participating villages described themselves as European, 
confirming ethnic and cultural composition in previous New Zealand studies.56 
 
Nowhere in the reviewed New Zealand studies or any available local publications 
has the sexual identity of residents been touched on, yet gay and lesbian 
retirement housing options are an emerging issue for retirement housing in the US 
and some European countries.57  Perhaps in New Zealand, this is a retirement 
housing reality that’s time has not yet come. 
 
1.3.1 What are the financial costs of moving into a 
retirement village? 
 
                                                 
53 Graham, V and Tuffin, K [2004] Retirement Villages: Companionship, Privacy and Security 
[2004]. 
54 Bowen, supra n 50. 
55 Atchley & Barusch, Social Forces and Aging: An Introducyion to Social Gerontology (2004); 
Bridge & Kendrig in Minichiello & Coulson Housing and Older People: Environments 
Professionals and Positive Aging (2004); Gilleard, C and Higgs, P Contexts of Ageing: Class, 
Cohort and Community (2005); McHugh, K E and Larson-Keagy , E M These White Walls: The 
Dialectic of Retirement Communities [2005].  
56 Retirement Commission, supra, n 49. 
57 See for example Journal of Homosexuality, Vol 49(2), 2005 and Lucco, A.J, “Planned 
Retirement Housing Preferences of Older Homosexuals”, Journal of Homosexuality [1987].  
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The research of Greenbrook58 was undertaken in the Auckland, Waikato and Bay 
of Plenty regions during 2005. In relation to the cost of moving into many New 
Zealand retirement villages, the following observation about a high priced Orakei 
village still under construction (unit prices ranged from $350,000 up to the 
penthouse from 1 million to 1.4 million) was made; 
Even with property prices rising as they are, very few older people would be 
able to afford a retirement village unit worth up to one million. Perhaps it is 
because of the cost of retirement village living that most of the residents 
interviewed for this research were fairly well educated and people who appeared 
to have a relatively large amount of discretionary income.59 
 
Possibly we can conclude from this that the participants in the Greenwood study 
occupied a more privileged position in New Zealand society than participants in 
the other studies undertaken during the past four years.  
 
The most recent study shows the two most common price ranges in the 52 villages 
surveyed as: $270,000-$300,000 and $120,001-$150,000. The most expensive 
purchase price in the survey was $600.000 and the least expensive $47,500.60 
Prices have increased in the last three years; residents who have been in their 
homes for three years or less tended to pay more for their homes.61 These figures 
indicate that many villages are built with an eye to accommodating those older 
people who sell their average priced homes to buy into a retirement village often 
at a lower price, leaving some savings to live on; albeit small in some cases. The 
income data in this study show 24% rely solely on NZ Superannuation; 37% rely 
mostly on NZ Superannuation; 33% have other money and 6% have NZ 
Superannuation and other money equally.62 The study gives the average age of 
entry to retirement villages as around 78 years63 with 70% being women, of 
whom 84% live alone.64 The resident population is 99% European.65 The survey 
covered retirement villages from Whangarei to Invercargill66 with prices 
reflecting market values in those locations. The not-for-profit category included 
                                                 
58 Greenbrook, S Village People: The changing role or retirement village in New Zealand’s ageing 
society, Thesis, 2005.  
59 Ibid, 99-100. 
60 Retirement Commission,  supra n 49. 
61 Ibid, 62. 
62 Ibid, 35. 
63 Ibid, 3. 
64 Ibid, 3. 
65 Ibid, 33. 
66 Ibid, 19. 
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33% of the villages67; 89% of the villages are licence to occupy.68 These statistics 
indicate a significant rise in the age of entry to villages and a greater population of 
older women living alone, possibly more accommodated in the not-for-profit 
sector.  
 
Fees in the surveyed villages ranged from $60 to $1,250 per month;  
over half of the villages (57%) do not return any capital gain to residents on or 
after departure. A few (8%) return all capital gain to residents, and 25% return 
some but not all. On top of this, there is a range of other charges or deductions 
(most commonly fixed percentage of the initial purchase price that depends on 
the length of occupancy (54%), over a third (38%) charge refurbishment costs, 
and a quarter (26%) charge ongoing fees until the re-sale of the unit).69  
 
 
1.3.2 The growth of retirement villages in New Zealand 
 
Although the concept of retirement villages has been on the New Zealand 
landscape for some thirty years, the past decade has seen considerable growth and 
interest in this retirement housing choice. Reasons for this interest include 
business opportunities that have become increasingly evident as our population 
ages requiring different forms of housing during later years. Of significance, the 
increase in interest in retirement village living is said to be coming from those in 
the 80+ age group.70  The Retirement Villages Association of New Zealand report 
a growth rate of 6% annually in village occupancy and estimates around 65,000 to 
70,000 people will be living in villages by 2020.71  
 
A cynical approach to increased interest from an older age group could lead to a 
conclusion that it makes good business sense to ‘sell’ to someone around 80 years 
to ensure quicker delivery on capital gain that can only be obtained by developers 
and owners when units are vacated.72 Villages that previously sold to those over 
65 years have raised their entry level to 75 years and older.73 A more positive and 
                                                 
67 Ibid, 21. 
68 Ibid, 22. 
69 Ibid, 3. 
70 Greenwood, J & Marks, S “Retirement Villages”, New Zealand Law Society Seminar (2004) 
Feb-Mar, 1.  
71 RVANZ cited in Greenwood & Marks , 2004, 2. 
72 The National Business Review 25th May 2007 reports “Retirement village operator Ryman 
Healthcare this week posted a new record net profit of $41.6 million, up 18% on last year. The 
result was achieved on higher turnover rather than property revaluations…” This suggests older 
residents occupy their village units for shorter time spans: units can be on sold sooner.   
73 This Information was provided by residents’ groups in NSW and Queensland and has been 
supported by members of Grey Power. In addition, the Retirement Commission Survey published 
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humanistic interpretation might favour the view that personal security and options 
for increased assistance through the provision of different levels of care in many 
villages, attracts those in the 80+ age group. The lure of sophisticated advertising 
and a consumer driven suggestion of an ageless life-style, can only go so far in 
getting people to actually buy in and then move in to a retirement village. Older 
people are apparently voting with their cheque books and making the move in 
increasing numbers to homes they see as offering above average surroundings, 
friendship, activities, support when required and perhaps most importantly, 
security from the ills and threats of the world outside the village gates. 
 
 
1.4 Free market vulnerability and statutory protection 
 
Prior to the enactment of the Retirement Villages Act 2003 high levels of caution 
were expressed about the vulnerability of older citizens and the free market 
approach to Retirement accommodation. When the Act was still a Bill (2001) and 
passing through Parliament Aitken expressed the following views in support of 
the Bill; 
The assumption is made that, at least for housing which is one of the most 
important needs for the elderly, ordinary free market and freedom of contract 
principles must not predominate alone. The ability to get out of a contract, 
perhaps merely because of emotional hesitations, recognises the potential for 
exploitation of the elderly, whether by business, family or professional advisers. 
A bit like minors’ contracts, these contracts by the elderly are treated out of the 
ordinary.74         
 
The Retirement Villages Act 2003 was enacted as a result of a growing concern 
and lack of legal protection for older people buying into retirement village 
schemes. New Zealand parliamentary debates during the second reading of the 
Retirement Villages Bill (July 2003) demonstrate the high level of emotion 
members of parliament felt at the time. Case upon case of “loss of meagre 
savings”, deliberate deception by a “minority [of] predators who would rip them 
off” and huge financial penalties when people wanted to leave after a short time 
were reported.75 Added to this, the earlier work of the Law Commission76 warned 
of the lack of protection of retirement village residents against a variety of 
                                                                                                                                     
in December 2006 found the average age on entry into retirement villages in New Zealand is now 
78 years (Retirement Commission, Retirement Villages Survey 2006, p3). 
74 Aitken, B “The Elderly, the Law and Accommodation Arrangements: Some Reflections from 
New Zealand” [2003] Elder Law Review, First Reading Retirement Villages Bill 21 July 2003, 
NZPD 7019-7034; 
74 Law Commission Report 57,10.  
75 First Reading Retirement Villages Bill 21 July 2003, NZPD 7031:11. 
76 Law Commission Report 57, 1999,  Retirement Villages. 
 24
contractual risks, including prudential risk caused by developers undercapitalising 
at construction stage; risk of entering into contracts containing unfair terms; and 
risk associated with what may appear as fair contract terms being compromised by 
operators skimping on contractual obligations.  
 
The Law Commission report acknowledged the reality “that risk is inseparable 
from human affairs” In noting the age of participants in a New Zealand retirement 
village survey (68-88 yrs) the Commission’s statement makes a compelling point; 
The complexity of such contracts is probably unmatched by that of any other 
contract that a consumer may be called upon to adhere to. A consumer will in his 
or her lifetime rarely enter into more than one contract, so there is no real 
possibility of learning from experience. The degree of  prudential risk and the 
fairness of such provisions as those providing for rear-end loading and other exit 
costs is difficult for an unqualified person to assess, and indeed requires 
specialist knowledge confined to relatively few lawyers, accountants and 
financial advisers...77  
 
The new Act has come about largely because of concerns about the vulnerability 
of older people and the risks they face when entering complex legal transactions 
with operators and developers of retirement villages. In addition, the lack of an 
existing independent dispute resolution process for residents has resulted in a 
significant part of the new Act addressing these concerns.78  
 
The Retirement Commission and the Retirement Villages Association (RVANZ) 
both have watchdog roles in the sector; the Commission’s focus is residents’ 
rights and providing information about the Act while monitoring its processes and 
RVANZ keeps watch on in its members and their legal and regulatory obligations. 
Age Concern and Grey Power represent the concerns of residents. These three 
roles are explained.   
 
1.4.1 The Retirement Commission  
 
The website of the Retirement Commission states the Commission “is an 
autonomous crown entity that helps New Zealanders prepare financially for their 
retirement”.79 In terms of financial planning the Commission has a range of 
responsibilities directed at education surrounding planning for retirement, 
collecting research on retirement planning behaviour and assisting the 
development of national policies impacting on retirement. The Commissioner has 
                                                 
77 Law Commission Report 57,7. 
78 The Retirement Villages Act 2003, Part 4 Dispute Resolution, enforcement and penalties.  
79  < www.retirement.org.nz> is the website for the Retirement Commission.  
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specific functions under the Retirement Villages Act 2003. These surround 
education and information, a monitoring role concerning the effects of the Act, 
regulations and code of practice under the Act. The Commissioner plays a 
significant role in the setting up of Disputes Panels and appointing appropriately 
trained and experienced panellists. This role will be discussed in chapter 3. The 
independent status of the Commissioner is considered to be a critical factor in the 
approval of panel members for the statutory disputes panel.  
 
The Retirement Commission website provides comprehensive information about 
the Act and residents’ rights.80 It is written from a lay perspective and covers 
every aspect of resident rights and what to do in situations of concern to residents. 
It also gives contact details for organisations with an interest in the well-being of 
older New Zealanders; Age Concern being one of these. The Retirement Villages 
Act and its relationship to complaints and disputes is well covered with 
information and dates provided to inform readers when the regulations and code 
of practice come into force during 2007. The Commission also plans to produce 
brochures for residents of Retirement Villages covering the same information 
available of the website. This is seen as an urgent requirement as many residents 
and potential residents do not have computers or use internet facilities.    
 
A letter from the Retirement Commissioner to the Minister for Building Issues 
dated 18th May 2006, reports on complaints regarding retirement villages. 
Couching the problems that have been brought to the attention of her office by 
residents in a considered manner, the Commissioner acknowledges she mainly 
sees only the problems and understands many residents are “very satisfied with 
their life in villages”. She goes on to say “nevertheless, the list makes sorry 
reading”.81  
 
1.4.2 Retirement Villages Association of New Zealand 
(RVANZ) 
 
The retirement village industry in New Zealand (and Australia) evolved out of the 
aged care sector. The Retirement Villages Association of New Zealand was set up 
in 1989 as a professional body to self-regulate the industry and manage what it 
                                                 
80 <www.retirement.org.nz> 
81 Diana Crossan, Retirement Commissioner, 18th May 2006. A copy of this letter was supplied by 
the Retirement Commission.  
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saw as emerging issues within the new industry. Its intention has always been to 
set professional standards and maintain a credible and professional front for the 
industry. Like its Australian equivalents, the Association has set up a website 
where it explains its functions and provides information for operators and 
residents or potential residents. It advises would-be residents on a number of 
matters including why they should choose an RVA member village. The reasons 
given are that RVA members provide quality services within their villages; they 
have to comply with the compulsory RVA accreditation programme which they 
believe demonstrates “that accredited villages are responsible and committed to 
meeting resident’s needs”. The Association describes itself as a “national body 
that works to represent, protect and promote the interests of its members and their 
associated services”. 
The principle aim of RVA is to represent villages with a shared vision for 
providing quality services. In order to achieve this aim, the association has for 
some time had a member’s Code of Practice requiring RVA members to operate 
their villages in a professional manner and with the highest level of commercial 
integrity. The Code of Practice is externally audited by PricewaterhouseCoopers 
and provides assurances to members that village management is meeting 
minimum operating standards.82 
 
The RVANZ’s commitment to the highest professional standards is as it should be 
in a situation where older people and large amounts of money are concerned. The 
operator professional Associations in New Zealand and Australia however, 
represent the industry not the residents. As stated in the introduction, this research 
is focussed on the conflict and dispute context between residents and operators.  
 
1.4.3 Grey Power and Age Concern 
 
Grey Power and Age Concern are both independent not-for-profit national 
organisations focussed on the well-being of all older New Zealanders. The web 
site of Grey Power describes the organisation as a “lobby organisation promoting 
the welfare and well-being of all those citizens in the 50 plus age group”.83 Age 
Concern on its website states  
Age Concern is an independent, charitable, not-for-profit organisation with the 
mission of working for the rights and well-being of older people, koroua and 
kuia. Age Concern New Zealand is a federation of local Age Care Councils, 
                                                 
82 This information was obtained from the website of RVANZ <www.retirementvillages.org.nz>  
22nd  November 2006. 
83 Grey Power’s website < www.greypower.co.nz> was accessed on the 1st October 2006.  
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which each provide information and services in cities and most major provincial 
towns around the country.84    
Both groups have contributed to this study and both have been involved in 
consultation with government agencies prior to and during the drafting of the new 
Act. In some instances these organisations have acted as advocates for residents 
and have alarming stories to tell about the experiences of residents at the hands of 
unprofessional and intimidating operators. They also acknowledge the work done 
by the Retirement Villages Association of New Zealand for its efforts in 
establishing sector provided dispute resolution processes in the absence of 
statutory provisions.85  
 
However, the advent of an independent disputes process via Part 4 of the Act is 
welcomed by the two groups. They believe the Act has been too slow to be 
implemented but welcome the package which includes; a universal code of 
practice and regulations (General Fees and Disputes Panel Regulations); a code of 
residents’ rights; a consistent and specified role for statutory supervisors and 
compulsory registration for all retirement villages in New Zealand.  Concerns 
remain that the Act will not be fully operational until late 2007 because of the 
time allowed for village operators to meet compliance requirements in preparing 
for the statutory Code of Practice and the General and Fees Regulations.   
 
 
1.5 Summary 
 
In this chapter I have established the context and actors in the retirement village 
sector in New Zealand. I have considered ageing demographics and identified the 
huge swell of age cohorts known as ‘the baby boomers’ who will, over the next 
decade begin to join the ranks of ‘superannuates’; those over 65 eligible for 
universal superannuation payments. I have highlighted the “darker side” of 
retirement village living in the USA and demonstrated that retirement village 
living in New Zealand is attractive and accessible to financially independent 
pakeha New Zealanders; that many single women live in retirement villages; and 
why people choose this life-style.  
 
                                                 
84 <www.agedconcern.org.nz> accessed 1st October 2006. Koroua is the Maori term for a male 
elder and Kuia is a female elder; both are imbued with cultural recognition and respect for 
knowledge and age. 
85Information was obtained from personal communications with office holders in both 
organisations during October and November 2006. 
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I have ascertained the growth rate of retirement villages in New Zealand and the 
average age of residents; an older group than advertising would suggest and 
explained how the risks involved in the free market led to statutory protection in 
the form of the Retirement Villages Act 2003. I have explained the education and 
monitoring role of the Retirement Commissioner; the role of the Retirement 
Villages Association of New Zealand (RVANZ) as the principal sector group 
adviser; and also Age Concern’s and Grey Power’s role as advocacy groups for 
older New Zealanders.  
 
The following chapter will focus on issues in, and surrounding retirement village 
residents and how these can impact negatively on their well-being.  
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Chapter 2 Retirement village issues: power, 
attitudes and resident needs. 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter considers retirement villages as a housing option. Here I will explore 
the needs of people who choose retirement villages as an accommodation and 
lifestyle choice for their later years. The safeguards that have been put in place by 
governments and sector groups to protect the interests of older citizens through 
legislation and good business practice will be included.  
 
I will review international studies to provide insights into problems in retirement 
communities in the U.S.A, Australia and New Zealand. These studies relate to 
management and resident issues and identify causes of conflict, including the role 
of power and control in village dynamics. Two approaches to retirement village 
management are included to demonstrate differences in approach to the ‘business’ 
side of retirement village living. Also included is the voice of a state residents’ 
association.  
 
Examples of disputes that have reached the Queensland Commercial and 
Consumer Tribunal are presented to illuminate the issues involved in retirement 
village disputes. These include abuse of power and intimidation of residents by 
operators.86 I include a study covering most of the retirement village court cases 
and approximately half the tribunal determinations in Australia which provides 
valuable information about where the major problems lie; this concerns both 
operators and residents in some instances. I have included features of the New 
Zealand Act and the first New Zealand disputes hearing. Finally I will provide a 
summary of the issues contained in this chapter that identifies the needs of 
retirement village residents. 
 
 
                                                 
86 Power and control issues are present in many of the disputes that can be found on the websites 
of tribunals dealing with retirement village disputes in NSW and Queensland. The cases cited are 
some of the most recent on the website of the Queensland Commercial and Consumer Tribunal. 
NSW disputes involve the same or similar issues.  
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2.2 Retirement villages: an alternative housing option and 
peace ever lasting? 
 
Many older New Zealanders who remain in their own homes are fascinated by the 
issues coming to light within the fast growing retirement village industry; 
especially those involving residents’ rights, costs and fees, and the hotly contested 
area of refurbishment costs. These are common discussion topics at family events 
and within neighbourhoods.87 These older New Zealanders would not consider 
swapping their “Huntly brick” homes; their 1930’s bungalows; or their renovated 
beach houses for a villa in a retirement village. However, increasing numbers of 
older New Zealanders are choosing this housing option for reasons identified in 
chapter one. Currently, approximately 5% of people over the age of 65 years are 
choosing to live in retirement villages in New Zealand; this is around 23,500 
people.88 It seems the majority are not attracted to the idea of placing their 
financial capital into a retirement village knowing they would in the majority of 
cases be relinquishing capital gain upon leaving.89 They may be less attracted 
following a recent New Zealand Consumer magazine article including headings 
“Charging like a wounded bull”, “Refurbishment rorts” and “Caught both 
ways”.90  
                                                 
87 The beach and nearby farming community where I live has seen the move and return of local 
people ‘trying’ retirement village living only to find it is not what they expected. These people 
have been fortunate to have the financial resources to relocate.  Others have reportedly regretted 
their move but had to remain in their chosen village because of the financial loss they would suffer 
upon leaving. The Retirement Villages Act 2003 s28(1) allows for a cooling off period of 15 
working days after the signing of  the occupation right agreement so a purchaser can have a change 
of heart without penalty. Once occupied however, a change of heart could be very costly or simply 
cost prohibitive. 
88 Grant, B “Retirement Villages: An Alternative Form of Housing on an Ageing Landscape” 
[2006] N.Z. Social Policy Journal, 7, 3-4.  
89 The loss of capital gain would depend on the type of entry contract between the resident and 
operator. The Retirement Commission Survey, 2006 showed 45% of residents in the survey did 
not expect to get any capital gain on leaving or death; 10% expect to get around 50%; 12% expect 
to get all their capital gain and 31% did not know. For operators the pattern was similar although a 
surprising 13% did not know what capital gain they would be able to return to residents/estates. 
(p67-68) The summarised data for both residents and operators suggests that under new contracts, 
residents may be less likely to get any capital gain returned to them. (p69) “In addition to the 
initial purchase price and ongoing fees most Villages charge capital deductions and other costs 
when Residents leave. The most common is a fixed percentage of the initial purchase price that 
depends on the length of occupancy (54%). Over a third (38%) charge refurbishment costs, and a 
quarter (26%) charge ongoing fees until the re-sale of the unit. One in ten (11%) deduct a fixed 
percentage of the re-sale price. Of this group, half pass on 100% of the capital gain to Residents, 
but the rest either keep all the capital gain, or pass on 50%. For those who do not pass on any 
capital gain, this means the more the property is worth on re-sale, the less the Resident gets back. 
Only 8% are not charged any further deductions (these villages either charge very high fees and/or 
keep all the capital gain” (p69).  
90 Consumer, March [2007] 467, 36-39.  
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Home ownership in New Zealand means different things to different people, but 
generally it means a chosen place to live which provides a personal haven, a sense 
of belonging and identity and a face to the community.91 The majority of older 
New Zealanders (65+) want to live in their own home and the government’s 
‘ageing in place’ strategy supports this preference.  
The value of older people to their communities cannot be underestimated. Many 
older people are involved in unpaid activities, either inside or outside of the 
home, and older people comprise a significant proportion of the volunteer 
workforce. Around 15% of all unpaid work is done by older people…This 
proportion was highest (21%) among 65-74 year olds.92  
 
However older people alone in their own homes can be affected by isolation and 
loneliness as mobility lessens and friends and neighbours die or move away.  A 
decision to move from home ownership to a retirement village is, as has been 
ascertained, not a step taken lightly by many residents interviewed in the studies 
examined.93 Their moves are based on sound reasoning including confronting the 
realities of aging and inevitable decrease in ability to manage a larger property. 
The biggest area of growth in the next two decades is for those over 85 yrs.94 In 
Queensland the cohort that requires the highest levels of care (those 85+) is 
expected to increase eight-fold over the next forty five years.95 This huge increase 
in the number of ‘old’ older citizens in both New Zealand and Australia 
incorporates the huge bulge that will come through as younger baby-boomers age. 
 
For those who have chosen retirement village living, the evidence suggests the 
large majority are very satisfied with their choice and are often pleasantly 
surprised at the caring and friendship they have become part of in their village 
communities.96 In addition, residents are free to engage with friends, family and 
their communities outside the village and many continue to do this, remaining 
                                                 
91 Office of Senior Citizens, “Taking a Positive Approach to Ageing” 2005, 22. 
92 Ibid, 24. 
93 Leonard, L “Retirement Villages: Promises of a Lifestyle”, Thesis, 2002; Bowen, B “Retirement 
Villages: A Lifestyle Choice for Older New Zealanders”, Thesis,  2003; Grant, B “A New Sense of 
Self and a New Lease of Life: Leisure in a Retirement Village” [2004] Annals of Leisure 
Research, 7; Grant, B “Retirement Villages: An Alternative Form of Housing on an Ageing 
Landscape” [2006] N.Z. Social Policy Journal; Graham, V and Tuffin, K “Retirement Villages: 
Companionship, Privacy and Security”[2004] Australasian Journal of Ageing; Greenbrook, S 
“Village People: The changing role of retirement villages in New Zealand’s ageing society”, 
Thesis, 2005; Retirement Commission, ACNielson, Retirement Village Survey, 2006. 
94 Office of Senior Citizens, supra n 91. 
95 Aged Care Queensland,  “Action Points for an Ageing Population” (2006)  Policy Paper. 
96 Stimson, R McRea, R and Star, L “What Retirees Look for in a Retirement Village” in Stimson 
R (ed) The Retirement Village Industry in Australia: evolution, prospects, challenges 2002, 80; 
Retirement Commission, Retirement Villages Survey, ACNielsen, 2006. 
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active on committees and within church and sporting organisations: some 
continue to undertake paid work.97 In other words, they treat their retirement 
village residence just as they did their own home but having removed the 
responsibility of home and ground maintenance, they are free to use their time as 
they wish.  
 
Other than inability to care for themselves or death, unhappiness and 
dissatisfaction are assumed (in the absence of any relevant studies) to be the 
reason residents move out of retirement villages. Anecdotal reports suggest this 
has occurred from time to time in New Zealand. In any event, such a decision 
would incur serious financial disadvantage to the resident.98 Under the new Act 
this remains the case but the decision to sign a contract and move in will be based 
on informed consent and legal oversight. The Minister for Building Issues 
explains the new code of practice all retirement village operators will have to 
comply with as “protecting the best interests of older New Zealanders entering 
complex contractual arrangements”.99  
 
As a means of informing and educating prospective residents, the Retirement 
Commission has established a well advertised website sorted.co.nz. Under the 
heading retirement examples are provided of typical retirement village financial 
structures including calculations and Kiwi stories. Under these structures it is 
considered “residents have really made a decision for life”.100 If the decision is for 
‘life’ however long that might be, then residents and potential residents need to 
know if problems arise there will be easily accessible mechanisms available to 
deal with them.  
 
The Retirement Villages Association (RVANZ) the peak sector group has taken 
this responsibility seriously and has incorporated on its website, its processes for 
dispute resolution under the new Act. However, approximately 45% of retirement 
villages in New Zealand do not belong to RVANZ and even those that do may not 
                                                 
97 Personal communication Vision Senior Living Co. Auckland 2nd November 2006 
98 The Retirement Commission survey 2006 suggests a 30% deduction from the initial price paid 
regardless of length of occupancy; 30% was the most commonly mentioned deduction in the 
survey. (p70)  
99 Clayton Cosgrove, press release NZ Government 27th September 2006. www.beehive.govt.nz  
accessed 15th November, 2006. 
100 Retirement Village Adviser, Retirement Commission, personal communication, 1st November 
2006. 
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necessarily comply with RVANZ guidelines.101 This is another compelling reason 
for the Act. 
  
 
2.3 What do we know about problems in retirement villages 
and attitudes of those in positions of power within the 
villages? 
 
A review of the limited empirical literature has drawn a variety of situations that 
give rise to conflict in retirement villages. In Australia, these can be broadly 
categorised under two headings. The first and most dominant theme concerns the 
nature of contracts between residents and operators/owners involving issues 
surrounding money; residents’ disinclination to pay extra charges or increases in 
charges when accounting procedures are not transparent and proper processes 
have not been followed. These contractual disputes account for approximately 80-
90% of disputes between residents and operators.102 The second area causing 
problems in Australia is the nature of agreements amongst parties establishing 
retirement villages 10-20%. These parties are owners, operators, financiers and 
builders.103  
 
While no official figures are available in New Zealand it seems from the literature 
examined and personal communications from stake-holder groups, financial 
matters dominate in disputes between residents and operators. Grey Power and 
Age Concern endeavour to be informed about trends and changes in the areas and 
both organisations were involved in consultation with appropriate government 
agencies at the time of drafting the Act and regulations. Their websites also 
provide useful information about retirement village issues. However, due to the 
relatively small percentage of those over 65 (5%)104  living in Retirement 
Villages, it is unlikely these organisations will develop a specialised advocacy 
focus.  
                                                 
101 Chapter 6 includes a summary of the process undergone by the resident who issued the first 
disputes notice under the Retirement Villages Act 2003. The first disputes hearing under the Act 
took place in Paraparaumu on the 26th February 2007. 
102 Keogh, J  & Bradley, P “The Potential for contractual disputes in retirement village living: an 
examination of recent litigation arising from resident contract disputes in NSW retirement 
villages” paper presented at Pacific Rim Real Estate Society 8th Annual Conference, Jan 2002. 
103 Ibid, 7. 
104 Turner, P cited in Grant, B “Retirement villages: An alternative form of housing on an ageing, 
landscape”,  Social Policy Journal of New Zealand (2006), 27, 100-113. 
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The Retirement Commission does not have an advocacy role and none was 
intended when the office was first established in 1995 although a “retirement 
village adviser” is a position that has been held in the office. It is to this adviser 
that most resident issues have been directed, either by residents or their family 
members. The Retirement Commissioner, in a letter to the Minister of Building 
Issues in May 2006 included a summary of issues raised about retirement villages 
received for the six months to May 2006. As a background, the Commission 
explains it does not receive complaints from operators about residents; residents 
involved are often in their eighties; many are about licence to occupy villages and 
others unit title villages; complaints involve Retirement Village Association 
members, including its governing Executive’s villages as well as non-member 
villages.105 Complaints on the list fall under the following headings; 
• Buying off plans 
• Not knowing what they were buying into 
• Financial 
• Information and involvement 
• Development of village 
• Village rules 
• Health and safety 
• Repairs and maintenance 
• Leaving the village 
• Statutory supervisors 
• Complaints process  
 
A category headed “Complaints process” lists the following issues and goes some 
way in cementing the new Act’s comprehensive disputes resolution section.  
• The village not having a complaints process at all, or residents not being 
made aware of it. 
• Villages not following their own or required industry complaints 
processes. 
• The Retirement Villages Association placing limits on the type of 
complaint/dispute or the amount of money member villages Disputes 
Committees and its Review Authority can address, despite its role in 
                                                 
105 “Summary of complaints about retirement villages received by the Retirement Commission for 
the six months to May 2006”. Copy supplied by the Retirement Commission.  
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determining complaints and disputes under current Securities Act 
regime. 
• Complainants not receiving a prompt acknowledgement, clear details 
about how their complaint will be dealt with and resolved, and copies of 
relevant documentation (including RVANZ processes). 
• Complainants being given the ‘run around’ and experiencing long delays 
in having their complaint dealt with. 
• Heavy involvement of lawyers by some villages. 
• Residents being abused by management when they make complaints or 
feeling they are being adversely treated because they’ve made a 
complaint. 
• When residents make a complaint, receiving complaints about them by 
management in return. 
 
This summary makes up a small part of the “sorry reading” noted in the 
Retirement Commissioner’s letter. 
 
Having established that money, power imbalance, attitudes and inadequate 
complaints facilities are catalysts for resident discontent and disputes in Australia 
and New Zealand, an examination of empirical studies undertaken to explore what 
is behind conflict in retirement communities follows.  
  
2.3.1 Autonomy in the U.S.A. 
 
An early study conducted in the United States of America looked at autonomy, 
power and decision-making in thirty-six retirement communities. The study’s 
focus was the exercise of decision-making power in the immediate living 
environment. In order to assess autonomy empirically, the researchers divided the 
concept into two dimensions; ‘external’ and ‘internal’. External related to state 
and county regulations, surrounding communities, occasionally the Federal 
government, land zoning and related matters. Internal factors surrounded matters 
within the control of management and residents and referred to the “operations, 
programs, and activities carried on within the community itself”. 106 
 
                                                 
106 Streib, G, Folts, W and La Greca, A “Autonomy, Power and Decision Making in Thirty-six 
Retirement Communities”, The Gerontologist [1985], 25, 4. 
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The findings especially relevant to this study include; 
It is not surprising to find men – almost exclusively and retired corporate 
executives in the “power” positions in many communities. 
This research shows that retirement communities are amalgam social units, 
combining characteristics of a community and a formal organisation. A 
retirement community has a range of needs interests and activities and yet 
because of its organizational structure, operations, and type of residents, it has an 
explicit focus similar to a formal organization. 
Most residents of retirement communities are seeking stability – a continuation 
of the conditions they thought were present when they moved in. Autonomy 
often means maintaining the status quo.  
…For a few persons, power and decision-making represent a continuation of 
earlier roles and the use of the skills and competencies honed and utilized during 
the working years. For these persons politics becomes an engrossing activity. As 
in other  political situations a few people are seen as being more instigators of 
discord than  harmony…yet other active residents with executive skills, 
technical knowledge, and expertise in group dynamics give valuable and selfless 
community service and have an important effect on the decision-making process 
and the quality of life within the community… 
It is our observation that communities whose residents have higher educational 
and economic resources are characterized by higher autonomy.107 
 
A later study by the same author Streib and colleagues was undertaken the US 
during 2001 using case studies as examples of how conflict and change manifest 
themselves in leisure-oriented retirement communities. Their findings include  
…the presence of various democratic and participatory committees provides an 
ongoing means to solve some of the problematic situations that are inevitable in 
organized group life…Since many of the conflicts are trivial and actually touch 
the lives of only a minority of the residents, conflict is often viewed as a waste 
of time. Most residents conclude that staying disengaged is the prudent, 
convenient, favourable, and satisfying stance to take on most issues… 
…Thus, in most situations, the majority of residents will go to great lengths to 
preserve a spirit of harmony, cooperation, and tranquillity in retirement 
environments. Unless their economic interests or style of life are severely 
threatened, they will generally attempt to reduce or avoid situations resulting in 
conflict. [emphasis added].108 
 
The authors’ overall findings confirmed disagreements over economics and power 
had the potential to become controversial and significant in the communities 
studied. Their major conclusion relates to the theoretical ideas of social 
construction. They found that the way in which parties involved in conflict 
“define the focus and importance of the triggering situation is basic to 
understanding what happens”. They argued;  
…that conflict like all other social phenomena is constructed by individuals and 
groups. The disagreements over resources and power may be crucial.109  
 
…some of the active participants in community conflict engage in them as a kind 
of “recreation”… a way of filling in recreational time, keeping them busy active 
                                                 
107 Ibid, 408-409. 
108 Streib G F & Metsch, L R “Conflict in Retirement Communities: Applying an Analytical 
Framework” [2002] Research on Aging, Vol 24, 1, 67-86.   
109 Ibid, 84.  
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and “alive”…some of the recreationalists are also persons who wish to exercise 
power in the community”…They wish to be in charge and “solve” a problem.110   
 
The authors’ view is that if the residents decide an issue is of high importance, 
they will become involved and engaged in seeking resolution. The corollary to 
this may be that some residents prolong conflict out of a need to seek recognition 
through that engagement. Constructivists operate from a position that studies the 
“multiple realities” constructed by people and the implications of those 
constructions for their lives and interactions with others”111 while 
Constructionists commonly assume that humans “do not have direct access to a 
singular, stable and fully knowable external reality. All of our understandings 
are contextually embedded, interpersonally forged, and necessarily limited.112  
[italics added] 
 
Social constructivism suggests that each person’s way of making sense of the 
world is unique and “as valid and worthy of respect as any other, thereby 
scotching any hint of a critical spirit”.113 The difference between the two 
perspectives can be found in the way people in the environment of their micro 
systems, relate and carry out roles in the linking meso-systems. For example 
constructivists might see residents’ rights to ‘participate’ as reason enough to 
become engaged in a village conflict whereas constructionists might see the right 
as being limited to those who are affected by the conflict; if cost increases are 
proposed, then it is likely more residents will become involved in the conflict. 
From an operator’s point of view, “troublemakers” in the resident population 
would be viewed from a constructionist perspective and possibly labelled 
‘agitators’; constructivism on the other hand would place the role of the resident 
in a legitimate ‘activist’ framework. 
     
The framework used by the authors to carry out their study, involved four possible 
situations in which conflict could arise, these being; 
1. resident v resident;  
2. resident v owner or developer;  
3. resident v outsiders (individuals, groups or organized bodies); 
4. residents v owner or developer v outsiders (triangular). 
 
Their framework suggests three broad questions regarding outcomes of conflict 
which include;  
                                                 
110 Ibid, 83. 
111 Patton, M Q Qualitative Research and Evaluation Methods (2002), 96. 
112 Neimeyer, R A 1993 cited in Patton, 2002, 96. 
113 Crotty, M 1998 cited in Patton, 2002, 97. 
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…whether the outcome results in solidarity or hostility; whether people leave or 
threaten to leave, and whether the conflict leads to additional or continuing 
conflict.114 
The authors’ preliminary assessment found that “conflict in retirement 
communities has both positive and negative outcomes” and concluded 
“disagreements over economics and power could become controversial and 
significant”.115 It can be concluded from this that economic and power issues 
possibly provide the greatest likelihood of prolonged conflict and also the greatest 
likelihood of resident participation in a retirement village.  
 
In terms of retirement village fees and costs, we can anticipate from the Streib and 
Metsch study, there will be significantly more likelihood of residents engaging in 
conflict for longer periods, when situations arise that require them to pay more to 
live in a retirement community.  
 
The two studies conducted by Streib and his colleagues revealed interesting data 
suggesting male residents seek power through becoming “engrossed” in village 
politics rather like a recreational activity. In the earlier study Streib placed this 
behaviour in a broader political context acknowledging “as in any other political 
situation a few people are seen as being more instigators of discord than 
harmony”. This acknowledgement gives balance to the dyadic resident-operator 
relationship. A retirement community like any other community represents a 
‘sample’ of society, that is, all dimensions of human nature and political leaning 
will be represented in both the resident and operator/management populations. 
There are several issues however that may cause imbalance within this dyad; the 
first is the relative age difference between operator and resident; second is gender; 
third, the disparate power relations between the two; fourth, residents are 
generally living out the final years of their lives in their villages and have 
committed their financial capital to that choice: operators and managers may come 
and go, but most are in the business to benefit financially. 
 
A recent New Zealand study looked at the concept of ‘participation’ by residents 
in retirement villages and adds another dimension to the ‘power’ and ‘conflict’ 
domain which, according to some, is a contested area; one seeing residents as the 
                                                 
114 Streib & Metsch,  supra n at 108. 
115 Ibid. 
 39
problem116 while the other views operators as the rogues.117   The New Zealand 
study approaches the ‘power’ issue from another angle. 
 
2.3.2 Participation or domination: a New Zealand study 
 
The New Zealand study considered participation and control in retirement villages 
and forms part of a doctoral thesis examining marketisation, participation and 
communication within New Zealand Retirement Villages. The study “aims to 
extend retirement village research by focusing on communication within the 
employee-resident domain”.118  The example used illuminates the covert and overt 
methods utilized by a female staff member who uses (in the author’s view) 
“hidden power” to gain female residents’ co-operation to use the village 
community centre rather than their own homes for socializing and interpersonal 
exchanges.  
 
Utilizing the work of Lukes and the combined use of critical discourse analysis 
(CDA) and rhetorical criticism (RC) to consider how a three-dimensional model 
of power is useful for examining “hidden or unobserved aspects of power”, 
Simpson makes a significant point. This point is consistent with theories 
underpinning the Duluth model for domestic violence. It is “that power cannot be 
resisted until it is recognised”.119 This is the reason many ‘stopping violence’ 
groups include partner groups because it is recognised that a certain conditioning 
of the partner occurs within the relationship or has already occurred (for the 
partner) prior to the relationship’s existence. The ‘victim’ partner either is not 
consciously aware of the power and control being exercised over them, or they 
believe whatever is happening, is justified. They also may fear consequences if 
they resist. 
 
Simpson’s example occurred in a retirement village promoted as a village where 
residents would experience “resort style” living and “participate”. The two hour 
interview with the activities co-ordinator took place in the village community 
                                                 
116 CEO Aged Care Queensland comments above “most disputes are resident v resident”.  
117 The Association of the Residents of Queensland Retirement Villages reports; “To try to bring a 
degree of balance into the equation is the reason [the Association] was formed…on the advice of 
the then Minister of Consumer Affairs…”. Email communication 25th November 2006. 
118 Simpson, M “Participation and control in retirement villages: Implications for customer 
service”, 10th Annual Waikato Management Student Research Conference, University of Waikato, 
20th October 2006.  
119 Lukes  S, 1974, Power: A Radical View cited in Simpson 2006, 12. 
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centre where residents came and went while the interview was being conducted. 
The residents involved the staff member in conversation and the interview was 
stopped at that point and re-continued later. The excerpt chosen by Simpson to 
demonstrate types of power follows. 
…we don’t encourage cups of teas  in each other’s homes, that’s something I 
frown on and they know it, they know I don’t want cliquey little groups, like I 
talk about it all the time and I say ‘ oh I hate to see that happen in our village 
because that’s where trouble starts’.  So what we do is we have endless cups of 
teas here – they come here [community centre] and have a cup of tea. There’s 
always a cake, there’s always a cup of tea, there’s always whatever they want 
because that’s - this is the community, not each other’s home because you start 
that crap and before you know it you’ve got problems and so and so is 
whispering about so and so…. so we don’t have that. If they want cups of tea 
they come here and what I say to people is if you want privacy shut your door 
and no one will bother you, but I will if I don’t see you, that’s the standing rule 
before they come in, but they sit on their front porch and before you know it, or 
they’ll sit on those seats out there and they’re like birds, come, go, come, go, 
people, different ones all the time, or if someone comes in here someone else 
will always come over to see what’s going in…. someone else will come over 
for something and there will be another little flurry and that’s what its like, they 
want to know what’s going on so they all come and [go]….but it’s not their 
home – so it’s not this ‘so and so’s been going in there because’ – ain’t going to 
have that happen in my village. I’ll probably lose control eventually (laughs) but 
at the moment it ain’t going to happen in my shift.  
 
From a conflict management perspective the staff member implies she is avoiding 
“problems”. Whether she would have known she was controlling an activity 
termed ‘gossip’ which other researchers have found is an important social 
interaction in older persons’ residential schemes or that she was attempting to 
prevent meetings at a popular meeting spot (the resident’s porch), is unknown. 120 
What is known is that she was fully aware she was in ‘control’ and it is clear she 
was not considering the rights of residents to ‘participate’ and use their homes as 
they wished. 
 
We can see from the studies examined that conflict and disputes in retirement 
village settings arise out of complex relationship dynamics involving power and 
control and that issues concerning money are more likely to develop into 
prolonged disputes. It is also apparent that many residents avoid conflict because 
they do not want to disturb the stability they were seeking when choosing the 
‘community’ lifestyle; silence is therefore one way of maintaining the status quo. 
Retirement communities can be seen to replicate the same dynamics as any other 
                                                 
120 Percival, J “Self Esteem and Social Motivation in Age-segregated Settings [2001] Housing 
Studies 16, 6 836, 839. This study found ‘gossip’ and spaces such as balconies for informal 
meetings between residents was conducive to enhancing positive social interaction amongst 
residents. 
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community; age,121 gender and permanency having unique impact in the 
retirement community setting: residents generally want to stay for their remaining 
life-time. 
 
Another perspective on conflict in retirement villages is approached from a 
management and sector group business point of view. Two examples will be 
covered; the first from the USA and the second from Queensland. This will lead to 
an examination of actual disputes that have gone before the Queensland 
Commercial and Consumer Tribunal during the past two years and identify the 
types of issues that have been unable to be resolved “in-house” or through 
mediation. 
 
2.3.3 International management and marketing 
perspectives on conflict in retirement villages 
 
A point of view obtained from an American operations management and senior 
living communities guide portrays conflict and complaining by residents as 
positive aspects to opening communication lines, dispelling rumours and building 
resident satisfaction and referrals. Pearce, the author says “encourage your 
residents to complain”, providing the reasons for this philosophy; 
• For every resident who bothers to complain, there are 24 silent unhappy 
residents. Yet if residents do complain and the complaint is resolved 
quickly 90 percent will recommend you to their friends. 
• The average “wronged” resident will tell 8 to 16 people, each of whom 
may tell 5 others. In a tight social circle such as a senior community, 
word can spread fast. 
• On average it can cost as much as five times more to attract a new 
resident as it takes to keep an old one happy.122 
 
                                                 
121 The US studies of Streib et al indicate a younger and more affluent age group entering US 
retirement villages in the 1980’s and 1990’s (Streib & Metsch 2002, 69). Their descriptions of 
male residents exercising power and control in a kind of recreational sense would not necessarily 
equate with the current New Zealand retirement village resident population; that is, 80+ years and 
predominately female, with incomes usually dependent on superannuation and small personal 
savings. 
122 Pearce, B W Senior Living Communities: A Complete Guide, (Maryland: The John Hopkins 
University Press, 1998). 
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Pearce’s insight into the older generation currently occupying retirement 
communities is demonstrated through his knowledge of the times they were born 
into and the historical events that have shaped their lives.  
Today’s residents may have grown up during the Depression and may have 
become conditioned to austerity. When first introduced to a modern senior living 
community, many react negatively to a lifestyle that they may personally 
consider “lavish”.  It is the dream of many to pass on their life savings to their 
heirs, and many find it very difficult to spend this money on themselves. 
Therefore they may be concerned about how their hard-earned money is being 
used by management to deliver resident services and may feel that they do not 
deserve the lifestyle. For most, at the very least, it is a significant departure from 
the frugal lifestyle they may have been living in their own home or apartment.123 
 
His philosophy is evident in his promotion of “constructive complaints”; he 
quotes a prominent retailer; 
Those who complain teach me how I may please others so that more will come. 
Only those hurt me who are displeased but do not complain. They refuse me  
permission to correct my errors and improve my service.124 
 
The findings of Streib and Metsch and the ideas of Pearce are compatible; they 
both relate to the theory of social construction and the theorem “when people 
define situations as real they are real in their consequences”.125  The world views 
of social scientists in the case of Streib and Metsch and Pearce, a business 
oriented management and marketing consultant,126 appear complementary in the 
examples cited. The business experience and personal philosophy of one can 
potentially be enhanced by the additional knowledge from the social sciences (and 
vice-versa). 
 
2.3.4 The Association of Residents of Queensland 
Retirement Villages 
 
The growth of retirement villages in Australia has consequently brought about 
consumer awareness and keen interest in legal contracts and issues surrounding 
                                                 
123 Ibid, 79.  
124 Field, M cited in Pearce, ibid, 81. 
125 “Thomas Theorem” cited  A Dictionary of  Sociology Scott J and Marshall G, Oxford 
University Press 2005.  University of Waikato 12th November 2006. <www.oxfordreference.com> 
126 Pearce is a former retirement community manager whose experiences of older relatives and 
friends in his early life lead to a life-long interest in the welfare and wellbeing of seniors. His book 
“A Complete Guide to Senior Living Communities” reveals his deep concern and knowledge 
about subjects such as the grief process of ageing and the realities of operating a retirement 
community. “Residents can be a challenge. Not only are we financially dependent on them, but for 
many senior living professionals they the source of both anxiety and job satisfaction…a complaint 
is not always a criticism, and indeed it is not always a simple matter to identify the real problem 
behind a complaint. Residents may be experiencing difficulty adjusting…” (p79).     
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payment of fees and charges to residents. The Queensland Residents’ Association 
explains why it is needed. 
…A balance has to be struck between commercial interests and the well-being of 
village residents which, almost inevitably, do not always coincide. Those whose 
interests in retirement villages are as a commercial enterprise are very well 
resourced and have influential lobby groups and law firms acting on their behalf. 
To try to bring a degree of balance into the equation is the reason that the 
Association of Residents of Queensland Retirement Villages was formed. It 
came into being in 1992, on the advice of the then Minister of Consumer Affairs 
with the purpose of representing the interests of Village residents in negotiations 
with the industry and all levels of Government. This refers both to Leasehold 
Retirement Villages and to Freehold Retirement Villages. 
There needed to be an organisation with an informed knowledge of the 
legislation pertaining to Retirement Villages and an understanding of the 
structure and function of the Retirement Villages industry…127   
 
A communication from the Queensland Residents’ Association (ARQRV) 
confirms there are more widows than widowers (more women alone) living in 
Queensland retirement villages which would emphasise any relative imbalance in 
the negotiating positions of female  residents and the over-all power disparity 
between the females residents and operators who are predominately male. The 
Association reports:  
…The most exploited group in retirement villages are those whom scheme 
operators find easiest to intimidate. Women are the majority and are less inclined 
to participate in any dispute or take up cudgels against intimidation or 
overcharging etc. Women are more vulnerable and demographically there are 
more widows than widowers. Many widows say that ‘my husband would have 
dealt with that’. There are cases where the village manager has called in elderly 
women to his office and given them a serious ‘telling off’ in front of his desk as 
if they were schoolgirls in front of the headmaster… 
…We have helped many residents committees in many villages and often with 
many thousands of dollars in legal costs. All too often the scheme operators 
capitulate before the hearing date having caused the maximum costs and delays 
with bluff and bluster… 
…operators adopt a strikingly similar attitude in their tactics. First they try to get 
residents to focus on trivial matters as opposed to their statutory function. Then 
they seek to tell residents that the few who complain are ‘troublemakers’, 
malcontents etc. They never want to focus on the matters in dispute or at issue 
and of course we think that is because they know their actions have been 
improper and cannot set out a rational, legal position to justify it. Invariably the 
operator says he is acting in the best interests of the residents. 128 
 
The Queensland state residents’ group formed in 1992 has promoted itself as a 
“consumer protection group” and actively sought membership at ten dollars per 
year per unit. With a membership of 7,000 it is able to assist residents with legal 
fees when problems with operators have not been resolved through negotiation. 
According to the secretary, it was ARQRV that lobbied for the inclusion of 
                                                 
127 Background (to The Association of Residents of Queensland Retirement Villages) accessed 
from website <http://www.villagers.org.au> 21st July 2006. 
128 Email communication from the Secretary, ARQRV 13th November 2006.  
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consumer protection in the state Act. This occurred in March 2006.129 Another 
important objective of the Act promotes and encourages resident participation in 
the affairs of retirement villages generally.130  This encouragement adds to the 
powers of residents’ committees enabling them legitimate involvement in matters 
affecting retirement villages in the state.  
 
2.3.5 Aged Care Queensland Incorporated 
 
…Aged Care Queensland  is the peak industry body representing providers of  
‘aged care’  in the broadest sense – whether the care and accommodation 
services are delivered in a home or community setting, in a nursing home, or in a 
retirement village…Thus Retirement Village (‘RV’) operations are only one part 
of the portfolio of activities carried on by our members.131  
 
Aged Care Queensland (ACQ) represents the industry in the broadest sense. Like 
RVANZ, ACQ does not represent the residents of its member groups which 
include retirement villages, though its membership is reportedly “all united in a 
common concern to provide Queenslanders with aged, community and retirement 
services of excellence”.132 ACQ like RVANZ is a peak industry body which 
maintains the perspective of its membership, just as residents’ groups maintain the 
perspective of residents. It is obvious that protective legislation has developed in 
both Australia and New Zealand in the past decade to balance the tensions that 
inevitably exist between those who pay to live in retirement villages and those 
who profit from that legitimate business activity; the age of the residents being an 
influencing factor.133  
 
In June 2006 the Queensland Law Society held a conference “Legal Planning for 
Older Persons Conference”. The CEO, of ACQ delivered a presentation covering 
the entire sector of aged care including retirement villages. The presentation was 
                                                 
129 As a result of the lobbying of ARQRV the first stated main objective in the amended Act is 
now “to promote consumer protection and fair trading practices in operating retirement villages 
and in supplying services to residents...” Division 2, 3 (1)(a) Retirement Villages Act 1999. 
130 Division 2, 3 (2) (c) Retirement Villages Act 1999. “Only through ARQRV (Inc) can residents 
participate across the full span of villages for it is the only association of residents whose 
membership is open to all residents of Queensland retirement villages. All residents have rights 
under the Act so all residents have a commonality of interests. The ARQRV (Inc) seeks to make 
the standards required by the Act the minimum standard and ensure these standards are met in all 
villages”.  Accessed from ARQRV website 21st January 2006. <www.villagers.org.au> 
131 Email communication from CEO, Aged Care Queensland, 15th February 2007. 
132 Ibid. 
133 Vinden & Shailer cited in Stimson,  (Ed) The Retirement Village Industry in Australia: 
Evolution, Prospects, Challenges 2002, 109; Dugdale, D F “Retirement Villages”, The Law 
Commission, [1999] NZLJ Oct. 357.  
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set out in dot point style and covered the interests held by ACQ membership. Four 
categories under the heading “What legal issues currently affect aged care 
providers” covered; elder abuse, retirement village legislation, planning laws and 
land tax anomaly. The first two categories are considered relevant in the context 
of this study and include the following points;  
 
ELDER ABUSE 
• ACQ members have practical concerns about implementing the 
requirement for police checks (eg volunteers/health 
staff/relatives/contractors). 
• Also, with so many authorities potentially having a stake in alleged 
abuse in residential aged care ‘compulsory reporting’ may be 
problematic. 
 
RETIREMENT VILLAGES 
• Reflecting grievances held by the few rather than the interest of the 
many? 
• 92% of RV residents say expectations have been met or exceeded  (UQ 
study) 
• Rigorous industry accreditation system (ARVA – run in Qld by ACQ) 
• Often complaints are not actually against registered RVs 
• Out of 45,000 residents, only 18 disputes before the Tribunal (2004/5)  
• Law focuses on resident-v-operator; in fact most disputes are resident-v-
resident 134  
 
The response on the day to this style of reporting on legislation to protect 
potentially vulnerable Australian’s is not known but the “speaker notes” give the 
overall impression of a resistance to burdensome legislation and troublesome 
residents. An explanation received from the CEO of ACQ clarifies the 
organisation’s abhorrence of any form of elder abuse and its frustrations with the 
June 2006 requirements for volunteers and others to lodge a “Form 349C 
Application for a Police Certificate Name Only”. The procedure at that time was 
seen as “demanding and time-consuming” for volunteers who wanted to give their 
                                                 
134 Speaker Notes, Queensland Law Society, “Legal Planning for Older Persons Conference”, 
Brisbane,  29th June 2006, CEO Aged Care Queensland Inc. In contrast, the Retirement 
Commission survey 2006 showed resident complaints against management well exceeded  
resident-resident complaints and 54% of residents were not satisfied with the complaints process 
(Retirement Commission, Retirement Village Survey 2006, 89-90). 
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time in the service of the community.135  The procedure for Police checks has now 
changed to electronic lodgement. Also, the presenter’s comments were aimed at 
residential care not retirement villages which are apparently seen in a different 
light in terms of opportunity for elder abuse. An exploration of this issue follows 
below. 
 
During the 2004/2005 period 18 disputes went before the Queensland Commercial 
and Consumer Tribunal (CCT). The fact these disputes did not seem to figure in 
the CEO’s presentation is not surprising given ACQ represents sector interests 
and 18 disputes amongst an overall population reporting 92%  satisfaction may 
seem relatively insignificant. However among those 18 cases were several in 
which residents were represented by the President of The Association of Residents 
of Queensland Retirement Villages (ARQRV) and determinations were made 
against operators.136 Added to this, the wording of the question “reflecting 
grievances held by the few rather than the interest of the many?” promotes from a 
reader’s perspective, the sense that “grievances held by the few” are not 
considered important in the larger picture of satisfaction. Taking a case to the 
CCT is known to cause tensions in relations between residents and operators; in 
addition it is a stressful process. It would appear that residents taking such action 
felt so aggrieved they chose to seek Tribunal assistance in spite of negative 
consequences.  
 
In relation to disputes, the Australian Consumers Association (CHOICE) in 2003 
reported on Queensland retirement village disputes: 
Since July 2000 a total of 54 applications to the Tribunal have been received of 
which 45 have been finalised. The majority of the complaints have been related 
to disputes over budgets and service charges.137 
 
These figures added together provide an average of 14.4 disputes referred to the 
Tribunal every year for five years; 18 over one year is an increase on the average.  
 
Mediation is used either through the Tribunal mediation services or privately by 
villages, to resolve disputes. The total figures for mediation are unknown but for 
                                                 
135 Email communication from CEO, ACQ dated 15th February 2007. 
136 These Tribunal decisions are listed on the Queensland Commercial and Consumer Tribunal 
website; <www.tribunals.qld.gov.au>  
137 Australian Consumers Association Retirement Villages State by State Guide 
<www.choice.com.au> accessed 9th September 2006.  
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disputes to reach the Tribunal, parties must have first attempted negotiation within 
the village (or mediation privately or via the Tribunal mediation services). From a 
researcher’s point of view, the annual increase in Tribunal dispute figures is not 
insignificant, especially given the addition of the unknown mediated agreements. 
It is not the outcome that matters so much as the fact that residents’, in spite of the 
obvious negative stressors involved, took action against operator behaviour and 
charges to an independent entity and frequently won. 
 
The CEO’s emphasis on resident-resident disputes138 (which would not usually 
involve issues of on-going payments) has the effect of minimising the situations 
where power differences are obvious, money is at stake and the majority of 
residents in retirement villages are older women. The gender situation raises other 
questions.  
1. Are male residents more likely than females to complain and initiate 
complaint action? 
2. Do female residents seek representation by male committee members? 
3. Are female residents less likely to complain? 
 
These questions require exploration. Nevertheless, the way sector leaders present 
information to professional groups such as lawyers has a predictable element. 
Lawyers have a vested interest in the business of the stakeholders. It seems likely 
stakeholders would want to present information in such a way as to encourage 
their interest; booming business and contractual issues being grist for the mill of 
the legal profession. 
 
One possible explanation for the downplaying of the 18 Tribunal cases by the 
CEO may be due to the reputation within the industry of the Chairman of the 
Queensland residents’ body. Phil Phillips, the Chairman is not seen in a 
favourable light by Aged Care Queensland (ACQ) due to his alleged 
scaremongering and fear-promoting tactics within the residents’ groups.139 Aged 
                                                 
138 A recent survey of New Zealand Retirement Villages found twice as many formal complaints 
about management than about residents. (Retirement Commission 2006, 90.) The experience of 
NSW and Queensland  state residents’ groups are that residents disputes with operators is the most 
common type of dispute dealt with at local and state level in NSW and Queensland. This 
information has been provided by the two state groups through email communication.  
139 This information was provided during an interview conducted with the Project Development 
Manager (Retirement Living) ACQ, 18th July 2006. 
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Care Queensland believes Phillips fear-promoting is not valid. The findings of the 
research conducted by the University of Queensland140 (92% residents 
expectations met or exceeded) is evidence to ACQ that the vast majority of  
Queensland retirement village residents are satisfied with their life-style choice.141  
 
2.3.6 Queensland Commercial and Consumer Tribunal  
 
A check on the decisions of the Queensland Commercial and Consumer Tribunal 
in early 2007 has revealed several cases that warrant inclusion in this study. They 
can be seen to represent the types of retirement village issues that are placed 
before the tribunal. They also go some way towards answering the question about 
gender representation at Tribunal level disputes.  
 
The first case discussed concerns an application by retirement village owners 
seeking orders pursuant to a section of the Retirement Villages Act 1999 to have a 
budget for the village for the 2005/2006 financial year which had been presented 
to residents of the village, but not passed by them, approved by the tribunal. Two 
male residents acting as co-spokespersons for the village residents sought to have 
the application dismissed on the basis that it was in contravention of the Act. The 
application by the owners was dismissed in a determination dated 11th December 
2006. The tribunal members commented; 
…15.  The applicant has demonstrated lack of care and responsibility in 
constructing the budget. Mr Garven appears to have adopted the attitude that it 
was the responsibility of the residents to advise the applicants if the budget was 
in contravention of the Act, rather than the applicant accepting its clear 
obligation to prepare a budget which complied with the Act. Mr Garven has 
made an implied threat that retribution may be exacted on the residents of the 
village for their refusal to pass the budget. He has said that as a result of the 
                                                 
140 Stimson, supra n 133 at 80.  
141 The December 2006 Retirement Commission survey found 99% overall resident satisfaction. 
The New Zealand research objective was to provide a benchmark measure before the Retirement 
Villages Act 2003 and its associated regulations and codes of practice came into force. Dispute 
resolution forms a significant part of the New Zealand Act, therefore questions surrounding 
resident knowledge of complaints procedures were included, resulting in a significant level of 
dissatisfaction among those who have made complaints; also gaps in knowledge about how to 
make a complaint. Paradoxically this dissatisfaction features within the overall 99% satisfaction 
found in the NZ survey.  The Australian ‘Stimson’ study looked at what retirees looked for in a 
retirement village e.g. services and facilities and asked questions about residents’ reasons for citing 
particular reasons for satisfaction. Complaints processes did not feature in this study which was a 
collaborative project between the University of Queensland and the sector group RVAA . The 
Australian project was entitled Potential Roles for the Retirement Village Industry in Providing 
Appropriate Affordable Housing Alternatives in an Aging Australian Society. Each study had a 
different focus, yet both returned high levels of satisfaction.  The Australian study however did not 
ask questions about complaint processes; the NZ one did yet achieved a higher level of 
satisfaction.   
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residents’ action the management company may have to be wound up. We are 
concerned about the potential for detriment to residents at the hands of the 
applicant as a result of their action in rejecting the budget and defending this 
application. The applicant must address the legitimate concerns raise by the 
residents. The delay in having the 2005/2006 budget passed is in no way the 
fault of the residents, but is the result of the applicant’s unacceptable conduct in 
preparing a budget which does not comply with the Act…142 
 
Another judgement, 30th October 2006, concerned a determination resolving costs. 
Both parties sought costs for the proceedings and agreed the determination should 
be “made on papers”. The applicants (the residents) whose spokesperson was 
female, submitted they had been “wholly” successful in the proceedings and 
further submitted; 
…that the respondent’s conduct before the proceedings in seeking to obstruct the 
efforts of the applicants to call and have recognised their residents committee 
should be taken into account in making a costs order in favour of the 
applicants.143 
 
The respondent Jodaway submitted; 
…it should not be required to pay the applicants’ costs because it did not oppose 
the formation of the residents committee but merely required the committee to 
be established in accordance with the Act…further submits that the applicants 
filed lengthy and prolix documents which contained irrelevant material and 
breached directions…144 
 
The Consumer and Commercial Tribunal Members Mr P Toohey and Mrs M 
Green commented; 
8.   With respect to the conduct of the respondent before the proceedings, the 
Tribunal made a finding that the removal from the village notice board of the 
applicants’ notice of meeting on the 14 and 15 February 2005 by Mr Fleming, 
the general manager of the village was heavy handed. The Tribunal also found 
that Mr Issakidis, who was a director of the respondent at the relevant time had 
issued to the residents of the village an intimidating notice on 16th February 2005 
stating that residents were under no obligation to attend the meeting called by 
the applicants for 17 February 2005. 
9.  We consider that this unacceptable conduct on the part of representatives of 
the respondent is an important consideration weighing in favour of an award of 
costs to the applicants… 
 
11.  We do not accept the respondent’s contentions that the applicants filed 
unnecessarily lengthy and prolix statements containing irrelevant material… 
 
12.  We consider that the nature of the proceedings was such as to warrant the 
legal representation which both parties availed themselves of.  
   
13.  In the circumstances we consider that the interests of justice require that the  
respondent should pay the costs of the applicants, and having regard to the 
                                                 
142 Milstern Retirement Services Pty Ltd v Sheppard & Royce as Co-Spokespersons for the 
residents of Urimbirra Retirement Village [2006] CCT VHO12-05; this judgement was delivered 
on the 11th December 2006.  
143 June Gilbert v Jodaway Management Pty Ltd [2006] CCT V007-05.  
144 Ibid, 5. 
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complexity of the proceedings, we consider that the scale of costs is the District 
Court scale applicable to claims less than $50,000, and will order accordingly.145 
 
Another case involving Jodaway determined by the Tribunal in May 2006 
awarded costs to the applicant residents in August 2006. The determination 
included the following comments… 
4.  The applicants were entirely successful in these proceedings, but section 
71(5) provides that a party to a proceeding is not entitled to costs merely because 
the party was the beneficiary of an order of the Tribunal. Or that a party was 
legally represented at the hearing. 
 
5. …With respect to the conduct of the respondent before the proceedings, the 
Tribunal made a finding that the general manager of the village, Mr Fleming, 
screamed obscenities, including a racial slur at Mrs Lafaele, a resident of the 
village, and acted in a generally threatening manner towards her. The respondent 
must bear some responsibility, in our view, for appointing a general manager 
who acts in such an unacceptable manner towards a resident.146   
 
Two further cases, one in January 2005 determined the operator/owner must 
refund to the residents $22,165.63 for excess water charges147  and another on 21st 
August 2006 involved repayment of $250.00, $67.10 and $54 for various 
overcharges.148 These two cases involved a male and a female resident taking a 
case against operators. 
 
Returning to the questions posed earlier, it appears that women are becoming 
involved in taking retirement village dispute action in Queensland. A perusal of 
the Brisbane Commercial and Consumer Tribunal website for retirement village 
decisions leads to a sense that female residents sometimes seek representation by 
males. Female residents may be less likely to complain: however determinations 
over the past 18 months suggest this situation may be changing.  
 
Another matter that should be (but may not be) widely known within retirement 
village communities is mentioned on the CHOICE website. Under Retirement 
Villages Queensland the following statement is included; 
In case of intimidation of residents an application can be made to the Retirement 
Villages Tribunal. If a resident is incapable of taking this action, they may need 
                                                 
145 Ibid. The order is dated 30th October 2006. The case was first filed by the applicants Gilbert (et 
al) on the 2nd August 2005 Orders were finally made to resolve the dispute on the 8th August 2006; 
one year after lodgement. Orders for costs were made on the 30th October 2006. In total a time 
frame of 14mths.  Proponents of the New Zealand Act expressed a desire for the disputes model to 
deal with disputes in a ‘timely’ manner. This was in part due to concern about relational issues and 
personal stress for both parties in the context of a communal living arrangement. 
146 Eugene & Kylie Mackay v Jodeway Management Pty Ltd. [2006] CCT V006-05. 
147 James Stanley Wales v Laurel Springs Management Services Pty Ltd, Application .CCT V002-
04, 11 January 2005.  
148 Sylvia Holt v Edenlea Retirement Village Pty Ltd. CCT VH004-06, 21st August 2006. 
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to seek the assistance of the services of the Office of the Adult Guardian 
(telephone: (07) 3234 0870). The Act provides a dispute resolution process that 
enables residents to seek a fair hearing without incurring significant costs.149  
 
The broader business oriented views of Aged Care Queensland CEO represent the 
model, and possibly philosophy, of the organisation. The Queensland Commercial 
and Consumer ‘decisions’ website provides a reality check of the actual 
circumstances some Queensland retirement village residents experience in their 
dealings with operators.  
 
The Aged Care Queensland CEO stated that there were “only 18 disputes” out of 
45,000 residents in 2004/5. The 2005/6 figures show a statistically significant 
increase from 18 to 27 which translates into a 50% increase in retirement village 
applications in one year. Added to this, the Office of Fair Trading report that 
within the 20 applications made in 2005/2006, 7-8 involve allegations of verbal 
abuse, physical violence and bullying and intimidation by staff.150  In the first half 
of the 2006/2007 year, the Queensland Tribunal reports 20 applications 151 
showing a possible 100% increase in applications with several months still to run.  
 
The New Zealand Law Commission Report Delivering Justice for All, confirms 
the vast majority of disputes settle on the Court steps; a situation likely to be 
replicated in Australia.152  We do not know how many retirement village 
‘settlements’ are achieved in this way or at mediation. This suggests the figure of 
18 applications in 2004/5 and 20 in the first half of 2006/2007 may not represent 
the reality. The Queensland residents’ group obviously has a different perspective 
to that of Aged Care Queensland; the CCT statistics provide a reality check. 
 
2.3.7 Elder Abuse and retirement village settings 
 
                                                 
149<www.choice.com.au>  Retirement villages state-by-state guide (archived), p4. Accessed 9th 
September 2006. 
150 Office of Fair Trading, Retirement Villages Industry, Stakeholder Report 2006, obtained from 
OFT website <www.fairtrading.qld.gov.au> accessed  16th February 2007. 
151 Email communication 27th February 2007 from the Executive Officer, Queensland  Commercial 
and Consumer Tribunal. 
152 Law Commission, Report 85 Delivering Justice for All: A Vision for New Zealand Courts and 
Tribunals. Wellington, March 2004. 
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The issue of elder abuse has become a significant concern of age concern 
organisations in most Western countries including New Zealand and Australia.153 
The Duluth model used throughout Australasia by Stopping Violence groups is as 
applicable to elder abuse in any context as it is to domestic violence. Based on the 
inappropriate use of power and control, the model covers a continuum of abuses 
including intimidation, coercion, threats and economic abuse.154 
 
 
 
Implicit in the Duluth model is the notion ‘the personal is political’ which takes its 
meaning from the ideas of feminist writers during the 1970’s and 1980’s. The 
subordination of women in order to privilege the rights of men is interpreted as a 
political act having implication for systemic abuse starting with the socialisation 
of females within the family and extending to issues such as promotional 
disadvantage in the workplace, pay equity and other broader societal 
discrimination.  
 
The goal of the Duluth model is to shift individuals from using power and control 
to dominate others, to relating in an equitable, safe and respectful manner. 
Facilitators of programmes using this model came to realise that women who had 
                                                 
153 World Elder Abuse Awareness Day fell on Friday 15th June 2007. National and Community 
radio and the print media covered this event with alarming stories about the forms of abuse 
perpetrated on elders by those whom they should be able to trust. In this sense many older people 
are as vulnerable as children. 
154 The Duluth model arose out of concern at the extent of domestic assault occurring in the City of 
Duluth, USA during the 1960’s. A key component of this initiative was to establish effective 
intervention which required changes to Police and Court responses to domestic assault. According 
to the Duluth response, the most important aspect of changing the judicial systems response to 
battering was “the coordination of its many actors to secure a consistent and uniform response”. 
There is no reason to believe a similar coordination of responses especially via education on elder 
abuse could not be undertaken in the Retirement Village/ Aged Care sectors.    
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been subjected to abuse as children (psychological or physical) were also at risk of 
becoming abusers themselves; usually the abuse is directed towards (more) 
vulnerable others (eg children and older people) and sometimes a ‘weaker’ male 
partner.155  
 
It is suggested that the potential for abuse using power and control in its various 
forms, is as likely to occur in a retirement village as it is in any other setting. In 
addition, residents themselves who have during their lives held positions of 
authority over others may be as likely as management to assert power and control 
over others they see as inhibiting their goals. Two possible contexts for this type 
of dominance (and abuse) are (1) where staff or residents are in positions to 
influence use of facilities and (2) within Residents’ Committees where domination 
by strong characters may silence others’. There is some evidence to support this 
suggestion.156 
 
The overall situation of disputes in retirement villages in Australia has been 
examined in a ‘first time’ study published in 2002 and has formed a background 
to the areas covered in this chapter.    
 
 
2.4 Australian retirement village disputes – an empirical study; 
realities and attitudes  
 
The Australian study conducted by Keogh and Bradley involved a review of court 
and some tribunal hearings in Australia. Under a heading “contracting for a 
peaceful retirement” the authors noted;   
Since 1996 a number of significant retirement village disputes have come before 
NSW Courts and Tribunals for determination. Collectively the cases have 
stripped away the rose-tinted notion that retirement living in a retirement village 
                                                 
155 The writer has been active in the Stopping Violence field for many years both as a facilitator 
and trainer using the Duluth model for men and (adapted) for women.  There is evidence that 
fewer men than women report abuse by partners due to a reported sense of shame that they are 
unable to defend themselves. However it remains the view of those working in the stopping 
violence field in NZ and within the New Zealand Police that men perpetrate significantly more 
violence towards their female partners and men kill women and children in domestic violence 
contexts every week in New Zealand. This level of violence is rare for women. Researchers in the 
US have also negated the myth of sexual symmetry in family violence. See Dobash, R P, Dobash, 
R E, Wilson M, Daly, M “The Myth of Sexual Symmetry in Marital Violence” [1992] 39, 1, 
Social Problems 71-91.  
156 Streib, G, Folts, W & La Greca, A “Autonomy, Power in Decision Making in Thirty-six 
Retirement Communities”, The Gerontologist [1985] 25, 4.; Office of Fair Trading , NSW 
“Review of the Retirement Villages Act 1999”, November 2006, 14.  A copy was obtained from 
the website <www.fairtrading.nsw.gov.au> 23rd November 2006. 
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will guarantee a perpetually peaceful lifestyle and re-enforced the timeless adage 
of eternal vigilance as the price one must ultimately pay to achieve a satisfactory 
level of comfort with retirement village living.157 
…the primary source of litigation, and hence conflict, in the retirement village 
industry is the contents of the contract signed by residents on entering the 
villages… 
Comparisons between matters that end up in the court and those at the coalface 
indicate that some major points of conflict include the relative lack of case law 
currently available in this area, the wide variety in contract and tenure structures, 
resident interface issues and unconscionable conduct on the part of the owners 
and developers of villages.158  
 
Both authors are from NSW which has the highest population of retirement 
village residents in Australia. These retirement villages are subject to the scrutiny 
of a Government well aware of the contractual pitfalls in the sector. Consequently 
the NSW Government is seen to be leading legislative reform.159  
 
The authors acknowledge communication problems between operators and 
residents as a “root cause” of problems suggesting this is more likely to occur 
when “contracts establishing relationships are being formed or re-negotiated” and 
both sides fail to reveal their expectations.160 They cite examples where Judges 
have criticised representatives of residents’ committees and operators for failing 
to learn from their “many forays into litigation” and operators for not observing 
the Industry Code of Practices Regulation which is directed at good behaviour and 
good management rather than legal rights enforceable in courts.161  
 
Bradley is the General Manager of property for Anglican Retirement Villages 
Diocese of Sydney which has 4500 residents and 1600 staff across 30 locations in 
NSW. He reports his organisation is one of Australia’s largest aged care 
providers. He and the organisation, live (and manage) by a Christian philosophy 
and a strong belief in the principle “do unto others…” which he maintains works 
well if followed within the industry. He sees active residents’ committees as an 
important component in the context of managing conflict. 
Active resident committees do definitely reduce aggravation levels in villages, 
and consequently do achieve earlier resolution of problems in a village context. I 
am unable to provide statistics on this but prior to establishing a far better 
                                                 
157 Keogh, J and Bradley, P “The Potential for Contractual Disputes in Retirement Village Living” 
Pacific Rim Real Estate Society 8th Annual Conference, January  21-24, 2002, Christchurch, New 
Zealand.  
158 Ibid,  Abstract, Cover Page. 
159 Ibid, 13.  
160 Ibid, 2. 
161 Ibid, 2-3. 
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consultation approach with our residents we had several matters heard in the 
tribunal and since then have had a significant reduction. 
 
The important fact is to put a process in place and give people an outlet for their 
grievances where they feel they have been heard. Being approachable, 
understanding and willing to change, but also being firm about what can and 
cannot be done, so the village doesn’t descend into negative cynicism, can be a 
balance, but it is really about doing unto others as you would have them do to 
you……And it works!162 
 
Nevertheless, the Keogh and Bradley study (which includes “most of the recent 
court cases but only 50% of recent tribunal cases”) and a search of decisions made 
by state legislated Tribunals operating under consumer and fair trading legislation 
over the past two years, shows disputes that reach Tribunals in the vast majority 
of cases surround costs, fees and charges.163 The numbers of disputes that actually 
get to a tribunal or a Court may not be considered high compared with the total 
number of retirement villages and village residents across Australia: the fact that 
the external mechanisms for dispute resolution are used on a regular basis 
demonstrates an ongoing need for independent determination of retirement village 
disputes.  
 
The writers make an important point regarding residents’ groups and operators; 
Sometimes resident groups demonstrate an inability to effectively articulate their 
concerns to the operator or to achieve consensus in decision making within 
timeframes expected by the operator.164  
 
In the case of The Heritage Retirement Village, it is clear that neither the 
administering authority nor the residents have abided by the precepts for 
appropriate conduct which the Code has laid down.165 
 
Clearly there can be problems on both sides.  
 
 
2.5 The New Zealand way  
 
The New Zealand parliament passed the Retirement Villages Act in 2003 as a 
response to concerns about the lack of regulation within the industry and 
examples of severe financial loss suffered by some older New Zealanders. The 
                                                 
162 Email communication from Paul Bradley 6th November 2006.  
163 State by state residential Tribunal decisions (including retirement villages) are accessible 
through Consumer Affairs and Fair Trading websites or in the case of Northern Territory via the 
Northern Territory Government, Department of Justice website <www.nt.gov.au/justice> The NT 
Government appoints a Commissioner of Consumer Affairs who is empowered to institute or 
defend proceedings before the Court on behalf of a resident of a retirement village (RVA, s8) and 
provide an annual report to the Minister (s11(1)(2)(3)).     
164 Keogh & Bradley, supra n 157 at 2. 
165 Ibid, 4. 
 56
problems arose when residents and potential residents, in the context of an 
unregulated market, entered into contracts with operators and developers often 
without the benefit of independent legal advice.  
The Retirement Commissioner in a report to the Minister of Building Issues in 
May 2006 noted; 
The biggest single area of complaint is people not knowing how to make a 
complaint and operators and even statutory supervisors fobbing them off – 
which means concerns and complaints can become entrenched disputes. The 
second biggest area is residents (or their families) not knowing what they are 
buying into. They often see this as exploitation by the industry of a vulnerable 
group.166 
 
This situation has not changed. The recent Retirement Commission Retirement 
Villages Survey found a 99% satisfaction rate among retirement village residents 
and also found 54% of a 13% group that had made a complaint in the past year, 
were not satisfied with the complaints process.167 There were more formal 
complaints about management than about residents; 29% of residents said they 
did not know whether there was an efficient and effective process for resolving 
complaints.168  
 
RVANZ has an established disputes resolution system in place and this is 
accessible from its website or contacting the organisation by phone. Having a 
disputes resolution system on a website does not necessarily mean that one is 
operating or that members understand and use its processes. Another concern is 
that over forty five percent of New Zealand retirement villages do not belong to 
RVANZ. By November 2007 the entire sector which is made up of some 400 
villages will be fully regulated. Much criticism has been levelled at Government 
for slowness to implement the 2003 Act and the wait now for all regulations and 
codes to be in force, further aggravates the situation in New Zealand.  
 
 
2.6 Summary 
 
In this chapter I have discussed the stress for older people associated with making 
life-changing decisions and how these changes have been beneficial and 
rewarding for many. I have identified potential sites of conflict and inappropriate 
use of power and control in retirement villages and described the educative and 
                                                 
166 Retirement Commissioner’s report to Minister of Building Issues,  May 2006.  
167 Retirement Commission, Retirement Villages Survey 2006, ACNeilsen, 89. 
168 Ibid, 88. 
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advocacy work done by state residents groups in Australia.  Using American 
studies I have illuminated the sources of conflict and harmony in retirement 
communities and shown the way in which conflict is perceived and responded to 
by those in positions of power in these communities.  
 
I have established that communication problems between operators and residents 
are a primary source of conflict at interpersonal and collective levels and that 
abuse of power and control, intolerance and prejudicial attitudes in the context of 
village life and dispute forums are potentially damaging to those to whom they are 
directed and the offenders themselves. Much of the evidence suggests that the 
reason for conflict is a desire to exploit. 
 
I have indicated a growing interest by women residents in Australia to become 
involved in dispute actions that concern paying extra and illegal charges. I have 
proposed that elder abuse may be as likely to occur in a retirement village as in 
any other context. Areas where residents’ needs are not being met have been 
emphasised in this chapter.  
 
The next chapter covers the Retirement Villages Act 2003 prior to and following 
its implementation. 
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Chapter 3 The Retirement Villages Act 2003 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
I will begin this chapter with an explanation of the environment prior to the 
Retirement Villages Act 2003 and include an account of the background to the 
Act during early stages of drafting. Second I will cover the role of conflict and 
consider conflict as a phenomenon in retirement villages. The third area covered is 
the Law Society’s perspective on the Act and fourth, issues will be raised about 
the monopoly the Act affords operators in selection and payment for key roles in 
dispute contexts. Fifth, I will discuss the process of dispute resolution in 
retirement villages and include criticisms the Act has received leading up to its 
implementation. Sixth, I will cover key legislative roles and the operator 
compliance elements surrounding disputes along with the Act’s disputes flow- 
chart.  
  
 
3.2 The pre-Act New Zealand Retirement Village dispute 
environment  
 
3.2.1 The way we were 
 
Retirement village disputes have previously been seen as a “private” matter 
between residents and operators. The court system and Disputes Tribunal dealt 
with unsettled disputes between residents and operators when villages were not 
part of the Retirement Villages Association. Prior to October 2006 when the 
disputes process in the Act became effective, the Retirement Villages Association 
(RVANZ) had a statutory role to determine complaints and disputes under the 
Securities Act 1978. However, the Retirement Commission reports that since its 
role came into force on 1st February 2004, it has continued to receive complaints; 
half the complaints reported have come from residents or family members of 
residents in RVANZ member villages; the other half are believed to “simply 
represent the market share”.169  During this period RVANZ has advertised its 
dispute resolution process on its website, giving the impression the system was 
                                                 
169 Retirement Village Adviser, Retirement Commission, December 4th 2006. 
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operating and member villages would know the process to follow when resident 
complaints become known.  
 
The experience of the Commission has not matched the website impression; 
residents from member villages have contacted the Commission claiming 
confusion about the process to follow or reporting no process to follow. This 
situation has raised questions with the Commission about the effectiveness of the 
Association’s procedures.170 For residents in non-member villages, the methods 
for dealing with resident complaints are not generally known. Some non-member 
operators have received high profile publicity when their actions have reached the 
media and Courts including the Court of Appeal and Privy Council in the case of 
Culverden171.  
 
In a recent case also involving the Culverden Group, fines of $30,000 followed 
the successful prosecution for un-consented work which put at risk the lives of 
residents living in the Culverden retirement complex, Mangere East. The un-
consented work included the removal of sprinkler system parts. The Manukau 
City Council took the case against the Group. The Manukau City Council became 
aware of the issues through residents and concerned others.172 Residents from 
other villages have used the Court process to challenge management decisions 
with mixed results.173  
 
3.2.2 Background to the Act 
 
The Ministry of Social Development reports that its involvement in the early 
stages of the Act’s drafting was focussed on the problems that were being 
experienced by residents. Many of the complaints were considered “low level” 
and of a kind with the potential to be resolved through an effective complaints 
                                                 
170 The dispute resolution flowchart of RVANZ can be found at page 83.  
171 Culverden Retirement Village Ltd v Registrar of Companies [1997] 2 WLR 291 reported in 
NZLJ [1997] 92 March. 
172 This information was provided by G. Smith, Manukau City Council in a personal 
communication 24th November 2006. 
173 Fenton & Ors v Pakuranga Park Village Trust & Ors HC Auckland, Dec 23, 1996; Pakuranga 
Park Village Trust & Ors v Fenton & Ors CA Nov 18, 1997.This case went to the High Court and 
then the Court of Appeal. Residents opposed the sale of land that housed the village bowling club 
and facilities to BP for a service station. The owner Trust wanted to relocate the bowling club to 
another site on the property. The residents sought and gained an injunction in the High Court to 
halt the sale to BP. This was overturned in the Court of Appeal almost a year later. The residents 
alleged an infringement by the (owner) Trust of their licence to occupy. When buying into the 
village they had not anticipated living close to a BP service station that could operate 24 hrs.   
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process. The Ministry was aware that few villages had a complaints process and 
while the RVANZ has a disputes process it was felt by the Ministry that it was 
oriented towards the interests of village owners. The tendency at the time was for 
those villages having a statutory supervisor174 to use that person as the “de facto 
complaints process”.  The challenge for the Ministry, knowing the issues 
consistently raised by residents, became one of how to design a process 
a) that enabled complaints to be addressed at the appropriate level by 
the village management with significant  or unresolved complaints 
flowing through to a disputes resolution process 
b) that ensured that principles of natural justice were upheld – i.e. 
responses were timely, complaints advised etc. 
c) in which dispute resolution was neutrally controlled, accessible and 
could be provided at reasonable cost 
d) that provided incentives for early and appropriate resolution and 
disincentives (e.g. the application of penalties) for village owners to 
exploit residents 
e) that recognised that some disputes about the slow on-sale of units 
(the most complained about issue) needed to take account of market 
considerations and therefore needed  to be separately constituted 
f) that allowed  matters of law to be taken to the Courts 
g) that slotted into the government administration somewhere175  
 
It was from this background, that the Act and specifically the dispute resolution 
provisions of the Act were born. At the time of undertaking this study the Act is 
finally emerging from its new-born state and has embarked on its first steps into 
the real world of older New Zealanders who have placed their finances and their 
trust in owners and operators of the places most will consider ‘home’ for the 
remainder of their lives.  
  
3.2.3 Views of the New Zealand Law Society 
 
The Law Society in a 2004 seminar paper “Retirement Villages” noted the 
“constant complaints” from residents about the absence of statutory support for a 
facility for “fast tracking” and dealing with resident complaints. The Society 
                                                 
174 Statutory supervisors have been appointed under the Securities Act 1978, s47.  The Retirement 
Villages Act 2003, s 37 covers statutory supervisors from the 1st May 2007. 
175Office for Senior Citizens’, Ministry of Social Development, 6th June 2006.  
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acknowledged RVANZ’s code of practice saying it adequately covered off dispute 
resolution for its member villages and went on to state “What has been absent is 
the rigour of independence and underpinning dispute procedure with the force of 
statute”.176  
 
The Law Society views the 28 comprehensive sections in the Act relating to 
dispute resolution as having been adopted in part using existing statutory models. 
These models include Part 6 of the Injury Prevention Rehabilitation and 
Compensation Act 2001 and the Weathertight Homes Resolution Services Act 
2002; specifically the mediation and adjudication procedure that provides a two 
tier approach which the Act replicates.177 The Act however does not specify 
mediation but the “complaints facility” may incorporate mediation prior to issue 
of a disputes notice.178   
 
The Law Society has produced a second seminar booklet “Retirement Villages – 
the full impact of the Act”. The authors state on the opening page 
One would have thought that an easy pathway now exists in explaining and 
understanding the impact of the Retirement Villages Act 2003 (the Act) and the 
Retirement Villages (General) Regulations 2006 (the General Regulations). Fox 
hunting in the United Kingdom however may prove a more profitable task…179  
 
The Retirement Villages Act 2003 will assist in protecting the rights of residents 
and sets out a legal framework within which operators must run villages. This new 
legal framework places responsibilities on operators for disclosure of information 
to residents and potential residents. It introduces independent oversight of villages 
through statutory supervisors and contains a dispute resolution process involving 
independent and experienced panellists approved by the Retirement 
Commissioner. This is in accordance with what the Retirement Commissioner 
agreed was to be a “low level” of involvement in the disputes process.180 The new 
process is deemed to be less expensive and less formal than a District or High 
Court hearing and is able to make orders and provide binding decisions though 
appeal rights remain.  
                                                 
176 Greenwood, J and Marks S “Retirement Villages” New Zealand Law Society Seminar, 
February – March 2004.  
177 Ibid, 33. 
178 Retirement Villages Act 2003, s51. 
179 Greenwood, J and Burke, M  “Retirement Villages – the full impact of the Act” New Zealand 
Law Society March, 2007, 1.   
180 This “low level” involvement was confirmed by Diana Crossan, Retirement Commissioner, 7th 
December 2006. 
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3.2.4 Disputes processes: early days and perceived flaws 
 
The subject of dispute resolution in the context of retirement villages and this 
thesis involves principally, the relationships between residents and operators. This 
includes financial arrangements that have been struck in order for residents to take 
up occupancy in a retirement village and receive continuing services. Section 52 
of the Retirement Villages Act 2003 specifies “a resident” (or former resident) or 
“the operator” as the parties who may require dispute resolution through a 
disputes panel process.  
 
The Retirement Villages (Disputes Panel) Regulations came into effect on the 1st 
October 2006.181 The Disputes Panel Regulations provide the supporting structure 
and detail for the operation of the disputes panel. They give direction to the 
disputes panel to consult parties on matters relating to the hearing and conducting 
of the hearing and disposal of the dispute which may include a refusal on the part 
of the panel to hear or continue to hear a dispute in specific circumstances. The 
awarding of costs and expenses, advising of the decision to parties, the operator 
and the Retirement Commissioner on the relevant forms and the records of 
disputes are covered in the regulations. Of importance to this chapter, regulation 
20 (2) of the Disputes Panel Regulations states; 
A disputes panel must determine the dispute according to the general principles 
of the law relating to the matter and the substantial merits and justice of the case.  
 
And regulation 20 (3)  
Subject to section 67 (4) of the Act and these regulations, every party to a 
dispute is entitled to call evidence, and to examine, cross-examine, and re-
examine witnesses. 
 
The disputes panel process must be considered a very important feature of the new 
Act. It is a response to the lack of a process, other than the courts or RVANZ’s 
internal processes to deal with disputes in all retirement villages in New Zealand. 
Most significantly it is intended to be an independent alternative to litigation and 
the sector group’s internal system which for residents, may not be perceived as 
being as independent as RVANZ would hope.  
 
                                                 
181 Retirement Villages  (Disputes Panel) Regulations 2006. 
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The processes contained in the Act have come about following extensive 
consultation followed by lengthy delays in producing regulations and a code of 
practice for operators. Prior to these delays, the responsibility for administration 
of the Act shifted from the Ministry of Social Development and the Ministry of 
Economic Development182 in 2003 to the Department of Building and Housing 
(DBH) in July 2005. The DBH was “responsible for completing all regulations 
and the Code of Practice, which was completed by the end of July 2006 for the 
dispute panel regulations, and 25th September for all the others”.183 The General 
and Fees Regulations and Code of Practice came into force 1st May 2007. The 
Retirement Commission fielded a list of criticisms. The criticisms concern;  
• the disputes panel model 
• implementation delays 
• borrowed provisions/patchwork legislation with flaws 
• not requiring operators to share capital gain and not requiring operators 
to ‘buy back’ units, especially when departed residents have to wait until 
re-sale and continue to be charged fees etc and delays (especially for 
licence to occupy when residents don’t actually own the unit)184  
• compliance costs especially for smaller, non profit and owner-occupied 
unit title villages – because of all the documentation required and the 
requirement to have a statutory supervisor 
• too much documentation/information required to be given to 
intending/residents without prescribed templates for e.g. the disclosure 
statement – to help compliance costs plus to give intending residents the 
ability to compare ‘apples with apples’ 
• not having any advice/advocacy role for residents. 
• the industry belief that it is too prescriptive and older people’s belief that 
it is not prescriptive/protective enough185  
 
The fact that mediation was not included in the Act has also been criticised. The 
list is comprehensive enough to indicate significant concern about the model for 
DR encompassed in the Act. 
                                                 
182  The Ministry of Social Development was always regarded as the lead agency. Retirement 
Village Adviser, Retirement Commission, 6th March 2007.  
183 Retirement Commission Adviser, 6th March 2007. 
184 These concerns came from Grey Power, Age Concern, Residents and families.  
185 Retirement Commission Adviser,  25th January 2007.  
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3.2.5 2008 Review  
 
In 2008 the Department of Building and Housing will undertake a review of the 
dispute resolution provisions of the Act.186 In the meantime some aspects of the 
Act model attract attention. The issue of power imbalance between residents and 
operators and the selection and payment of three key DR roles by operators is 
questioned. The key DR roles are mediators, disputes panel and statutory 
supervisor. Representation of residents is also an issue which will be covered 
later. The perceived lack of independence of the panel appointments is 
exacerbated further because the panel has no autonomy to decide for itself which 
members will adjudicate particular disputes. With no connection to an ‘arms 
length’ body and no principal adjudicator, the disputes panel has little 
flexibility.187 Autonomy and flexibility within the role could have avoided 
suggestion of panellists being ‘connected’ to particular villages or companies 
owning villages.  
 
Currently RVANZ has a pool of mediators who conduct mediation for member 
villages and the same conditions apply; the operator chooses and pays the 
mediator. If mediation is used more often than the disputes panel, operators will 
become familiar with the style of particular mediators and possibly what outcomes 
have been delivered by certain mediators. This could include how particular 
outcomes transpired during the mediation process; what compromises were 
achieved; and sometimes who has gained the most benefit from an outcome 
facilitated by a particular mediator. If operators have been a party previously, they 
will have learned from this. This does not exemplify a fair and proper process 
and in a different context, it is a situation that has not been tolerated by the courts. 
 
The Court of Appeal in Carter Holt Harvey Forests Ltd v Sunnex Logging Ltd 
held that “the lawyers could not act in a confidential mediation for one client, then 
act for the other clients in parallel litigations against the same defendant”.188  
                                                 
186 This information is published under Retirement Village’s Sector Group Meeting 14th March 
2007 on the Retirement Commission website <www.retirement.org.nz>. Accessed May 2007.  
187 Eight panellists have been approved by the Retirement Commissioner; one resigned in April 
2007.  
188 Carter Holt Harvey Forests Ltd v Sunnex Logging Ltd [2003] 3 NZLR 343.  See the discussion 
of this case by David Williams QC, Arbitration and Dispute Resolution [2002] NZLR, 76-78.  
Also David Carden, Confidentiality in Mediation, AMINZ 2005 Annual Conference, Queenstown, 
New Zealand.    
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Confidentiality was at stake in this example. In the context of retirement village 
disputes, it may not be confidentiality that is compromised, but independence 
along with conflict of interest. The operator (party) in a retirement village context 
is involved in selection of mediators and dispute panels. The rules surrounding 
conflict of interest and possibly confidentiality would disqualify a mediator189 and 
counsel from a similar situation, yet retirement village operators are apparently 
seen in a different light within the Act model.  
 
Mediators who practise in statutory contexts190  report tensions between the goals 
of their contracting organisation such as limitations on fees, time constraints and 
the needs of the parties. In this organisational context, the organisations are not 
parties yet the tensions are acknowledged and apparently taken into account by 
mediators. No one seems to be aware of how or whether this impacts on 
outcomes.191 There is a suggestion that when the Act is reviewed in 2008, the 
disputes panel may move to the jurisdiction of the tenancy tribunal raising 
different issues about the special needs of older New Zealanders in dispute with 
those who have considerable control over their living environment and financial 
interests. This may become the topic of another study but for now, the misfit 
between independence and fairness of process within the complaints facility and 
disputes panel mechanisms in the Act remain, highlighted for ongoing attention in 
this study.  
                                                 
189 AMINZ Code of Ethics states at 2 “A member should disclose any interest or relationship likely 
to affect impartiality or neutrality or which might create an appearance of partiality or bias”. From 
August 2005 David Carden, an approved Disputes Panel member under the Retirement Villages 
Act 2003 and AMINZ member has promoted model standards of conduct for mediators. In March 
2006 these model standards were considered at a Mediator Duties Workshop held in Auckland.  
These being the standards of the American Bar Association, American Arbitration Association and 
Association for Conflict Resolution which take the issues of conflict of interest and impartiality to 
higher levels of application than sometimes experienced in New Zealand. For example, Standard 
III A. states “A mediator shall avoid a conflict of interest or the appearance of a conflict of interest 
during and after mediation. A conflict of interest can arise from involvement of a mediator with 
the subject matter of a dispute or from any relationship between a mediation participant, whether 
past or present, personal or professional, that reasonably raises a question of a mediator’s 
impartiality”.  In addition Standard III E qualifies this further by placing the duty to withdraw with  
the mediator; “If a mediator’s conflict of interest might reasonably be viewed as undermining the 
integrity of the mediation, a mediator shall withdraw from or decline to proceed with the 
mediation regardless of the expressed desire or agreement of the parties to the contrary”.  In this 
context, mediators who have acted previously in that capacity for a particular village with the same 
operator as a party, should not act again as a mediator for that village. It is unlikely however that 
aged residents would grasp the significance of the repeated role of the mediator and even if they 
did, evidence suggests they would be unlikely to complain.  Questions of fairness and integrity of 
process naturally follow.  
190 For example, housing/tenancy, employment and the Family Court.  
191 Conversations about these and similar issues take place regularly at meetings of the Waikato 
and BOP branches of AMINZ.  
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3.3 The Act’s key legislative roles and compliance elements: 
actors, factors, and contradictions. 
 
The key roles of the four government agencies are; 
• The Department of Building and Housing is responsible for 
administration of the Act from July 2005 
• The Registrar of Companies (Ministry of Economic Development) is 
also  the Registrar of Retirement Villages 
• The Retirement Commissioner is responsible for managing the disputes 
panel process 192 
• The Registrar-General of Lands is responsible for noting relevant details 
on the land titles of the village193   
 
The key compliance elements of the Act are; 
• s10: the operator of a retirement village must ensure that it is registered 
under the Act 
• s10 (2) (c) the operator must appoint a statutory supervisor (unless 
exempted) 
• s12: if a retirement village has one or more residents at the 
commencement of this particular section (to be specified in regulations), 
an application for registration must be lodged within six months from the 
1st May 2007 
• s13: an operator must deliver for registration an annual return for the 
village. Upon s10 registration, the Registrar of Retirement Villages will 
allocate a month to that retirement village for the purposes of the annual 
return 
• s21: upon registration, the registrar must notify the Registrar–General of 
Land. The Registrar-General must note a memorial against the title to the 
village land. Under s22, that memorial restricts the rights of a security 
holder to enforce its security in certain regards 
                                                 
192 The Retirement Commissioner has a management role in the Disputes Panel Regulations; cl 7, 
Operator to give Retirement Commissioner documents; cl 26, Retirement Commissioner to hold 
records of disputes but the Act , Part 3, s36 (1) states clearly “The functions of the Retirement 
Commissioner in relations to this Act are as follows: (a) to monitor the effects of this Act and the 
regulations and code of practice made under this Act:…” [emphasis added] 
193 NZ Companies Office <www.companies.govt.nz> accessed from website 17th November 2006. 
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• s27: the occupation licence agreement itself must contain at least the 
information prescribed in the Act. The intending resident must receive 
independent legal advice 
• s30: before an occupation right agreement may be entered into, the 
intending resident must receive a disclosure statement which sets out the 
prescribed information concerning the village, the residents’ code of 
rights and the village code of practice 
• s32: Villages must have a code of residents’ rights. The minimum rights 
conferred upon a resident are set out in Schedule 4 of the Act.  
• s50: in any retirement village there are to be two forms of dispute 
procedure: a complaints facility and dispute resolution. 
• s89: each village must comply with the code of practice governing the 
management and operation of retirement villages. The code was 
approved by the Minister responsible for the administration of the Act on 
the 25th September 2006; the code will apply to all villages194 from 25th 
September 2007 (unless exempted).  
 
Announcing the approval of the regulations which will, by the end of 2007, bring 
the Act fully into force, the Minister for Building Issues stated;  
For the first time, all residents will have a mechanism for resolving their 
disputes with village owners and managers, and a clear voice…Often residents’ 
only option has been court action, which can be out of reach for those on fixed 
incomes… 
…This will ensure accessible and fair hearings in a sector where disputes tend to 
involve substantial issues, both in property and emotional terms… 
…This is about informed consent and protecting the best interests of older New 
Zealanders entering complex contractual arrangements…the Government was 
not prepared to let the safety and security of residents rely on goodwill… The 
Act will for the first time, require all villages to be registered and to meet 
required standards…195 
 
It is curious that a Minister speaks of “accessible and fair hearings”; “substantial 
issues both property and money” and “protecting the best interests of older New 
Zealanders”, when the parties with whom these older New Zealanders are in 
dispute are given the control of so many facets of the dispute resolution processes. 
Whether the writers of this law had an informed knowledge about the principles of 
                                                 
194 A Segedin, NZLJ [2004] April; bracketed comments updated, emphasis added for clarification .  
195 Hon Clayton Cosgrove, 27th September 2006, accessed from< http://www.behive.govt.nz> 6th 
November 2006:102-104. 
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independence and fair and proper process is questioned. Nevertheless, the 
existing law remains, to be reviewed in 2008. 
 
The Act is supported by the Retirement Villages (General) Regulations 2006; the 
Retirement Villages (Disputes Panel) Regulations 2006; the Retirement Villages 
(Fees) Regulations 2006 and the Retirement Villages Code of Practice 2006.  The 
regulations surrounding dispute resolution are currently in force. The general 
regulations came into force on the 1st May 2007 but the code of practice is not 
effective until the 25th September 2007 unless an operator agrees to be bound 
earlier. Previously the Securities Act 1978 applied to the majority of retirement 
villages and some with unit title.  
 
The resident or the operator is entitled under the Act to seek dispute resolution 
through the Disputes Panel unless the dispute relates to health or disability 
services, or any facilities that would fall under the Health and Disability Services 
Commissioner Act 1994. This includes matters contained in the Code of Health 
and Disability Services Consumers’ Rights.196   
 
3.3.1 Residents 
 
The Act provides a very broad coverage for residents including five sub-sections 
covering contravention of an occupation right agreement by an operator making 
an occupation right agreement voidable under the Act.197 An occupation right 
agreement means any written agreement or other document or combination of 
documents that;  
(a) confers on any person the right to occupy a residential unit within a 
retirement village; and            
(b) specifies any terms or conditions to which that right is subject.198 
 
Other types of disputes for which residents may give dispute notice cover breach 
of the resident’s occupation right including access to services or facilities; charges 
for outgoings or services or facilities; charges or deductions imposed as a result of 
the resident’s occupation right coming to an end; a breach of a right referred to in 
the resident’s code of rights or the code of practice; a breach of the resident’s 
rights or the code of practice in disposing of a residential unit in a retirement 
village formerly occupied by the resident. A resident may also give a dispute 
                                                 
196 RVA s 53 (2). 
197 s 31(1) (2) (3) (4) (5). 
198 Part 1, 5 Preliminary Provisions,  RVA 2003. 
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notice when another resident or a person in another resident’s unit with 
permission, affects the resident’s occupation right.199  
 
3.3.2 Operators 
 
An operator may give a dispute notice under the same sections of the Act 
concerning occupation rights; access to services or facilities; charges for 
outgoings or access to services and facilities imposed under the resident’s 
occupation right agreement or relating to charges or deductions imposed as a 
result of the resident’s occupation right coming to and end for any reason; or 
relating to money due to the resident under the resident’s occupation right 
agreement following termination or avoidance under section 31 of the resident’s 
occupation right agreement.200 The operator may also give a dispute notice in 
certain circumstance where suspension of registration of the village is 
concerned201  and offers of occupation have been suspended.202 Other sections of 
the Act concerning voiding of occupation rights,203 withdrawing all advertising 
and not entering occupation rights agreements, 204 and contraventions of 
occupation right agreements205 allow dispute notices to be given by operators.  
                                                 
199 s 53 (1 ) (3) (4). 
200 s53 (1) (a) to (c). 
201 s18(3). 
202 s25(1). 
203 s31(1). 
204 s18(3). 
205 s31(1). 
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3.3.3 Disputes process 
 
The disputes flowchart available through the Retirement Commission website is 
set out below. 
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3.3.4 Role of Statutory Supervisor  
 
Under the Act, the role of the statutory supervisor will be focussed on the 
collective interests of residents and the financial viability of the retirement village. 
In certain circumstances the operator must notify the statutory supervisor of 
disputes as soon as practicable after a dispute notice has been given.206 This 
includes situations where the operator considers the outcome of the dispute may 
affect a significant number of residents; the general operation of the village and 
the operator’s rights and obligations under the deed of supervision. In addition 
there is the situation when a resident has issued a dispute notice concerning the 
operator’s breach of the resident’s occupation right (or code of practice) in 
disposing of a residential unit in a retirement village formerly occupied by the 
resident.  
 
The operator must also immediately inform the parties to the dispute that 
notification of the dispute has been made to the statutory supervisor. Residents too 
can inform the statutory supervisor of a dispute they are a party to and have the 
right to make a complaint about the breach of their rights to the statutory 
supervisor.207 They can also involve the statutory supervisor in a dispute once a 
dispute notice “may” be given. This indicates residents can involve the statutory 
supervisor in a dispute prior to the dispute notice being given.208 In addition, 
statutory supervisors have duties and powers under sections 42 and 43 of the Act 
which could mean a resident may not know of actions taken by the statutory 
supervisor but nevertheless, any matters of concern on the part of the residents 
would fall into the category of complaints. The Act states; 
42 Duties of statutory supervisor 
 A statutory supervisor must – 
(a) provide a stake holder facility (for example, under section 29(1)) for 
intending residents pay deposits or progress payments in respect of 
occupation right agreements or uncompleted residential units or 
facilities at the retirement village; and  
(b) monitor the financial position of the retirement village; and 
                                                 
206 s55. The extent to which a statutory supervisor becomes involved in a complaints facility for a 
village will depend on the terms of their deed of supervision with the village operators. Some 
operators will have detailed requirements requiring statutory supervisors to take an active role in 
complaints. This information was provided by John Greenwood, personal communication 27th 
February 2007. 
207 Schedule 4, 8,  Code of Residents’ Rights.  
208 s55 (3). 
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(c) report annually to the Registrar and residents on the performance of its 
duties and the exercise of its powers; and 
(d) perform any other duties that are imposed by this Act or any other Act, 
any regulations made under this Act, and any documents of 
appointment.  
 
43 Powers of statutory supervisor  
(1) If a statutory supervisor believes the financial position of the retirement 
village, the security of the interests of the residents or the management 
of the retirement village is inadequate, the statutory supervisor may – 
(a) direct the operator to supply all residents (or their nominated 
representatives) with the information that the statutory supervisor 
may specify; or 
(b) direct the operator to operate the retirement village in a specified 
manner; or 
(c) apply to the Court under section 49 of the Securities Act 1978 
which applies with all necessary modifications.    
 
(2) The statutory supervisor may direct that an advertisement that the 
statutory supervisor considers is inconsistent with this Act or 
regulations made under this Act, or the disclosure statement, occupation 
right agreement, or code of practice, not be published or distributed.  
 
 
These duties and powers are broad, far more encompassing and imposing than 
those invoked under the Securities Act 1978 under which a statutory supervisor 
previously operated. Since the General Regulations came into force on the 1st May 
2007, the powers of statutory supervisors can be extended through provisions of a 
‘deed of supervision’ that potentially places the statutory supervisor in the role of 
resident advocate.209 In the context of this study, the independence and perceived 
independence of this role is critical because of the responsibility attached to over 
seeing the interests of residents.210 
 
                                                 
209 Retirement Village (General) Regulations, 2006. For example cl 47 (1) (b) in accordance with 
section 33 (2) (b) of the Act (resident entitled to bring an allegation of breach of a right referred to 
in the code of residents’ rights to the attention of the statutory supervisor); cl 53(1) relates to 
provisions in deeds of supervision such as the operator having to provide the statutory supervisor 
with any communications a resident is entitled to receive; (c) permits the statutory supervisor to 
attend meetings of the residents and be heard in any discussion at the meeting concerning the 
statutory supervisor or the residents; to call a meeting of the residents; (d) to attend a meeting of 
the residents called by at least 10% of the residents (iii) “for the purpose of the residents giving the 
statutory supervisor their opinions or directions relating to the exercise of the statutory 
supervisor’s powers; “(e) require a meeting of the residents of the village called by the statutory 
supervisor to be chaired by a person appointed by - (i)  the statutory supervisor; or (ii)  if the 
statutory supervisor does not appoint a chair, the majority of the residents of the village who are at 
the meeting”. These are selected parts of the regulations that implicate the statutory supervisor in 
an advocacy role.        
210 One trustee company advertises on its website that it provides “statutory supervision and 
advocacy for retirement villages throughout New Zealand” (accessed 25th June 2007). It sees  
independence as its paramount ethical responsibility; acting for residents only and focussing on 
dispute avoidance through close involvement with residents. Associate membership of RVANZ is 
seen by the Trustee Director as a way of giving that organisation the benefit of some of its 
experiences (Trustee Director, 5th July 2007).  
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It has been acknowledged that statutory supervisors have already been involved to 
an extent in dispute resolution and this will expand under s55 (3) of the Act211 
however, their role is perceived as being more connected to operators than 
residents.212 This being so, what do we know about resident knowledge of this 
important role? The Retirement Commission survey showed levels of confusion 
about the role which may indicate policy changes are required. For example; 
 
over half of Residents can say whether or not their village has a Statutory 
Supervisor (56%) and the majority of those do have one. Almost half (44%) do 
not know.213   
 
Causing confusion regarding residents’ knowledge about statutory supervisors is 
the finding relating to “Overall Satisfaction with Statutory Supervisor”; 
 
Almost half (46%) of Residents who say they have a Statutory Supervisor say 
they have had any contact. Regardless of whether they have had contact or not, 
all Residents with Statutory Supervisors were asked how satisfied they were 
overall with their Statutory Supervisor. Three quarters (74%) state they were 
satisfied with their Statutory Supervisor. Only 6% say they are dissatisfied. 
 
This indicates residents who had no contact with the statutory supervisor (54%) 
were in the majority “satisfied” with their statutory supervisor; only 6% being 
dissatisfied.  
                                                 
211 Greenwood, J and Marks, S  Retirement Villages, New Zealand Law Society (2004) 38. 
212 Retirement Commission Retirement Villages Adviser, 4th December 2006. A personal 
experience of a visit to a retirement village late last year provided feedback that came in the form 
of a comment made by a manager. The manager was talking about village audits and spoke of 
[their] statutory supervisor being like an adviser and friend of the village. This indicated a level of 
closeness which the role would understandably involve but also raised questions about 
professional boundaries and expectations of managers of the role vis-à-vis the legal definition of 
the role and what that should involve concerning independence of the role. Recently the secretary 
of a Waikato Residents’ Committee reported concerns (to the Retirement Commission and to me) 
about lack of support and perception of lack of independence of the Village’s statutory supervisor.  
Problems in this village development are being taken up by the local MP who does not want to 
publicise the issues for fear of bad publicity impacting on sales in the village. The village received 
its first residents two years ago. At this time, the death of a resident and the sale of their apartment 
is hampered by the soggy, unfinished construction site around the uncompleted complex. The 
family members of the deceased occupant have to continue to pay ongoing charges because the 
Code of Practice limiting this does not come into effect until the 25th September 2007. Sales are 
not occurring due to the unfinished state of the complex. In the meantime it appears there is a lack 
of goodwill on the part of the developer to complete the project and lack of commitment by the 
statutory supervisor to heed the existing situation in this uncompleted village. Villagers are 
experiencing difficulties including finding level ground to walk on or push walking frames and 
they have no permanent manager to see essential tasks are carried out. The secretary of the 
residents’ committee is unable to move to another village in the region because of the adverse 
financial impact on her limited funds; this was a solution put to her by the developer at a recent 
meeting at the village. (Communication with Village Residents’ Committee Secretary, 4th July 
2007).  
213 Retirement Commission,  Retirement Villages Survey, ACNeilsen  (2006) 84. 
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One conclusion that could be drawn is that operators do a very adequate job  
informing residents about the role of the statutory supervisor. In contrast, the 
study also found 44% did not know about the role of the statutory supervisor 
suggesting possibly some older people do not like to record their 
dissatisfaction.214  This may be particularly so when the residents for the 
Retirement Commission survey involved those whom the operator had given 
permission to be interviewed. Of these, 9 refused to be interviewed and 15 
screened themselves out because they were aware there was to be a survey.215 
Residents who had left the surveyed villages were not interviewed. 216 This 
situation raises further questions, unable to be addressed here but it is worthwhile 
to point out, the pre-Act role of the statutory supervisor was much narrower and 
the survey was conducted prior to the Act’s implementation. The role now has a 
much wider focus including complaints, making it of greater significance to 
residents. 
 
3.3.4.1. Independence of role 
 
The recent Law Society Seminar on retirement villages takes the view that while 
statutory supervisors are an independent party, they can “look at a dispute from a 
fresh perspective rather than being an advocate for a resident”.217The role appears 
confused and conflicted.  However it is anticipated as residents’ become better 
informed about the Act and the Code of Practice which comes into effect on the 
25th September 2007, residents will begin to ask questions about what value the 
statutory supervisors are providing.218  There is some evidence this has already 
occurred.219 
                                                 
214 Refer also to the studies previously quoted by Streib, Folts and La Greca, 1988; Streib and 
Metsch, 2002 and Simpson, 2006.  
215 This information was provided by the Commission’s Retirement Villages Adviser.  
216 Retirement Commission, Retirement Village Adviser’s presentation to Sector Group meeting 
13th December 2006.  
217 Greenwood, J and Burke, M  Retirement Villages – the full impact of the Act, New Zealand 
Law Society Seminar, March 2007, 30. 
218 Snr Policy Advisor, Department of Building and Housing, 4th July 2007.  It was explained the 
Code of Practice will require operators to provide itemized invoices. When residents see where 
their money is going (which may include payment to statutory supervisors) this will be noted by 
residents and they will want to be sure there is value to them from this payment.  
219 I have become aware of one large South Island Retirement Village where residents heard of a 
sale in the village falling over in early May 2007, reportedly due to comments made by the 
statutory supervisor favouring ‘licence to occupy’ tenure: resident’s believed this would seriously 
impact on the values of their units and therefore saleability of units.  A special meeting called by 
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Clause 49(g) of the General Regulations imposes duties on an operator including 
“to accept the statutory supervisor as a representative of the interests of the 
residents of the village in any matter relating to the village”. In addition, the 
Retirement Villages Code of Practice 2006 makes special provision for access to 
the statutory supervisor; 
 
3. The operator must have a process for residents to contact the statutory 
supervisor (if there is one) about an alleged breach of a right, or to make a 
complaint. The operator must inform residents about any change to this 
process. 
 
4. The operator must inform residents in writing of the name of the statutory           
supervisor (if there is one) and how to contact them. Code of residents’ rights 
in Schedule 4.220 
 
This being the case, the independence and perceived independence of statutory 
supervisors should be an imperative in appointments to this position under the 
Act. The Law Society in an earlier seminar highlighted the ‘independence’ of 
statutory supervisors. 
 
…Operators still have the prime role in appointing statutory supervisors. The 
Justice and Electoral Committee, in their wisdom, considered that the fact that 
statutory supervisors are appointed and paid for by the operator will have no 
bearing on the independence of statutory supervisors…221 
 
Currently the existing statutory supervisors are associate members of RVANZ and 
two companies specialise in retirement village supervision.222 How independence; 
suggestions of conflict of interest; and the performance of statutory is to be 
monitored under the new regime is not specified. Again operators both appoint 
and pay for a key role affecting residents’ interests; the perception of 
compromised independence naturally follows.  
                                                                                                                                     
the residents to address what they saw as a breach of their right to be consulted and informed was 
held; around 200 attended. Later, the residents conveyed (via management) a statement to the 
statutory supervisor expressing their disappointment about the ‘licence to occupy’ comments and 
strongly criticising the statutory supervisor’s style and length of presentation as unsuitable for the 
age and understanding of the audience (Residents’ representative 4th July 2007). 
220 Retirement Villages Code of Practice 2006, 30, 3 & 4, p27. 
221 Greenwood, J and Marks, S  Retirement Villages (2004) 38.  
222 While existing statutory supervisors are associates of  RVANZ, they have differing ideas about 
how their relationship with RVANZ is managed. One sees its connection with the sector as limited 
to informing the sector about its experiences as a residents’ advocate (reported 5th July 2007). 
Another has a moving advertisement on the ‘home page’ of RVANZ’s website and a profile 
informs that this trustee regularly features as a speaker at RVANZ conferences. 
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Statutory supervisors have oversight over residents’ villages and the issues and 
interests of residents. Under the Act, statutory supervisors must be approved by 
the Securities Commission Registrar. Once approved, appointment is indefinite, 
whereas prior to the Act the appointment was for up to five years. In addition 
there is no requirement to seek independence for this role. The existing statutory 
supervisors are to continue in the role223 and already have established 
relationships with village operators; a situation I believe can be strengthened 
through affiliation with RVANZ.  
 
The notion of ‘biting the hand that feeds’ is an ever present tension in this type of 
context, and is one that is currently at the forefront of Grey Power and residents’ 
committee thinking towards the role of statutory supervisor. For example, there is 
currently a move underway by the sector group RVANZ to vary clause 49.1(e) of 
the Retirement Villages Code of Practice which covers “Refurbishment costs and 
process”. Recent and past publicity224 including reports from the Retirement 
Commissioner to the Minister of Building Issues over several years, have raised 
concerns about refurbishment costs to residents upon vacation of units. The code 
of practice to come into effect on the 25th September contains a new 
refurbishment clause welcomed by residents, Grey Power and Age Concern. The 
clause relates to the occupation right agreement and requires the agreement to;  
 
e. State that the residential unit is to be refurbished to no more than the condition 
of the unit when the resident entered it, less fair wear and tear. 
 
It appears the move to vary this clause will have mixed impact, but is generally 
seen as a detrimental step for the majority of residents. The move to vary the 
clause is supported by one Trustee Company, which describes itself as “the major 
provider of statutory supervision”225 and some legal commentators with an 
interest in the sector. The move to vary the clause has angered residents and 
groups such as Grey Power.226  The Trustee Company believes the issues 
                                                 
223 Section 37 (2) RVA 2003. 
224 For example The Press, 25th May 2004, Ed 2, 5; Consumer 467, March 2007, 36-39; The New 
Zealand Herald 14th April 2007, Part C Business Section; Retirement Commission, Retirement 
Villages Survey 2006, and reports to the Minister from the Retirement Commissioner. 
225 This is the same company that raised concerns in the South Island village. Its website states – 
“We are New Zealand’s leading provider of statutory supervision services to the retirement village 
industry…we have around 50% of the market…” (accessed 25th June 2007).  
226 The Chairman of the Grey Power Retirement Villages portfolio reports the Trustee Company  
made its support for the variation of Cl 49.1(e), known to residents of his village recently.  The 
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surrounding refurbishment have been “overstated”227 and provides two examples 
to demonstrate a wider issue. The examples appear to hold legitimate issues and 
should be considered in the context of universal refurbishment requirements, yet 
there is also widespread concern surrounding excessive refurbishment 
requirements and the fairness of this.228  There appears to have been no 
consultation with the wider resident network other than perhaps those in the two  
examples used by the Trustee Company, but knowledge and support of operator 
interests can be gleaned from its submission.229  
 
Like the dispute panel members, statutory supervisors first must be approved. 
Unlike the disputes panel members, their tenure is indefinite. The role of statutory 
supervisor requires a level of independence at least equivalent with that expected 
of disputes panel members. In addition, monitoring each statutory supervisor’s 
performance including resident feedback should involve assessment of whether 
they have the capability to manage their role as trustees for vulnerable investors; 
the more clients they have, the murkier the waters in terms of realistic oversight 
and case management. For the residents in the examples provided, not only is 
there a perception that one trustee company is not independent, but residents 
                                                                                                                                     
residents find it difficult to accept the role of statutory supervisor, intended by the Act to represent 
the interests of residents and intending residents, supports a variation they believe will 
discriminate against the majority of residents; most have not  been consulted. If an operator is 
genuinely in trouble financially and can prove it cannot comply with the Act or the Code of 
Practice, section 93 of the Act contains exemption provisions. The Chairman estimates it is 
unlikely more than two villages would genuinely qualify for this exemption. The likelihood for 
statutory supervisors to be to be biased towards “those who reward them” is reinforced in the eyes 
of residents through the Company’s justification to seek a variation to the Code of Practice without 
consultation and his position that refurbishment problems have been “overstated” (Grey Power 
Retirement Village portfolio chairman, June 2007).  It is accepted that people will have different 
perspectives on this issue depending on whose perspective they are representing.  All submissions 
on this code variation will be available once the Minister has decided how to proceed. At that time, 
a document analysis can be undertaken which will illuminate the perspectives of the submitters. 
For those who have made their submissions available publicly, it can be ascertained whose 
perspective they are supporting.  In the meantime, the Retirement Commission reports having 
received “numbers” of submissions covering a range of perspectives on the proposed variation to 
the Code.      
227 This comment is contained in the Trustee Company’s submission to the Retirement 
Commissioner 3rd May 2007 to vary Clause 49, 1 (e) of the Code of Practice. The letter suggests 
the dispute resolution processes in the Act will provide “a significant deterrent to abuses of these 
provisions”. 
228 A former Parliamentary Ombudsman and Banking Ombudsman Nadja Tollemache spoke of 
fairness in this way “Fairness is a constantly developing concept...there is no such things as a free 
lunch and in the private sector, measures that may be fair to one person may increase costs of a 
service to such an extent that it will disadvantage and so be potentially unfair to many others”.  
Tollemache, N “Taking the Ombudsman Concept into the Private Sector: Notes on the Banking 
Ombudsman Scheme in New Zealand” [1996] VUWLR 26, 233-245.  
229 The website of this company demonstrates its close alignment with the industry, identifying its 
clients as owners of retirement villages and solicitors: there is no mention of residents as clients. 
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regard the Trustee’s actions in making a statement about their views on Unit Titles 
without having consulted them, as clearly aligned with management and the sector 
group RVANZ. They feel equal concern about the Company’s support to vary the 
refurbishment clause in the Code of Practice. 
 
The Trustee Company in question is obviously experienced in the role of  
statutory supervision and no doubt has excellent marketing skills, having a firm 
hold on the role of statutory supervisor for retirement villages in New Zealand.230 
It is possible these attributes will combine to reveal the Achilles’ heel of its 
business.  
 
The statutory supervisor role is seen as the linchpin of the Act, requiring a high 
level of independence231 and personal ethics.  Retirement Village residents 
deserve and require faithful advocacy; they cannot afford to have their interests in 
the hands of trustees who demonstrate ambivalence towards the independence 
expected of the role.    
 
 
3.3.5 Role of the Retirement Commissioner 
 
The Act sets out the role and responsibilities of the Retirement Commissioner in 
relation to the disputes panel, the main features being the requirement for the 
Commissioner to approve dispute panel members and publish the names on a 
list.232 The appointments are for a term of not longer than 5 years providing the 
person does not fall within a range of situations that would require the 
Commissioner to remove the persons name from the list. In certain circumstances 
the Commissioner has the power to restore a person to the list.233 The Retirement 
Commissioner’s role is described as “limited”234 although the Retirement 
Commissioner sees the functions outlined as having oversight of the disputes 
                                                 
230 See footnote 225. 
231 The Retirement Commission and the Ministry of Economic Development recognise the very 
important role of statutory supervisor which has been described as “the linchpin” of the Act.   
232 s58. 
233 s58(4). 
234 Greenwood, J and Marks, S Retirement Villages, New Zealand Law Society (2004) 35. 
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panel.235 Section 36 sets out the monitoring responsibilities of the Commissioner. 
These are 
1. (a) to monitor the effects of the Act and the Code of Practice made under 
this Act:  
(b) to advise on issues relating to retirement villages when requested to do 
so by the Minister or required by this Act: 
  
 (c) to promote education about retirement village issues and to publish 
information about such issues: 
 (d)  to collect and publish information relating to any of the functions 
referred to in this section: 
 (e) to perform any other function conferred by this Act or regulations made 
under this Act. 
 
A monitoring role by definition suggests investigation at some level. Every 
operator of a retirement village is required to answer “any questions” and supply 
“any information” at the request of the Retirement Commissioner and must do so 
within 20 days of the request unless the Commissioner permits an extension.236 
The Commissioner has no involvement in the approval of statutory supervisors, 
only the approval of disputes panel members237 and no direct advocacy role for 
residents other than through offering advice to the Minister. The Commission’s 
Statement of Intent however states “The Retirement Commission has a broad 
guardianship role in protecting the interests of residents of retirement villages”.238   
 
The role of the Health and Disability Commissioner arose out of the enactment of 
a Code of Patients’ Rights239 set out in the Health and Disability Commissioner 
Act 1994. The banking ombudsman arose from a Code of Banking Practice which 
sets out customer rights.240There is now a Code of Residents’ Rights incorporated 
in the Retirement Villages Act 2003241 which makes clear resident entitlements 
                                                 
235 Retirement Commissioner, personal communication 6th December 2006. 
236 s36(3).    
237 The New Zealand Law Society seminar “Retirement Villages” raises the matter of the 
continuing involvement and extent of any continuing involvement of the Retirement 
Commissioner in the retirement village industry in future. The writers make the point that 
government funding of the “Commissioner’s functions will dictate to a large extent what 
monitoring and educative role is adopted”. They also anticipate the need for the Commissioner to 
balance the dual roles under both the Retirement Income Act 1993 and the Retirement Villages 
Act 2006. What the writers appear to be addressing in terms of the “dual role”, is the possible 
tension between ensuring retirement financial planning for all New Zealand citizens remains a key 
government focus juxtaposed to ensuring older New Zealanders have an informed, government 
appointed figure, involved in their welfare and financial well-being once they become residents of 
a retirement village.  
238 See Retirement Commission website <www.retirement.org.nz>. 
239 Paterson, R  “ The Patients’ Complaints System in New Zealand [2002] Health Affairs, Vol 21, 
3, 70-79. 
240 Tollemache, N “Taking the Ombudsman Concept into the Private Sector: Notes on the Banking 
Ombudsman Scheme in New Zealand” VUWLR [1996] 26, 240. 
241 Schedule 4, Code of Residents’ Rights, RVA 2003. 
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and minimum requirements to be included in any occupation right agreement. We 
have an existing Retirement Commissioner with an established statutory 
administrative base, with a “broad guardianship role” yet retirement village 
residents can be seen as disadvantaged in the advocacy stakes because of an 
apparent definitional and policy preference in the Commission’s interpretation of 
the term ‘guardianship’. 
 
3.4 Retirement Villages Association of New Zealand approach 
to complaints and disputes 
 
3.4.1 What the Act and code of practice prescribes set 
against what RVANZ promotes 
 
Section 51 of the Act places the responsibility on the operators of every retirement 
village to operate and make known to residents, the existence in the village “of a 
facility for dealing with complaints by the residents”. In addition the Retirement 
Villages Code of Practice 2006, clause 31 refers to “Procedure for making and 
acknowledging complaints by residents” and clause 31.1 states; 
The operator must have a written procedure for dealing with complaints about 
the operator or other residents of the retirement village. Section 51   
 
The Act and the regulations specify the complaints facility is for dealing with 
complaints made by residents against operators and residents against residents.  
In contrast, the Complaints Policy page on the RVANZ website provides the 
following information; 
 
The RVA Complaints Process enables both complainants and operators the 
opportunity to access the most appropriate process for resolution of their 
complaint…242 
 
Under a heading “What is the Retirement Villages Association” the Association 
states; 
The RVA is a national body that works to represent, protect and promote the 
interests of its members and their associated services.243 
 
The Association’s updated Constitution provides specific objectives in relation to 
promoting standards within the industry.244 These include; promoting the interests 
                                                 
242 Complaints Policy, RVANZ, accessed  28th November 2006 and 24th May 2007.                                                           
<www.retirementvillages.org.nz> 
243 <www.retirementvillages.org.nz> (complaints) 
244 Clause 3.1.1 RVANZ Constitution August 16th 2006. 
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and good reputation of members;245 improving conditions of the industry in a 
“proper and lawful manner”;246 and in terms of dispute resolution, providing and 
maintaining; 
…dispute resolution processes and procedures dealing with residents’ 
complaints or issues in relation to their occupation of a Retirement Village 
and/or complaints or issues of Operators.247  
 
In addition, the Constitution clause 3.1.9 states;  
To petition Parliament or any authority on any matter for the general benefit of 
the Industry including the suggestion of amendments to laws affecting 
Members’ interests and to promote and/or oppose any current or proposed 
legislation, regulation or requirement that in any way affects the interests of 
Members and to take such steps for this purpose as the Executive determines. 
 
These selected statements concerning standards taken from the official 
publications of the RVANZ promote the Association’s commitment to member 
interests. This is understandable given the Association’s membership is made up 
of owners and operators; not residents.  
 
A section on Village Operation covers “management consultation with residents” 
and “extent of (resident) participation”. The document determines resident 
participation “to protect their residency, lifestyle or investment” with a rider to 
this participation being subject to management’s requirement for “reasonable 
management autonomy”.248 It is assumed that management can veto residents’ 
participation based on their interpretation of “reasonable management needs”.  
 
The recent Retirement Commission survey found under half (37%) of operators 
work together with their residents in a “consultative” way. A further 47% 
“consult” and 17% “inform” or have “little communication”. Residents are 
provided with the opportunity to “contribute to the formation of the committee for 
resolution of disputes referred to in clause 7.2 and this is specified in the actual 
clause; 7.2 Disputes Committee “The Disputes Committee shall comprise three 
persons as follows: (a) a person appointed by the residents…”.249  
 
                                                 
245 Clause 3.1.4. 
246 Clause 3.1.6. 
247 Clause 3.1.17. 
248 RVANZ Code of  Practice,  6.1. 
249 RVANZ Code of  Practice 6.1 (e). 
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Whether resident contribution to the formation of the complaints committee has 
been given effect, is not known. What is known is the new statutory regulations 
support the establishment of a residents’ committee in every village allowing 
residents to agree to their own rules for running the committee.250  The Retirement 
Commission survey found that in spite of the legislated Code of Practice not 
taking effect until 25th September 2007, 84% of residents in the survey stated 
there was a Residents’ Committee or other grouping of residents in their village. 
Only 68% of operators were aware such a group existed. The surveys found 
“…there are more Residents’ groups or committees functioning in villages than 
Operators are aware of and which they are not meeting with”.251  This finding can 
possibly be linked to Age Concern’s view indicating some residents hold 
meetings in spite of opposition or lack of encouragement from management.252 It 
may also indicate the possibility of lack of operator interest in residents’ 
committees.  
 
RVANZ has a process for dealing with dispute resolution including an internal 
adjudicative process; the RVA Review Authority. 
  
 
                                                 
250 Retirement Villages Code of  Practice 2006, 29. 
251 Retirement Commission, Retirement Villages Survey, ACNeilsen,  2006, 78. 
252 This information was provided in a personal communication November 2006, with an Age 
Concern member endeavouring to set up a national residents’ group. 
 83
 
 
 
 
Clause 13.2 and 13.3 of the reviewed Constitution outlines the Review Authority 
position within the climate of the new Act.253 [emphasis added] 
13.2 The Review Authority shall consist of three persons appointed from time 
to time by the Executive from a pool of persons approved by the 
Executive and the Association. Appointment to the Review Authority 
shall be on such terms and conditions as may be decided from time to 
time by the Executive in its sole discretion but two individuals from the 
same corporate entity or Retirement Village may not be appointed to the 
Review Authority at the same time. At least one person appointed to the 
Review Authority shall be independent of the industry. 
13.3 The Review Authority may conduct its affairs entirely as it sees fit and 
may elect one of its members to be its convenor. 
 
                                                 
253 Reviewed Constitution received from RVANZ Head Office 5th September 2006. 
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The Association’s Review Authority unlike other dispute resolution mechanisms 
does not specify its processes or make clear the way it operates raising a number 
of critical questions;  
(1) Why it is the methods of the Review Authority are not 
transparent? 
(2) Is there a time frame in which certain matters must take place? 
(3) Is there a hearing and if so do people have a right to be heard? 
(4) What information is given to participants? 
(5) Where can a Review Panel hearing be held - i.e. does it meet at 
the resident’s location or do residents have to travel?  
 
A quorum under the Association’s new regime is two members of the Authority; 
one being independent of the industry; decisions are by majority. Numerous other 
clauses pertaining to the operation of the Authority are listed. One of particular 
interest relates to payment to Review Authority members and is described as 
“appropriate remuneration as determined by the Executive”. Prior to the Act’s 
Disputes Panel being approved, it was not known what the cost would be to 
RVANZ operators using the Disputes Panel.  
 
There is confusion in the terminology used by the RVANZ resulting in its 
processes appearing contradictory and at odds with the Act model. It is also a 
complicated model requiring residents (and their complaints) to go through a 
number of processes. Most significantly it shows a choice of two models; the Act 
model or the Association’s, yet the Act is specific: part 4, s50 states “In any 
retirement village there are 2 forms of dispute procedure: a complaints facility and 
dispute resolution”. Section 51 states “The operator must operate and make 
known to the residents of a retirement village a facility for dealing with 
complaints by the resident”. Section 52 (1) addresses dispute resolution and a 
dispute notice. This terminology is in keeping with accepted dispute resolution 
language; complaints are usually internal matters and disputes usually involve 
external independent dispute resolution mechanisms. 254  Simply stated, 
complaints systems usually underpin disputes systems. The RVANZ model is 
complicated and confusing in this regard.  
 
                                                 
254 Sourdin, T Alternative Dispute Resolution (2nd Ed) 2005, 10.100, Chap 10. 
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Documentation pertaining to the first disputes hearing conducted near Wellington 
in February 2006 provides evidence of the confusion caused by inaccurate 
terminology and several processes operating; under statute; within RVANZ and 
individual villages. The panellist had difficulty sorting out exactly what 
documents were being referred to in a number of communications. Consistent use 
of language and application of accepted dispute resolution terms would assist. 
 
3.4.2  Some critical issues 
 
The continuation of the Association’s Review Authority for unresolved resident 
complaints following implementation of the Act is a situation that may not have 
been considered by legislators; anticipated cost of the Disputes Panel being 
RVANZ’s justification. Residents however can, by issuing a dispute notice, avoid 
the Association’s internal process and opt for the Disputes Panel which offers 
greater protection and finality of a dispute. Whether the legitimate concerns that 
prompted the Retirement Villages Act are no longer within the sight of the 
RVANZ is not clear. The Association’s decision to allow operators to make 
complaints about residents along with its continued promotion of its Review 
Authority, suggests the Association prefers to be in control of issues that may 
involve costs and expose its members to public scrutiny through the public 
Disputes Panel process.  
 
The NSW state residents’ association is experienced in the issues connecting, 
legislation, dispute resolution processes (external and internal) and reasons why 
the sector may prefer issues to stay inside the village walls. Currently the NSW 
Act is under review: the Retirement Villages Amendment Bill 2006 which has 
passed through the consultation phase is said to provide greater protection to 
residents and reduce red tape for operators.255 A report is available on the Office 
of Fair Trading (OFT) website.256 The government however has not disclosed 
what recommendations from the report it has included in the Bill which remains 
under wraps. It has been reported that operators pushed for village based systems 
                                                 
255 The Minister of Fair Trading in a news release on the 22nd November 2006 identified 
“significant elements of the Bill” including provisions to improve the disclosure of information to 
incoming residents; improving dispute resolution procedures; limiting the continuation of charges 
once a resident leaves; reducing red tape for operators by simplifying accounting and budget 
procedures. This news release was obtained from the Fair Trading website, February 2007. 
<www.fairtrading.nsw.gov.au>   
256 <www.fairtrading.nsw.gov.au> 
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at every level unless significant matters of law were involved. NSW state 
residents’ representatives say  
…operators would have pushed for that in their submissions. They are required 
under the Act to indicate in the Disclosure Statement (Schedule 1 to the RV 
regulation) when there are court or tribunal cases and to reveal the decisions. To 
get around that which could affect their sales – why wouldn’t an operator 
develop a system in the village?  
   
…The trouble with dealing with OFT officers and Government Members of 
Parliament and their staff is that none of them have experience of living in a 
village and thus do not know how an operator can play to the residents who are 
gullible as well as vulnerable.257 
 
This may also be an issue to consider in the New Zealand context. The nature of 
operator influence on residents can be seen in a variety of circumstances; it can 
also impinge on the independence of residents in a number of ways including 
preventing transparency in dispute resolution processes.  
 
3.4.3 Over-kill?  
 
The Retirement Commission survey covered retirement villages only where the 
operator gave permission and the “most frail” residents were not interviewed.258 
This ‘gate-keeping’ while obviously legitimate and sensible in instances where 
resident frailty is concerned not only raises the possibility of operators being able 
to manipulate who takes part in surveys, but also the issue of operators being able 
to make complaints about residents.  
 
Where power relations are so disparate it is not obvious why an organisation 
basing its livelihood on providing accommodation and services for the aged 
would provide a facility for its members to make complaints against the residents. 
The Association’s Constitution and Code of Practice promotes “the interests and 
good reputation of members and improve the conditions of the Industry in every 
proper and lawful manner”.259 Perhaps this may be seen as a  type of David and 
Goliath situation with the frail, powerless residents finding themselves at the 
mercy of the strong and powerful owners who, blinded by their inability to see 
themselves as others do, blunder on until their strategy is exposed, powerful no 
more. 
                                                 
257 Secretary NSW Retirement Villages Residents’ Association email dated 23rd November 2006.   
258 Retirement Villages Survey 2006, Retirement Commission, December 2006, Appendix 11, vi. 
259 Clauses 3.1.4 and 3.1.6 Constitution of Retirement Villages Association of New Zealand 
Incorporated, 16th August 2006; The Code of Practice and Minimum Operating Standards, 
Retirement Villages Association of New Zealand, February 2002.  
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The NSW state residents’ association has a particular view on surveys undertaken 
for the purposes of ascertaining whether residents feel their village complies with 
accreditation requirements. The Office of Fair Trading apparently carries out these 
surveys and does not ask questions about the financial management of the village. 
The association describes the NSW accreditation requirements which once 
accomplished, allow a village to include that accreditation in any advertising.  
They [OFT] survey 10% of the residents and while they say it is not a contrived 
system, nevertheless I have never heard a person who is anti-management ever 
being asked to reply to the survey. Our main objection to the system is that they 
never ask whether the staff is good or bad and whether the services are adequate 
or not, but leave out the one where residents are critical of the fees being 
charged…260  
 
On the one hand operators want to “protect” frail residents from being involved in 
surveys and on the other,  RVANZ has set up a system allowing operators to take 
complaints of harassment against residents.261 The incongruence with the context 
is startling. There are other options for professionally competent managers to deal 
with difficult residents. Operators are in the business of elder accommodation262 
which the residents have usually paid for upon entry and will continue to pay for, 
therefore sector leaders should be looking to educate operators and staff about 
managing difficult situations. The facility for this type of complaint in an elder 
living context will have impact when a New Zealand residents’ association is 
formed. Publicity naming villages with facilities for operators to take complaints 
against residents would have an impact. Chances are, resident recruits might be 
difficult to attract to those villages. 
 
3.4.4  Where does this leave residents? 
 
The Act’s disputes panel and the 2006 Disputes Panel Regulations were in the 
realms of contestation before they were fully implemented and prior to the Code 
of Practice coming into force. What actually transpires after all components of the 
Act are operational may depend on the weight of resident opinion and how justice 
and fairness of process is perceived by them and others. It is likely informed 
residents will perceive the Act model has been rejected by sector leaders in favour 
                                                 
260 Email communication from Secretary NSW Retirement Villages Residents’ Association, 23rd 
November 2006.  
261 RVANZ confirmed harassment by a resident would be grounds for an operator to make a 
complaint. 
262 Some retirement villages also provide different levels of care to meet the changing needs of 
residents as they age.   
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of the less independent in-house disputes process (the Review Authority); a 
process controlled by the sector and lacking public accountability through 
published decisions. The consequences of this will be loss of residents’ 
confidence in the process and RVANZ’s credibility will be seriously 
compromised.  
 
 
3.5 Summary 
 
This chapter has provided an overview of the Retirement Villages Act 2003 and 
its complexities and contradictions. I have included criticisms fielded by the 
Retirement Commission and added my own. These are directed primarily at the 
way provisions in the Act allocate operators’ tasks that seriously compromise the 
fairness and independence of the DR process. I have argued the role of the 
statutory supervisor cannot be seen as independent or offering assurance to 
residents that their interests are not compromised by the ambiguity of the role and 
the lack of accountability for that role. The role lacks tenure of office, a neutral 
remuneration base and independence from operator interests. I have shown this 
situation can be linked in part to the broadening of the duties and powers of the 
role contained in sections 42 and 43 of the Act and the apparent lack of limitation 
on individuals and companies access to this role: I have highlighted industry 
‘capture’ as a significant concern. 
 
I have considered the role of the Retirement Commission and suggested it is out 
of kilter with comparative contexts where codes of rights have been implemented 
to protect sectors of the community and ombuds/commissioners appointed to 
serve as independent advocates/dispute resolutionists for consumers.  
 
I have examined the complaints and disputes processes of RVANZ and found 
confusion and lack of understanding of terminology about dispute resolution 
processes. The continuation of the Association’s Review Authority suggests the 
possibility of a preference to bypass the Act model which consequently may 
impact on some resident’s access to fairness and independence of process. I have 
highlighted the Association’s intention to provide a facility for operators to make 
complaints about residents, seeing this as a moral and ethical contradiction to the 
Association’s Code of Practice and Constitution.  
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The following chapter examines the key principles of DR processes and considers 
how these principles might be experienced by parties involved in disputes.  
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Chapter 4 Towards theoretical principles for 
evaluating dispute resolution models 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to develop principles to inform DR processes. A 
particular focus of this review will be the principles that attempt to balance the 
power relations in less powerful groups such as residents of retirement villages. 
All DR processes are guided by a number of key principles which explicitly and 
implicitly guide the process. I understand conflict and disputes as complex 
phenomena, made up of many different interrelated parts; any change in one part 
will affect others. This being so, the principles involved in DR processes should 
be sensitive and synchronised with the context and culture of the participants, 
including their gender and age.  
 
As a woman, communication and conflict specialist and researcher, the 
perspective I take on the principles that ought to inform methods and models of 
DR, should attempt to balance the power relations between participants in such a 
way that the powerlessness ought to be recognised and reflected in the 
experiences of the participants.  
 
 
4.2 Principles involved in determinative and consensual DR 
processes: a starting point 
  
In the Law Commission Report, Delivering Justice for All,263  the President’s 
opening statement emphasises the preservation of “fundamental and immutable 
principles” alongside the need for the accommodation of “flexibility and 
change”.264 The report seeks the delivery of responsive and flexible processes 
incorporating the accepted fundamental principles of 
• Equality before the law 
• Adherence of the rule of law  including principled appeal rights265 
• Fair and proper process 
                                                 
263 Delivering Justice for All: A Vision for New Zealand Courts and Tribunals, Law Commission 
Report 85, 2004. 
264 Ibid,  8. 
265 Ibid, 3-4. 
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• Independent adjudication266 which includes the principle of impartiality  
• Accessibility 
• Efficiency including timeliness  
 
There is an expectation also that citizens will make efforts to resolve disputes 
prior to entry into the Court system and alternative forms of dispute resolution can 
be seen as playing a very significant role in this regard; rules may change due to 
the lack of transparency and the confidentiality of ADR processes but the basic 
principles remain for ADR processes, including tribunals.267 This includes parties 
being treated in an even-handed, fair and impartial manner; processes such as 
mediation follow accepted rules and procedures; accessibility is covered by the 
availability of accredited mediators through professional membership of AMINZ 
or LEADR and facilitators and mediators are responsible for ensuring parties 
understand the process, the issues and language268 in which they are presented in 
order to participate fully in the process.    
 
Through my reading, I have identified two concepts that provide additional tools 
to the array of processes available to manage and resolve disputes. These concepts 
are;  
• Process pluralism 
• Advocacy (non-legal) 
 
The concept process-pluralism has two requirements; the first is that all those 
affected by decisions should participate in the decision-making process; the 
second surrounds the choice of process which must take account of the morality of 
any outcomes, the legitimacy of the process and the context of both the conflict 
and the participants. Together these two requirements result in procedural 
fairness. Advocacy requires conflict engagement through effective coaching and 
educating of parties on how to conduct themselves through the course of conflict. 
                                                 
266 Ibid, 8.  
267 Astor, H and Chinkin, H Dispute Resolution in Australia (2nd ed, 2002); Spiller, P (Ed) Dispute 
Resolution in New Zealand (1999); Sourdin, T, Alternative Dispute Resolution (2nd ed , 2005);  
Code of Residents’ Rights, Schedule 4, Retirement Villages Act 2003 and the Retirement Villages 
Code of Practice, 2006. 
268 Language in this context means style of presentation, understanding the issues involved and the 
way they have been framed. 
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This can be achieved only when conflict is exposed and the reasons behind it 
understood.  
 
I will first discuss the principles equality before the law, adherence to the rule of 
law, fair and proper process and independent adjudication according to the 
history, law or what key writers have to say on the subject. There is overlap 
between these principles; for example adherence to the rule of law means treating 
people in an even handed way which also impacts on fair and proper process.  
For a process to be fair, independent adjudication is required; if processes are not 
accessible, timely or cost effective then  fairness is compromised; the 
interdependence of the principles being essential to the complete concept of 
procedural justice. Second, I will consider different points of view and determine 
whether there is any consensus of opinion. Third, I will provide a statement on the 
principle that incorporates what might be evident when the principle is present in 
a DR process.  
 
With respect to the two concepts which I consider to be emerging principles, I will 
discuss each one in relation to the situations to which they apply, and clarify the 
principle through the final statement.  
  
 
4.3 Equality before the law 
 
Lord Hewart’s famous dictum “justice should not only be done but should 
manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done”269 is a principle on which the law 
relies to promote equality and fairness before the courts and other legal processes. 
Following from this, the Oaths and Declarations Act 1957, section 18 requires 
judicial officers to swear to “…do right to all manner of people after the laws and 
usages of New Zealand without fear or favour, affection or ill will” and common 
law conveys the duty on decisions-makers to apply the principles of natural 
justice.  
 
This principle guides formal and informal DR processes in New Zealand to some 
extent though processes such as mediation allow parties to caucus separately with 
the mediator and the subject of the caucus is not disclosed to the other party. 
                                                 
269 The dictum originated from R v Sussex Justices, ex parte McCarthy [1924], 1 KB 256, 259.   
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Where consensual or informal DR processes are undertaken and swearing 
allegiance is not required, the principles nevertheless are present270 but to a lesser 
degree in ethical standards of professional bodies such as AMINZ and LEADR. 
For example both organisations promote standards through rules and codes of 
ethics and both have complaints processes to deal with complaints against 
members.271  
 
The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 incorporates the principle of equality 
before the law in section 27 Right to justice;  
 
(1) Every person has the right to the observance of the principles of natural 
justice by any tribunal or other public authority which has to make a 
determination in respect of that person’s rights, obligations, or interests 
protected or recognised by law.   
 
In addition, sub sections (2) and (3) cover all persons whose rights, obligations 
and interests are protected or recognised by law, to apply in accordance with law 
for a judicial review and to bring civil proceedings against or defend civil 
proceedings brought by the Crown in the same way as civil proceedings against 
individuals.  
 
The Judicial Commission of New South Wales in 2006 published a book Equality 
before the Law Bench Book which provides NSW judicial officers with 
information concerning “different values, cultures, lifestyles, socioeconomic 
                                                 
270 In mediation it is the duty of the mediator to be even handed in dealing with the parties and 
ensure each side is heard uninterrupted while the other side listens. Impartiality is also implicated 
in equality and fairness of process. 
271 For example AMINZ Code of Ethics includes (1) A member should uphold the integrity and 
fairness of the relevant dispute resolution process; (2) A member should disclose any interest or 
relationship likely to affect impartiality or neutrality or which might create an appearance of 
partiality or bias; (9) A member should avoid impropriety or the appearance of impropriety; (11) A 
member should make decisions in a just, independent and considered manner; (12) A member 
alleged to be in breach of this code shall be subject to the provisions of the Institute’s rules dealing 
with professional misconduct and disciplinary matters. LEADR’s Ethical Standards for Mediators 
was developed by the Law Council of Australia and adopted by LEADR (including LEADR NZ) 
as part of its Accreditation Scheme. The standards cover the definition of mediation (1); 
impartiality (2), conflicts of interest (3), competence (4), confidentiality (5), quality of process (6), 
termination of mediation (7), publicity and advertising (8) and fees (9). Rule 2 of LEADR’s 
Ethical Standards for Mediators provides a commentary concerning impartiality, for example 
Comment (a) Whatever  their own views and standards mediators should not only not be partial or 
prejudiced but should avoid the appearance of partiality or prejudice by reason of such matters as 
the parties’ personal characteristics, background or conduct at the mediation; (b) Mediators should 
seek to avoid behaviour which, however innocent, may be interpreted as indicating partiality or 
prejudice, such as spending more time with one party than another without good reason, 
socialising with a party and adopting different modes of address; (c) Even if all the disputants 
agree that they would like the mediator to express an opinion on the merits, there is a substantial 
risk in giving such an opinion that the mediator may no longer appear to be impartial. As a result 
the mediator may be obliged to withdraw.  
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disadvantage” and other disadvantages that might impact on a person’s ability to 
fully and equitably participate in court proceedings. The book also provides 
“guidance” only on how judicial officers “might need to take account of this 
information in court”.272 The explanation surrounding why the information has 
been provided specifically refers to the oath to administer the law fairly 
undertaken by all judicial officers and brings together the notion of equality 
before the law and discrimination. The 1991 determination of McHugh J makes 
the point that equality does not necessarily mean “same treatment”. 
 
…discrimination can arise just as readily from an act which treats as equals 
those who are different as it can from an act which treats differently persons 
whose circumstances are not materially different.273 
 
Mediation literature has addressed various forms of partiality, bias and the issue of 
power imbalance in mediation, particularly unequal bargaining power.274 It is not 
clear whether the demonstration of partiality or non-intervention of mediators in 
situations where power imbalance is clearly affecting the ability of a party to 
participate effectively, actually means discriminatory practice. What is clear from 
the literature is that power, perspectives and their impact on parties and outcome, 
is now well documented and acknowledged in literature concerning conflict, 
disputes and their settlement or resolution through both determinative and 
facilitated processes.275  
 
The consistent message should be that “people must be treated fairly and without 
discrimination and also believe they are being treated fairly and without any form 
of discrimination…”276  In addition, practitioner self-awareness of bias and 
prejudice and on-going education about the value systems of people from diverse 
backgrounds is encouraged and expected of dispute resolution practitioners and 
                                                 
272 “Equality before the Law Bench Book: Providing for community and individual difference in 
court proceedings” (Judicial Commission of New South Wales, June 2006) obtained from 
<http://www.jc.nsw.gov.au/benchbks/equality/> 10th February 2007.   
273 Waters v Public Transport Corporation [1991] 173 CLR 349 at 402 cited in “Equality Before 
the Law Bench Book”(2006) 1103. 
274 Boulle, L Jones, J and Goldblatt, V Mediation: Principles Process and Practice (NZ ed) 
(1998); Mayer, B The Dynamic of Conflict Resolution (2000); Sourdin, T Alternative Dispute 
Resolution, (2nd Ed) (2005); Menkel-Meadow, C Dispute Processing and Conflict Resolution: 
Practice and Policy (2003); Spencer, D and Brogan, M Mediation Law and Practice (2006).   
275 Sourdin, T Alternative Dispute Resolution, (2nd ed, 2005); Astor, H and Chinkin, C Dispute 
Resolution in Australia (2nd ed 2002); Bayliss, C and Carroll, R “The Nature and Importance of 
Mechanisms for Addressing Power Difference in Statutory Mediation” (2002) 14 Bond LR; 
Menkel-Meadow, C Dispute Processing and Conflict Resolution: Theory, Practice and Policy 
(2003).    
276 Judicial Commission of New South Wales, Equality before the Law Bench Book, June 2006, 
1104. Obtained from <http://www.jc.nsw.gov.au/benchbks/equality/> 10th April 2007.   
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the judiciary; in NSW there is an expectation that judicial officers must “actively 
seek to neutralise these”.277  In theory this sounds positive but it is also a response 
to situations that have shown that all are not equal before the Courts or in ADR 
processes; strong educative and awareness strategies are therefore being 
promoted.278   
 
An information sheet that would be provided to users of a court, tribunal or 
process would contain a statement including the following; “The principle of 
equality before the law incorporates being treated in such a way that your 
Indigenous status, ethnicity, culture, religion, socio-economic status, disability, 
age, gender, sexuality or their lack of legal representation will be respected and 
not cause difficulties in your dealings with a court/tribunal/process. The 
court/tribunal/process is adaptive and can be responsive to your cultural 
background and current circumstances and will make every effort to ensure you 
feel comfortable and able to participate fully in the legal process. If this means 
you wish to provide information about your cultural background or other 
information you believe could affect your ability to participate and be understood, 
this can be arranged. As far as possible, we will ensure you have access to 
appropriate information, advice and representation and that you understand what 
happens in the process and why”.  
 
 
4.4 Adherence to the rule of law 
 
The British Constitution is founded on the rule of law (and the supremacy of 
parliament). Its primary meaning is that everything must be done according to 
law. Those affected by others’ decisions and actions, especially decisions of the 
government may always resort to the courts of law; the rule of law is essential to 
fair and proper government. This right is the principle of legality.279 The second 
meaning of the rule of law includes legal and discretionary power which impact 
on the way governments can conduct their business; “…government should be 
conducted within a framework of recognised rules and principles which restrict 
                                                 
277 Ibid, 1104. 
278 Ibid; the complete document covers many aspects surrounding the provision for community and 
individual difference in court proceedings.   
279 Wade, H and Forsyth, C Administrative Law (7th ed, 1994) 24. 
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discretionary power”.280 The rule of law here is directed at prevention of abuse of 
discretionary power.  
 
The rule of law is the principle that governmental authority is legitimately  
exercised only in accordance with written, publicly disclosed laws adopted and 
enforced in accordance with established procedure. The principle is intended to 
be a safeguard against arbitrary governments.281 
 
The third meaning surrounds disputes that question the legality of acts of 
government. The rule of law ensures these disputes are heard by unbiased judges 
of the courts or judicial officers operating within administrative tribunals which in 
turn, are subject to control by the court. This process of checking preserves the 
rule of law and also includes the right to appeal decisions to higher courts. The 
fourth meaning promotes the principle equality before the law, determining that 
the law should be even handed between government and citizen in an 
administrative dispute, but not privileging or allowing exemptions to government. 
In New Zealand the Crown Proceedings Act 1950 is the mechanism that sets the 
limits of actions that can be taken by the Crown and officers of the Crown “and to 
civil proceedings by and against the Crown”.282 The growth of powers in 
government intensifies the importance of the rule of law. Continuing to have the 
court of justice as the sole arbiter of lawfulness of officers or departments of 
central government means the court is the only judge.283  Extending beyond public 
administration the rule of law also means only those found to have committed 
legally defined crimes can be punished. Whatever the context “…the rule of law 
provides certainty as to the law and confidence that it will be properly applied to 
all”.284 
 
The rule of law appears to have universal acceptance because it preserves the right 
of all people to the benefit and protection of the law; it enforces minimum 
standards of fairness, both substantive and procedural and individual liberties 
depend on it.285  
 
                                                 
280 Ibid, 24. 
281 Coxe, H M Third World Countries and the Rule of Law The Florida Bar Journal [2007] April, 
6. 
282 Crown Proceedings Act 1950. Leading statement preceding “ANALYSIS”. 1950, No 54 
obtained from <www.legislation.govt.nz> June 10th 2007. 
283 Wade & Forsyth, supra n 281 at 33. 
284 Law Commission, Delivering Justice for All, Report 85 (2004) 3. 
285 Baylis, C “Statutory Mediators and Conciliators: Towards a Principled Approach” [2002] 
NZULR, 20, 104. 
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In summary, the rule of law will be present in a dispute resolution process when 
the participants experience even handed treatment by the judge or judicial officer 
at the hearing and the resulting decision is based on the correct and proper 
application of the law and is one that gives full reasons for the decision and states 
the timeframe and process for appealing the decision. Those with appeal rights 
will able to exercise those rights. When the rule of law is applied to ADR 
processes such as mediation, the rule of natural justice will be present ensuring a 
procedurally fair process with proper accountability.    
 
 
4.5 Fair and proper process 
 
The concept of a fair and proper process and the right to a fair process are 
encapsulated in the Latin phrase audi alteram partem ‘hear the other side’, 
sometimes known as the adversary principle; when justice is to be done and seen 
to be done. This is said to be the more far-reaching of the principles of natural 
justice because it embraces almost every question of fair procedure (or due 
process) and has wide and detailed implications.286 Its origin is attributed to Saint 
Augustine who was born in Algeria in 354. His dictum was based on the broad 
principle that the exercising of legal power could not be validated unless the 
person who was going to suffer was first given the opportunity to be heard.287  
 
Some writers believe that fairness in procedure (or procedural justice) for 
resolving conflicts is an invariable and fundamental kind of fairness, a “constant 
in human nature” across cultures, places and times.288  Universal fairness might 
include the ability to make a case and be heard and have impartiality and fairness 
determine direct decision making processes. It might also include participation in 
the process by all those affected by any decisions and in any context.289 These 
ideas relate to the principle of process pluralism which encompasses the spectrum 
of dispute resolution processes; adjudicative and consensual. The idea of 
‘universal fairness’ leads the author to believe we have enough consensus to 
identify processes for making decisions that will allow us to “go forward and 
                                                 
286 Wade & Forsyth, supra n 281. 
287 Ibid, 494.  
288 Hampshire, S Justice is Conflict (2000) 2. 
289 Hamphire in Menkel-Meadow, 2003, xii. 
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act”.290 It has also been argued that in determining a fair and proper process, the 
outcomes that derive from particular processes should be considered. The 
outcomes may be fair from a legal perspective but morally incongruent with the 
context of the conflict and the parties’ circumstances.291  
 
Indigenous DR processes typify those that are considered morally and culturally 
congruent with the contexts of conflicts and disputes involving Indigenous 
people.292 It is claimed that dealing with Indigenous people in conventional 
settings does not provide an appropriate context for resolving disputes or morally 
or procedurally just methods for determining disputes that involve and impact on 
Indigenous people.293 Varied multi-disciplinary fields have joined the study of 
disputing processes over recent decades and decentred law from its primary 
position in the DR field. Sociologists, social psychologists, anthropologists, 
international relations theorists, game theorists, organizational management, 
labour relations, peace studies and political theorists are some of the disciplines 
and fields involved in debates about fair and just processes for disputing 
parties.294 Many writers from these fields promote consensual ADR processes in 
the belief that mutually arrived at decisions will have greater legitimacy and 
longevity than a determination reached by a judge or adjudicator.  
 
The issue of true ‘consent’ however is challenged by others who consider power 
imbalance can seriously impact not only on an agreement to participate but also 
the negotiations that ensue from any settlement. This has become more of an issue 
since the introduction of statutory mediation and court directed mediation over the 
past two decades. Private negotiation or processes such as mediation and 
arbitration, including those that are court directed can have considerable impact 
on procedural change, yet there is an assumption at least at a theoretical level, that 
ADR does not advocate a particular ideology.295  
 
                                                 
290 Ibid, xiii. 
291 Menkel-Meadow, C Dispute Processing and Conflict Resolution, 2003, xii. 
292 Indigenous processes that involve torture would not be considered moral or right. 
293 Behrendt, L Indigenous Dispute Resolution, (1995); Bell, C and Kahane, D (Eds) Intercultural 
Dispute Resolution in Aboriginal Contexts (2004); Love M Te W “Te Waitangi Tribunal’s Role in 
Dispute Resolution of Indigenous (Maori) Treaty Claims” in Intercultural Dispute Resolution in 
Aboriginal Contexts, 2004, chapter 7; Treaty of Waitangi Fisheries Commission, Dispute 
Resolution Procedures (1995). 
294 Ibid. 
295 Astor, H and Chinkin, C Dispute Resolution in Australia (2nd ed, 2002) 29. 
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 Feminist writers have claimed court mandated mediation in the family law area of 
child custody has concealed substantive change concerning how decisions about 
children are made. These decisions and ‘settlements’ previously public and 
contestable, now elude public scrutiny due to the private and confidential nature 
of mediation. Two simultaneous events influenced this change. The first was the 
implementation of mandatory mediation and the second change occurred when 
mediators ideologically committed to shared parenting, influenced custody 
outcomes within the private and confidential process of court mandated 
mediation. Accountability in this context is problematic and women feel pressured 
to settle based on the belief system of the mediators.296 Similar arguments have 
arisen where historical domestic violence features and parties are coerced to come 
together to ‘seek agreement’. Studies have shown this practice to be counter to the 
notion of consensual outcomes and not in the interests of women victims of 
violence or their children.297   
 
Court directed mediation has both proponents and detractors with some writers 
believing it is a contradiction in terms, 298 others extolling its virtues299 and still 
others believing that the fundamental value of self-determination is so seriously 
compromised the notion of parties “actually making their own decisions is purely 
illusory”.300 Although parties may be compelled to attend mediation, they are not 
forced to settle but in the Family Court at least, not settling is seen in a negative 
light both by lawyers acting for parties, and Judges who would prefer parties 
                                                 
296 Fineman, M “Dominant Discourse, Professional Language, and Legal Change in Child Custody 
Decision Making” Harvard Law Review [1988] 101, 4, 727-774.   
297 Elliott, C In what circumstances should a mediation conference be convened in the Family 
Court of New Zealand under the Family Proceedings Act 1980 where domestic violence has 
occurred Inter Parties? Massey University, 2002; Astor, H “Violence and Family Mediation: 
Policy” [1994] Australian Journal of Family Law, 8.  
298  TheLaw Society Journal, March 2001, 65. Spigelman, J, who was then Chief Justice of New 
South Wales made the point that compulsory mediation is a contradiction in terms because a 
mediation process requires consensus. He had however formed the view the power to order 
mediation, conferred on the Court by Parliament, was a useful addition “to the armoury of the 
court to achieve its objectives”.  In an article on  Mediation and the Judicial Institution Sir 
Laurence Street AC commented that “ADR  - more specifically mediation…is not an exercise in 
the administration of justice…Natural justice or due process have no more relevance to the 
mediation of a dispute than they have to the mediating of any commercial deal…(p795)… The 
warning that I venture to give …is against the use by the court of a procedure that is in its very 
substance antithetical to the maintenance of public confidence in the integrity, and inaccessibility 
to external influence of the court system” (p796). ALJ [1997] Vol 71.  
299 Venus, P Court Directed Compulsory Mediation – Attendance or Participation [2004] 15 
ADRJ 29-37. 
300 Spencer, D and Brogan, M  Mediation, Law and Practice (2007) 245.  
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come to their own decisions.301 An influential author decrying settlement writes 
about the critical differences between settlement and judgment; one assumes a 
rough equality between the parties and is based on bargaining via consent that is 
often coerced, and the other struggles against those inequalities through its 
aspiration to “an autonomy from distributional inequalities”302 and a focus on 
rights and the rules of law. Civil litigation in his view “is an institutional 
arrangement for using state power to bring a recalcitrant reality closer to our 
chosen ideals”.303  
 
Hearing the other side in a settlement context, can mean the loudest and most 
persuasive voice will gain the most, whereas hearing the other side in an 
adjudicative forum, usually means the process itself will balance the voices, 
leaving the adjudicators to determine disputes in accordance with general 
principles of law relating to the particular matter and in some instances, the 
substantial merits and justice of the case.304 
 
Fair and proper process also encapsulates the principles of accessibility, efficiency 
and timeliness of process. These principles address individual rights contained in 
various pieces of legislation and their codes.305 
 
In summary the principle of a fair and proper process means viewing processes 
from the perspective of process pluralism which would include determinative 
processes with a neutral adjudicator making a decision in favour of one party 
through the range of consensual and facilitative processes. All must be 
procedurally just and consider culture, class, race, sexuality and age of 
participants, adjusting processes if fairness is likely to be compromised. The 
processes available and those chosen must as far as possible promote self-
determination and be morally and contextually congruent with participants’ life 
                                                 
301 This is my personal experience following 14 years working within the Family Court system. 
302 Fiss, O “Against Settlement” The Yale Law Journal [1984], 93, 1073. 
303 Ibid, 1089. 
304 For example the Retirement Villages (Disputes Panel ) Regulations 2006 state in Clause 20 (2) 
“A disputes panel must determine a dispute according to the general principles of the law relating 
to the matter and the substantial merits and justice of the case”.  
305 Retirement Villages Act 2003, Schedule 4 Code of Residents’ Rights; New Zealand Bill of 
Rights Act 1990; Human Rights Act 1993. 
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situations.306 They should be accessible, timely, cost effective and efficient; 
responsive to power imbalance and contain principled remedial components that 
reflect research surrounding gender, age, culture, historical factors such as 
historical violence and how these can impact on parties’ ability to fully participate 
in processes. In addition, fairness of process should be present in the perception 
and experience of the participants. Participant feedback should be sought, and 
evaluation and publication of results should follow.    
 
 
4.6 Independent adjudication 
 
The notion of independent adjudication was originally linked to Aristotle’s 
Politics and later, philosophers Locke and Montesquieu.307 The principle of 
separation of powers now refers to the separation of legislative, judicial and 
executive powers of government. Locke’s principle308  concerned only the powers 
of government through the separation of legislative and executive functions and 
was based on his belief that nobody can transfer to another, more power than he 
possesses himself. He asserted that the power of legislators be “limited to the 
public good of society …” through the vesting of this power to declare laws to 
maintain peace, quiet and protect property of and for the citizens.309 
 
Montesquieu reformulated Locke’s distinction into the classical Westminster 
system which separates legislative, executive and judicial powers. The basis of 
this further separation was his understanding of liberty which for him required the 
separation of judicial power from the legislative and executive. His fear was that 
without the separation, subjects would be exposed to arbitrary control because the 
                                                 
306 I believe the colloquial term horses for courses is an apt alternative title for process pluralism. 
It encapsulates the notion of legitimacy and fit; in this case referring to appropriateness of process 
to context and outcome.  Sometimes the terms “appropriate” or “proportionate” dispute resolution 
are used. 
307 Ryan, K Judges, Courts and Tribunals, Paper presented at The Australian Judicial Conference 
Symposium on Judicial Independence and the Rule of Law at the Turn of the Century (1996) 
November 2-3.  
308 John Locke (1632-1704) was a philosopher of freedom.    
309 The year 1690 saw publication of Locke’s two principle works Essay Concerning Human 
Understanding and Two Treatises of Government. The first established the principles of modern 
empiricism (we learn through experience) and the second established him as a supporter of 
revolutions and philosopher of freedom. This was based on the idea that government rests on 
popular consent and rebellion when government subverts the ends; the protection of life, liberty 
and property – for which it was established. Article obtained from John Locke (1632-1704), The 
Philosopher of Freedom at 
<http://www.blupete.com/literature/biographies/philosophy/locke.htm>. See also Ryan, K Judges, 
Courts and Tribunals, November 1996.  
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judges would then be the legislators. His concern was for the balance of power 
between the “three orders of the realm, the King, Lords and Commons”.310 The 
checks and balances were then in place and the fundamental constitution 
formulated with the two part legislative body checking each other “by the mutual 
privilege of rejecting”.311  Both were restrained by the executive power just as the 
executive is by the legislative.  
 
In 1932 the Donoughmore Report identified two major areas of concern about the 
extent of ministerial power and ministerial involvement in both legislative and 
adjudicative functions.312 Thirty years later the influential Franks report of 1957313 
was concerned with controversies between citizens and government and the 
administration of impartial justice to determine such disputes. This development 
and the increase in the use of tribunals followed intensive post Second World War 
social legislation. Tribunals were seen as a part of the machinery of adjudication, 
not part of the machinery of administration. Key principles contained in the 
Franks report were aimed at providing certainly about the independence of 
administrative tribunals from the department whose decisions they were 
reviewing. These principles continue to guide the work not only of tribunals but 
other processes that determine or investigate government or quasi government 
organisations. Key principles in the Franks report include; 
• open, fair and impartial adjudication 
• evidential rules should be modified in their application to tribunals 
• tribunals must be independent of the department (or entity) 
concerned 
• the procedure should be adversary and not inquisitorial 
• Chairmen of Tribunals should normally be legally qualified; 
always in the case of appellate tribunals but members should 
comprise a lay majority in keeping with the Council’s guiding 
principle being the ordinary man’s sense of justice and fair play  
                                                 
310 Ryan supra n 309 at 3. 
311 These ideas were produced in The Spirit of Law , Book XI “Of the Laws Which Establish 
Political Liberty, with Regard to the Constitution”, Charles Montesquieu, 1748.  Montesquieu 
cited in Ryan, 1996, 3. from an online edition of The Spirit of Law to be found at 
<http://www.constitution.org/cm/sol-02.htm>.  
312 Craig, P Administrative Law (4th ed 1999) 64.  
313 The 1957 Report of the Franks Committee on “Administrative Tribunals and Enquiries” 
(Cmnd.218) lead to the establishment of the Council on Tribunals which has itself provided 
influential reports of the work and administration of  tribunals in the UK and  Scotland. See also 
Tribunals their Organisation and Independence (Cm 3744, 1997).   
 103
• remuneration should be examined by the Council of Tribunals 
• procedure should be orderly with informal atmosphere 
• appeal and judicial review should be based on fact, law and merits 
from a first instance tribunal 
• on principle there should not be an appeal from a tribunal to a 
Minister  
• tribunals must provide reasons for their decisions   
 
The independent Council of Tribunals for England and Wales and the Scottish 
Council were set up as a consequence of the recommendations of the Franks 
Report. These Councils would oversee the appointment of lay members of 
tribunals, leaving the chairmen to be appointed by the Lord Chancellor. 314  The 
advent of the Councils is seen to have strengthened the original principles 
contained in the Franks report, especially in regard to independence. Additional 
wording has been added to the independence principle; “the principal hallmark of 
any tribunal is that it must be independent. Equally importantly, it must be 
perceived as such”.315 Australia and New Zealand now have a Council of 
Australasian Tribunals (COAT) whose work is making inroads to tribunal 
independence in New Zealand.316 
 
While there has been support for the organisation and work of tribunals over 
recent years there has also been concern expressed about the ad hoc nature of the 
growth and housing and resourcing of tribunals by departments directly affected 
by the decisions of the tribunal; their independence has been examined and 
questioned as has the quality of their decisions.317  There is consensus surrounding 
the clustering of tribunals into fewer and larger ones. This is thought likely to 
                                                 
314 Craig supra n 312 at 252. 
315 Council on Tribunals,  Tribunals their Organisation and Independence (1997, Cm 3744) 3.  
316 The Council of Australasian Tribunals was formed in 2002. Its website 
<http://www.coat.gov.au> states its intention “to facilitate liaison and discussion between the 
heads of tribunals”. It has developed best practice models, model procedural rules, standards of 
behaviour and conduct for members along with increasing capacity for training and support for 
members. One of its objects is “to co-operate with institutions of academic learning, and to other 
persons having an interest in Tribunals and Tribunal practices and procedures”. The NZ branch of 
COAT is active through its Chairperson in consulting with government agencies about delivering 
justice in an independent and informed way. (Personal communication with Trish McConnell, 
Chairperson COAT NZ July 2006).      
317 Tracey, R Administrative Tribunals – Some Emerging Issues, A paper given at the ABA 
Conference, July 1990, 35; Law Commission, Delivering Justice for All: A Vision for New 
Zealand Courts and Tribunals, 2004; Letts, P Natural Justice and Tribunals, A paper presented at 
the 9th Annual AIJA Tribunals Conference, Canberra (2006) 6-7 April.    
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make tribunals better known; be more accessible and more independent and 
authoritative.318  Tribunals, like courts, must both be independent and seen to be 
independent. And this applies as much to private sector tribunals dealing with 
disputes between private individuals as those adjudicating between citizen and 
state. The perception is as important as the reality.319 Likewise the independence 
of mediation and mediators has come under scrutiny as mediators mediating 
between dissatisfied clients and government departments or Crown entities has 
increased and statutory and court directed mediation has proliferated in the past 
two decades. When mediators are influenced by supply of work and ideology or 
policies of the organisations they are employed by, such as pressure to settle, it is 
possible outcomes may be affected.320 This has implication not only for the 
principle of independence, but also for fairness and integrity of the process.321 
This issue is heightened in situations where hybrid processes such as med-arb 
have been legitimised in legislation.322   
 
The Retirement Villages Act 2003 has drawn a range of criticism about its 
independence in both the complaints process and dispute resolution process. There 
is a perception of lack of independence of mediation and the disputes panel 
because the Act places the responsibility for selection, ensuring independence and 
payment for both processes with the operator who will be in the majority of cases, 
a party to the dispute.323  In this Act and others identified, it seems the principle of 
independence and the perception of independence has been diluted through; 
ideology, the consultation process and the desire of the executive to process 
disputes in as timely, expeditiously and with the least disruption to administrative 
stability as possible. The Retirement Villages Act has the distinguishing feature of 
                                                 
318 Law Commission, Delivering Justice for All, Report 85, 2004. 
319 Council on Tribunals  “Tribunals their Organisation and Independence” (1997, Cm 3744, 3); 
Law Commission Report 85, Delivering Justice, 2004, 284.  The Council on Tribunals in its report 
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challenged or appealed, or from anyone else” (Framework of Standards for Tribunals, Council of 
Tribunals, 3). This report was obtained from the website of the Council on Tribunals 
<www.council-on-tribunals.gov.uk/pubs_guid_framstan.htm> on the13th September 2006.  
320 Here I am referring to pressure to settle and mediators not using principled approaches to 
mediation when consumer or client rights are implicated.  
321 Baylis, C “Reviewing Statutory Models of Mediation/Conciliation in New Zealand: Three 
Conclusions” [1999] VUWRL 30; Krivis, J Preventing the Death of Mediation, obtained from 
<www.firstmediation.com> 30th October 2006. 
322 For example the Fire Services Act 1975; Employment Relations Act 2000.  
323 Grey Power and Age Concern raised this issue during the consultation period prior to 
implementation of the Act. The Retirement Commission reports receiving many concerns about 
the refurbishment requirements. Personal Communications August - November 2006.  
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being a protective mechanism for citizens entering into private living 
arrangements with business operators providing housing opportunities. for a 
significant number of senior citizens. Housing for seniors in the next decades will 
burgeon and governments faced with the ‘ageing’ problem are likely to want to 
minimize interference with this process. 
   
In summary an independent adjudicative process is one that is accessible and 
where the judicial officer would not be subservient to the executive branch of 
Government or any entity with interests in the dispute. The tenure of office and 
payment of salary or fees would be standardised and institutional support would 
be delivered from a neutral administrative base. The selection and payment of 
adjudicators to hear disputes would be unambiguously neutral.  An independent 
adjudicative process would adopt the rules of natural justice hearing evidence 
from both sides including the evidence of witnesses and weigh that evidence 
according to the principles of law relating to the matter. When a matter is not 
litigated, usually the law and substantial merits and justice of the case would be 
the criteria for determination. The adjudicator would be flexible and responsive to 
the context and the parties presenting their case while also ensuring impartiality, 
demonstrated by listening carefully and seeking information in a thorough and 
even handed way. The adjudicator would understand the inequities surrounding 
culture, gender and class including age of participants and be able to adjust the 
process to accommodate these factors. This would go some way in demonstrating 
independence from ideological influence about how adjudication should be 
conducted. The process would be open and reasoned decisions made and the right 
of appeal and process of appeal clearly explained. 
 
 
4.7 Emerging principles 
 
4.7.1 Process pluralism: horses for courses 
 
The context of a retirement village and the capabilities of residents should be a 
determining factor in the choice of a dispute resolution process. To impose a 
process that may produce an outcome directly influenced by the disadvantaged 
position of the less powerful party must be considered to lack morality. It also has 
the potential to jeopardise procedural justice. In addition, to impose a process that 
is so unfriendly and inequitable towards users they would choose to avoid conflict 
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and suffer on-going disadvantage, should be seen as immoral in the extreme.324 
Identifying legitimate process for retirement village disputes necessarily means in 
the first instance, rejecting processes that leave residents unsupported in 
negotiations and secondly, processes must be principled in terms of openness 
about how power imbalance would be addressed and residents’ rights privileged 
and non-negotiable.325 
 
The concept of process pluralism has derived from a range of process institutions 
developed as a response to what Galanter described in 1985 as “the law in action”. 
This was pursued by actors ranging from litigants to mediators pursuing “their 
visions of advantage and justice”.326 
Regulatory enterprise is not an official monopoly. There are multiple arenas of 
normative innovation and interpretation. Legal pluralism, it turns out, is not just 
a condition of some less developed societies. Under rubrics like private 
governments, semi-autonomous social fields, indigenous law etc., we have 
learned that pluralism is very much with us…The official law does not preside 
over a landscape barren of regulation, but over a thick tangle of rivals and 
companions…327 [emphasis added] 
 
The invariability of indirectly attendant and unintended consequences surrounding 
the pronouncement and implementation of legal norms is recognised as coming 
also from competition for scarce resources: as overload of courts and costs have 
skyrocketed in recent decades so too has the proliferation of ADR processes.328 
‘Rival’ ways of understanding the legal world have emerged, and processes 
developed and considered to be more responsive, inquiring and contextually 
appropriate than traditional legal processes have become institutionalised. 
Hampshire, who pursued procedural justice from the perspective of a moral 
philosopher, identified several principles which he considered crucial to an 
understanding of procedural justice.329   
 
The first principle relates to the idea that conflict is human, ubiquitous and 
essential for understanding what is important about ourselves and our civil 
                                                 
324 This issue is elaborated further in relation to the Australian National Native Titles Tribunal, 
Chapter Four.  
325 While both parties have rights, Schedule 4 of the RVA sets out a Code of Residents’ Rights 
which includes the right not to be exploited. RVA Schedule 4, 8. 
326 Galanter, M “The Legal Malaise; or Justice Observed” [1985] Law and Society Rev 19, 4, 537-
556. 
327 Ibid, 544. 
328 Ibid. 
329 These have been restated by Menkel-Meadow.  
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government or society. The second relates to procedural fairness and the notion 
that “we might have some almost universal ideas about procedural fairness…”330  
The third concerns the principle   process pluralism; that is fair procedures in any 
context should allow all parties likely to be affected by a decision to participate 
and be heard. The fourth principle requires that conflict resolution be 
acknowledged as a multi-dimensional human skill “to be theorized about, taught, 
learned and practiced”.331   
 
Menkle-Meadow suggests Hampshire has discounted multi-party dispute contexts 
and focussed only on “the adversary principle or merely hearing the other side”.332  
Menkel-Meadow sees pluralism as encompassing not only the game-players but 
all those affected by the game. Both dual and multi-party disputes fit within the 
framework of process-pluralism and ‘context’ and ‘legitimacy of process’ is 
applicable for both.  
 
Procedural justice should be viewed within the context of ‘process pluralism’ 
because particular processes affect outcomes and each produces its own 
morality.333 For example an adversarial process whether litigation or negotiation 
will “limit the field of possible outcomes to distributive arrangements” including 
unprincipled compromises; whereas a different process can allow more creative 
options such as “joint-gain” and “wealth creation”. Critics have suggested that a 
focus on “participatory processes” can create “false harmony” and could be 
equally as unjust as the adversarial “conventional institutions”.334 Process 
pluralism requires that practitioners know what they are doing and why. 
 
In summary, process pluralism addresses procedural justice offering a spectrum of 
dispute resolution processes335 that can be context specific or adapted to meet the 
contextual and cultural needs of parties. The principle pluralism determines all 
parties should participate and be heard in decisions affecting them. Therefore 
conflict specialists involved will be appropriately qualified and skilled to assist 
                                                 
330 Menkel-Meadow, C Dispute Processing and Conflict Resolution, 2003, xiii-xiv.  
331 Ibid. 
332 Ibid, xv. 
333 Ibid, xiv. 
334 Nader, L “Controlling processes in the practice of law: Hierarchy and pacification in the 
movement to reform dispute ideology”, (1993) cited in Menkel-Meadow (2003) xiv.   
335 This includes determinative processes such as adjudication through the range of consensual 
processes including negotiation and mediation.   
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individuals and groups choose the most appropriate process or processes. This 
will include substantial knowledge about facilitative, advisory and determinative 
processes and what each process might offer particular circumstances. Parties will 
be provided with information about the type of outcomes that different processes 
produce; what types of problems they are supposed to solve; how imbalance of 
power and individual rights will be dealt with during the process and under what 
conditions some processes would result in termination of the process. The likely 
cost and methods of accountability will be provided for each process and contracts 
to undertake any of the processes available for perusal. This pre-process 
familiarization for parties will assist in fulfilling the aspiration of democratic 
participation and provide conflict specialists the opportunity to be involved in 
expert education about their professional field of choice and allied fields.  
     
4.7.2 Advocacy – lay and legal  
 
Non-legal advocacy has been proposed as the way forward for the conflict field. 
According to Mayer the conflict field has the potential to make a much bigger 
difference by not avoiding conflict but rather engaging in it constructively.336 His 
most recent contribution to the conflict resolution field, Beyond Neutrality has 
pushed the boundaries beyond mediation and facilitation because these processes 
are not being called upon in contexts that are “crying out” for the assistance of 
specialist conflict professionals.  
 
There is a perceived crisis in the field which has arisen from of its inability to 
significantly impact on serious national and international issues, from long 
standing discriminatory practices to the perpetration of violence and terror on 
innocent people. Mayer’s answer to the crisis that has evolved after twenty five 
years is for conflict professionals to change the way they think about themselves 
and their work; changing self-perceptions will “both reflect the market for 
ourselves and shape it”.337   
 
Helping people engage in conflict means not abandoning commitment to conflict 
resolution or conflict management but instead, putting it in a broader context. 
Conflict engagement sometimes necessarily means working with people to raise 
                                                 
336 Mayer, B Beyond Neutrality (2004) 181. 
337 Mayer, B The Dynamics of Conflict Resolution (2000) 296. 
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the level of conflict; an often difficult and risky proposition but one he believes is 
sometimes necessary to settle conflict.  
 
The concept of advocacy placed within the spectrum of process pluralism, will as 
other processes have done previously, develop the theoretical and conceptual 
tools, organizational structures and track record to help people engage in conflict 
and actually resolve it. A goal is to assist people   
to find their own voice and respect others, to mobilize their own resources and 
power…and to appreciate the concerns of those with whom they are in 
conflict.338  
 
Helping people to get their conflicts noticed, raising the level of conflict and 
assisting people to manage conflict and “conduct themselves through the course of 
a conflict”339 is seen by Mayer as a necessary prerequisite to effective resolution.  
 
Mayer’s work is consistent, and compatible with the view that conflict is 
inevitable and functional in a society340 the corollary being, we have limitless 
opportunity to find ways to deal with it and positively effect systemic change 
through the process. The narrative therapeutic and mediation ‘stream’341 is a 
branch of counselling and mediation that uses language to separate or externalise 
problems (from people) so that problems can be examined from an observer’s 
point of view. The goal of the narrative model is to gain mastery over the problem 
without attaching blame. The narrative field for the past two decades has 
promoted ‘public conversations’ as a way of bringing conflict into the open, to 
share information, dispel myths  and endeavour to find common ground and 
understand others’ positions; likewise, consultative models for public 
administration, policy formulation and implementation.342 The form of advocacy 
promoted by Mayer fits within this mould; it seeks to expose the reasons behind 
conflict and place them in a position where they are able to examined and debated 
                                                 
338 Ibid, 296. 
339 Ibid, 181. 
340 Coser, L The Functions of Social Conflict, 1956; Fuller, L The Morality of Law,1977; Galanter, 
M “The Legal Malaise or Justice Observed” [1985] Law and Social Review 19, 4; Hampshire, S 
Justice is Conflict, 2000. 
341 Drewery, W and Monk, G “Some Reflections on the Therapeutic Power of Poststructuralism” 
International Journal for the Advancement of Counselling (1994) 17 (4) 303; Winslade, J Monk, G 
and Cotter, A “A Narrative Approach to the Practice of Mediation” Negotiation Journal (1998]) 
14 (1) 21-41. 
342 Blomgren Bingham, L and Nabatchi, R “The New Governance: Practice and Processes for 
Stakeholders and Citizen Participation in the Work of Government” Public Administration 
Review, [2005] 65, 5. 
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in a constructive way. Traditional advocacy has three key elements; 
representation, empowerment and substantive focus which requires experience in 
the area in which advocates are working.343  
 
When embracing advocacy as a conflict specialist function, additional skills are 
required; communication skills such as listening, ability to frame and deliver 
messages, arguments and proposals “in a way that moves a conflict forward”, and 
also the ability to raise difficult issues.344 Advocates as conflict specialists also 
need to be problem solvers, coaches and counsellors and negotiators. These roles 
require different sets of skills than those contributed by traditional legal advocacy. 
Advocacy is now being promoted as an additional process to include in the 
spectrum of ADR processes. 
 
In summary, advocacy would be present in a conflict context when a party could 
demonstrate through the assistance of an advocate, the multiplicity of levels 
contributing to a situation and then be able to consider ways to bring the conflict 
into the open and engage in personal or public debate with those parties with 
whom they are in conflict. The revelation of issues outside of those stated would 
indicate that deeper issues were being exposed having more to do with the conflict 
than those claimed. This disclosure of deeper issues would show that strategizing 
through advocacy had been successful in its impact.  To have reached this point 
would have required the party to understand the nature of conflict as a complex 
adaptive system and also to understand the development process and associated 
tasks that need to be accomplished before conflict can be addressed effectively. 
The tasks include being aware of what we are in conflict about and who we are in 
conflict with; giving expression in some way to the existence of the conflict in 
order to achieve self realisation of the conflict; mobilizing resources such as will, 
determination, clarity, allies, legal arguments, finances to bring the conflict to a 
level of planned intensity; taking active steps that bring about a response to a 
further goal – this may raise or lower intensity; finding ways to connect with those 
whom we are in conflict with through negotiation, public actions, third parties or 
any other way possible to achieve connection; satisfying some need that has 
                                                 
343 Mayer, B “Beyond Neutrality: Confronting the Crisis in Conflict Resolution” (2004) 251.  
344 Ibid, 255. 
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resulted from the conflict; releasing energy occupied by the conflict; being 
involved in the selection of the process to accomplish the tasks required.345 
 
 
4.8 Summary 
 
This chapter has discussed key principles that should inform DR. Taken together I 
will utilize them in my discussion. The principles are; 
Equality before the law 
Adherence to the rule of law 
Fair and proper process 
Independent adjudication which includes the principle of impartiality and 
the expectation of expertise in the DR field  
Accessibility 
Efficiency, including fair and timely process 
Process pluralism 
Advocacy 
 
From this point I will cross reference to these principles and the ideal model that 
will emerge in Chapter Eight will be protected by them. 
                                                 
345 Mayer, B Beyond Neutrality, 2004, 188-189. 
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Chapter 5 How do the processes relevant to 
retirement village complaints and 
disputes align with the principles? 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
Having established the essential dispute resolution principles I will now approach 
the principles in the context of retirement village complaints and disputes and the 
processes that might provide appropriate responses to this conflict. Firstly I will 
cover the role of conflict and consider conflict as a phenomenon in retirement 
villages. Next I will utilize Sourdin’s ‘process map’ to evaluate a number of 
processes that might provide appropriate responses to conflict in the retirement 
village context; these are the facilitative processes, negotiation, facilitated 
negotiation, partnering, mediation and the determinative process adjudication. I 
have included in this evaluation impressions from the first two disputes346 
conducted under the Act and applied the statements of principle identified in 
Chapter Four.   
 
 
5.2 Conflict, its role and retirement villages 
 
The needs of a specific group were the rationale for the Retirement Village Act 
2003. If we take a snap shot of a retirement village from the boundaries of the 
macrosystem, we will find a ‘class’ of older citizens living out on average, the 
final decade of their lives.347 This ‘class’ of citizen is predominantly female living 
alone. Their ‘capital’ and therefore their effectiveness will be reduced because of 
their inability to claw back the inevitable physical issues of ageing and their 
decreasing economic capital. Chapter two has identified areas about this ‘class’ 
and its relationship to conflict and according to Coser,348 conflict is everywhere, 
conflict is inevitable and conflict is essential to social cohesion and interaction.  
 
                                                 
346 See pages 128 and 129 for further analysis of these disputes. 
347 The Retirement Commission, Retirement Village Survey, December 2006, (p3) found 70% of 
residents in the survey live alone, 70% are women and this figure increases with age. Almost ¾ 
(73%) are aged over 80 years, only 7% are under 70 years and 12% are over 90 years of age.  
348 Coser, L 1956 cited in Mayer , B Beyond Neutrality (2004) 175. 
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This cliché (at least in part) coined from Coser’s work, is extended through his 
analysis of conflict. He asserts we have a certain dependence on conflict to bring 
together otherwise isolated groups, tackle difficult and divisive issues, focus on 
important issues, include people not usually in our sphere, break down barriers 
and provide an outlet for pent-up emotion. Individuals, couples, groups, 
organisations and even governments are seen to have developed a fragile form of 
unity if they are without conflict. However, for retirement village residents, 
conflict could impact heavily due to the age and gender of the majority of 
residents especially if the conflict involves operators or staff. Conflict in 
retirement villages can be between residents; residents’ committees having been 
identified as a context for domination and power contest.349 The focus here 
however is on the conflict that develops into disputes between residents and 
operators when usually matters of money are concerned.350 Conflict in this 
context may have a catalyst role. If identified and responded to wisely, conflict 
should ensure communication and consultation between operators and residents. 
This could avoid issues such as the imposition of arbitrary decisions that can lead 
to disputes and bad publicity for village operators. 
 
The difference between a complaint and a dispute within the context of the Act is 
best explained in terms of steps in a process. Complaint systems generally 
underpin dispute systems and are usually internal to an organisation.351 A 
complaint is an expression of dissatisfaction that a resident makes to an operator 
of a retirement village about any aspect of village life that concerns the resident. 
Once a complaint has been made, a process should occur that addresses the issues 
involved. The focus at this point is on ‘resolution’ and informal processes (ADR) 
to achieve this outcome.  If the issues remain unresolved then a disputes process 
can be initiated after 20 days, either by the resident or the operator in certain 
                                                 
349 NSW Office of Fair Trading, Review of Retirement Villages Act 1999, 14 obtained from 
<www.fairtrading.nsw.gov.au>  November 2006 ; Streib, L & Metsch, L “Conflict in Retirement 
Communities: Applying an Analytical Framework” Research on Ageing [2002] 24, 1, 67-86. 
350 NSW Minister for Fair Trading, 23 November 2006 press release sent by Secretary NSW 
Residents’ Association Inc. N. Carnegie 23rd November 2006; Keogh, J & Bradley, P “The 
Potential for contractual disputes in retirement village living: an examination of recent litigation 
arising from resident contract disputes in NSW retirement villages” paper Jan 2002. Retirement 
Village Amendment Bill 2006 NSW; Queensland Commercial and Consumer Tribunal Retirement 
Village decisions available at website <www.tribunals.qld.gov> 
351 Sourdin, T Alternative Dispute Resolution (2005, 2nd ed).  
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circumstances and this can involve a process where a determination is sought 
through the appointment of a disputes panel.352  
 
 
5.3  Retirement village residents’ needs: how do the various 
processes align? 
 
Chapter Four examined principles that should underpin dispute resolution 
processes involving less powerful groups; in this case retirement village residents 
who are in the majority, female with an average age of 83 years. Ideally what is 
required for residents is a process that will not result in disadvantage to the 
resident due to lack of knowledge about legal processes and does not pit them 
against more powerful operators in coerced negotiations or incur additional costs 
and stress, associated with disputes about their living arrangements.  A cluster of 
resident needs emerged from Chapter Two and will also be considered in the 
process of evaluating suitable DR processes for the retirement village context. 
These are; 
1. Resident representation/advocacy 
2. Legal provision for class actions by residents 
3. Legal recognition of residents’ committees 
4. Education about power and control dynamics in residential settings and     
prevention of elder abuse. 
The principles of process pluralism and advocacy are included.  Each process will 
be evaluated through application of the statements of principle set out in Part 1. 
Advocacy is both a principle and a process; as a process it falls within the advisory 
and facilitative categories and as a principle it may cover the spectrum of DR 
processes. Process pluralism in this study is a principle with two parts. The first is 
what Menkel-Meadow describes as “the principle of process pluralism” as it 
relates to fair process: all parties should be heard on and participate in, any 
decisions affecting them. The second incorporates the entire spectrum of DR 
processes and involves the selection of a process or processes that best fit the 
context of the participants.   
 
                                                 
352 Part 4, s (59) Retirement Villages Act 2003. 
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Sourdin 2005:20 
 
The distinction between litigation and ADR is authoritatively stated by Sir 
Laurence Street353 in a foreword to Sourdin’s book. He focuses specifically on 
what ADR does not involve.  
In the final analysis, adjudicative or determinative processes are not dispute 
resolution processes. Judges do not resolve disputes coming before their courts; they 
decide disputes or adjudicate on them. Disputes are resolved through consensual 
interaction between the disputants…  
…The important distinction between deciding and resolving disputes has been 
masked by the use of the letters ADR and attempts to render them meaningful. I 
believe that the time has now come when further debate on this topic is profitless. 
The letters should be seen in their own right as describing an holistic concept of a 
consensus-oriented approach to dealing with disputes or conflict. The concept 
encompasses conflict avoidance, conflict management and conflict resolution. The 
over-arching element of ADR in addressing these three aspects of conflict is the 
consensus-oriented philosophy that pervades the newly evolving recognition that 
conflict avoidance, management and resolution are simply three closely related 
sequential approaches each of which has relevance and application within the broad 
field of social and personal interaction.354 
 
The reasons people generally enter adversarial processes is said to surround the 
belief that they are entering an arena in which principles are at stake and that 
whatever transpires will be partially linked to right and justice.355 The governing 
principle of the adversarial process is the rule of law which provides “a worthy 
aspiration for any decision-making process”356 and probably one that those using 
                                                 
353 “Forward to the First Edition” by Sir Laurence Street in Sourdin, T (2nd ed 2005). 
354Ibid.. 
355 Grillo, T “The Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers for Women” [1991] YLJ 100, 6, 1559. 
356 Ibid. 
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the process place heavy reliance upon. We now have a protective piece of 
legislation covering retirement village residents making litigation a less likely 
process in the future; the determinative disputes panel mechanism being the 
choice. However, before conflict reaches dispute proportions parties are expected 
to attempt resolution through the complaints facility. Through this facility, it is 
likely mediation will be promoted ahead of the disputes panel. Twenty days after 
a complaint has been made a disputes notice can be issued; the complaints facility 
therefore has to be accessible and speedy in response. 
  
5.3.1  Mediation 
 
Mediation is the most frequently used of the ‘alternative’ facilitative processes 
and the most difficult to define or describe due to the way it has evolved and the 
uses it has been put to over the past two decades. Mediation no longer necessarily 
falls exclusively within the range of consensual processes. Compulsory mediation 
is now a regular feature of contractual arrangements in employment and 
commercial settings and within the court system. In the context of the Retirement 
Villages Act, following informal negotiation mediation is likely to be the 
preferred if not compulsory second step complaints facility process.357  
Generally definitions of mediation have evolved from two approaches; conceptual 
and descriptive. Boulle, Jones and Goldblatt provide examples of both 
approaches. A conceptualist definition is; 
The process by which the participants, together with the assistance of a neutral 
person or persons, systematically isolate disputed issues to develop options, 
consider alternatives, and reach consensual settlement that will accommodate 
their needs.358 
And a descriptive approach; 
…a process of dispute resolution in which the disputants meet with the mediator 
to talk over and attempt to settle their differences.359 
Sourdin adds to the conceptual/descriptive approaches with two models of 
mediation; evaluative and facilitative; both are seen as empowering for parties and 
involve compromise. She believes that “where lawyers expect and promote 
                                                 
357 An ideal first step would be an attempt at resolution through informal communication.  If this 
failed it is likely mediation would be advised. Section (2)(a) of the  Act states “A resident may not 
require resolution of a dispute (other than a dispute referred to in section 53 (3) by a disputes panel 
unless – the dispute has earlier been referred to the complaints facility…”     
358 Folberg and Taylor in Boulle, L Jones, J and Goldblatt, V Mediation: Principles, Process, 
Practice (NZ ed. 1998) 4. 
359 Roberts, M in Boulle, Jones & Goldblatt, 5. 
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evaluative mediation models, the mediator chosen is likely to adopt a more 
evaluative approach”.360 Sourdin uses a description from NADRAC  
Evaluative mediation is a term used to describe processes where a mediator, as 
well as facilitating negotiations between parties, also evaluates the merits of the 
dispute and provides suggestions as to its resolution… 
and attaches a note:  
…evaluative mediation may be seen as a contradiction in terms since it is 
inconsistent with the definition of mediation provided in [the NADRAC] 
glossary.361 
The NADRAC description of mediation states; 
A process in which parties to a dispute, with the assistance of a dispute 
resolution practioner (the mediator), identify the disputed issues, develop 
options, consider alternatives and endeavour to reach an agreement. The 
mediator has no advisory or determinative role in regard to the content of the 
dispute or the outcome of its resolution, but may advise on or determine the 
process of mediation whereby resolution is attempted. Mediation may be 
undertaken voluntarily, under a court order, or subject to an existing contractual 
agreement. 
An alternative is “a process in which the parties to a dispute, with the assistance 
of a dispute resolution practioner (the mediator) negotiate in an endeavour to 
resolve their dispute”.362   
What is the potential for using these two models of mediation in the context of 
retirement villages?  How do they rate in relation to the statements of principle? 
•  Equality before the law: In the context of retirement village conflicts, 
mediators represent ‘authority’ and by proxy, the law. The age and 
gender of the majority of residents will mean a considerable power 
imbalance between the parties; this comes in the form of both individual 
and structural power and is likely to result in difficulties for the resident. 
Mediators therefore are expected to possess knowledge about gender 
disadvantage in mediation, including the difficulties faced by older 
people in negotiation with those they see as capital rich and socially 
advantaged. However, mediator attempts to balance power between 
unequal parties has been criticised for a number of reasons including the 
existence of partiality which can mean the activation of prejudices 
“based on gender, social class, and even desired outcomes”. Also 
countertransference, a complementary process which refers to the 
mediator’s response to the party’s superimposed view of the situation, 
                                                 
360 Sourdin, T Alternative Dispute Resolution (2nd ed 2005) at 2.252, 28. 
361 National Alternative Dispute Resolution Advisory Council (NADRAC) fn 2, p 8 cited in 
Sourdin (2005) 28. 
362 Ibid, fn 2, p 9. 
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projected363 onto the mediator by the party. This, according to Grillo 
explains “why mediators’ attempts to redress power imbalances cannot 
necessarily be relied upon to meet the problem of unequal bargaining 
power”.364 Others argue that the image that power can be balanced in 
such as way as to produce some equality of power “fails to account for 
the dynamics of power and the interactional context within which it must 
be understood”. 365 Writing on the subject of gender and [any] mediation 
Grillo asserts; 
…in a very fundamental way, impartiality is a myth…The concept of 
impartiality is based on, the notion of an observer without perspective. But any 
observer inevitably sees from a particular perspective whether that perspective is 
acknowledged or not. Mediators like other human beings,  have biases, values, 
and points of view. They all have experiences in their lives that influence how 
they react to others, independent of  anything the others might do…A mediator’s 
attempt to remain neutral is to some extent always doomed to failure, but it is an 
important effort nonetheless…The most salient feature of a good mediation 
process is that the failures of neutrality are not denied, but recognized and 
addressed…366 
And on  “Mediators and Judges: the importance of form” she adds;  
Mediators are not supposed to be judges…It is assumed, however, that mediators 
as well as judges can and should be impartial. In the context of judging, Judith 
Resnik has shown how impartiality among judges is an aspiration, not a reality. 
Rather, a demonstrable “picture of partiality, of prejudgement, of judges ready to 
translate racial and sexist views into law” emerges. Even among well-
intentioned judges who try to be impartial, the twin dangers of unacknowledged 
perspective and unrecognized partiality are always present. These dangers, 
serious enough in the context of judging, are exacerbated in mediation. There are 
numerous restrictions on the way the decision maker ordinarily relates to parties 
in the adversarial setting that simply do not apply to mediation…At the most 
mundane level, judges sit apart from the parties…they speak to the parties’ 
attorneys…they do not ordinarily communicate with one side 
separately…judges can consider only certain evidence. By contrast, mediators sit 
close to the parties and speak directly to them. They frequently meet with the 
parties separately, often without subsequently telling the opposing party what 
transpired…no attempt is made to limit the sort of material that may be 
considered in the session on the grounds of privilege or relevancy…In sum, a 
mediator establishes what may be a risky relationship of informality and 
apparent intimacy with the parties… 367 
• Under a heading “Implicit agendas and defining fairness” Grillo speaks 
of the personal values, recognized and unrecognized of the mediator. 
These values are derived from multiple sources including professional 
training and the contexts and communities in which a mediator lives and 
                                                 
363 Transference also means projection; the client/party transfers/projects a view of a situation or 
personal world view onto a mediator and the mediator counters this using a response that comes 
from the mediator’s own past experiences. (Grillo, 1991, 1591) 
364 Grillo, T The Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers for Women [1991] YLJ 100, 6, 1592.  
365 Mayer , B The Dynamics of Conflict Resolution, 1990, 50-51. 
366 Grillo, supra n 364 at 1587. 
367 Ibid, 1588. 
 119
works. The reliance on these values whether recognized or not, may not 
be disclosed to parties. “It may appear to the mediator, as to any of us, 
that her perception of the world is objectively true”. 368 
 
• Mediation for older people, especially women appears to have many 
disadvantages. To understand what happens in the process of mediation 
and why, would probably require residents to undergo coaching for 
mediation prior to attendance. Whether that is a responsible or fair 
expectation of residents raises a number of issues including whether 
mediation is a fair and proper process for aged residents.  
 
• Adherence to the rule of law can have meaning within a mediation 
context. When a mediator provides a procedurally fair process for 
dealing with issues and demonstrates even handed treatment of the 
parties they are adhering to the rule of law in a non-determinative 
context. Additionally, in the event of lack of settlement parties have the 
right to proceed to a determinative process and the mediator should 
make this known to the parties.   
 
• A fair and proper process according to the statement of principle 
requires amongst other things that a process must be procedurally just 
and take account of culture, class, race, sexuality and age of participants. 
It must also promote self-determination.  The absence of lawyers in the 
majority of mediations and the privacy and intimacy of the process, 
results in difficulties in ensuring accountability of the process. If 
residents have family members who can attend, this would assist, but for 
those lacking support, the process does not seem one that would 
encourage participation from aged, conservative, ‘stability motivated’ 
residents.369 In the event of a ‘settlement’ being reached, the mediator 
has to be assured that the content of the settlement will hold in the event 
of an appeal. If a mediator had doubts about this, the integrity of the 
                                                 
368 Ibid, 1593. 
369 Chapter two has identified the key reasons people move into retirement villages; security and 
stability head the list. Engaging in conflict may be in direct opposition to these goals; silence and 
maintenance of the status quo is more likely to be the preferred option. 
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process would be compromised and the professional integrity of the 
mediator called into question.  
 
A retirement village context with the potential for examples of extreme power 
imbalance would, in some instances, contain all the ingredients of a complex and 
challenging procedural and ethical maze for even the most experienced and 
sensitive mediator. On the other hand parties can attend mediation and exercise 
self-determination by attending mediation and fail to reach an agreement. Who 
would know whether the failure to reach agreement resulted from a genuine lack 
of agreement or from a strategic decision taken to ensure the conflict reached a 
determinative process?  
 
In any event, whether mediation is undertaken voluntarily or mandated, whether it 
is a commercial, neighbourhood or family matter, parties can refuse to negotiate 
and retain the right to resolve their issues by adjudication.370   
 
If adequately assessed using the principles of fair and proper process and process 
pluralism, it may be decided that some retirement village disputes should not be 
mediated; the age and relative vulnerability of residents disqualifying the process.  
 
In summary, the independence, fairness and by implication effectiveness, of the 
mediation process in a retirement village would depend to a large degree on the 
model of mediation being used by the mediator; the self-awareness, 
perceptiveness, training, knowledge base and skills of the mediator, especially 
application of the ethical duty to facilitate a fair process. This would include 
whether the process is morally and contextually congruent with residents’ 
situations. Whether the mediator made explicit their own value base including 
how they would deal with power differences and whether the parties were aware 
of their legal rights, especially if financial matters were at stake, are all critical to 
actual and perceived responses to the concepts of a fair and proper process. 
Whether fairness of process was or had been present in the perception of the 
                                                 
370 Brown, B and Marriott, A  ADR Principles and Practice (2nd ed , 1999) 136. 
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resident may be demonstrated by their level of participation in the process and 
their evaluation of the process after the event.  
 
Independent adjudication/mediation in the retirement village context is 
problematic. The identification, selection, and payment of adjudicator under the 
Act is the responsibility of one party, the operator. This is in direct opposition to 
the statement of principle. If mediation is used in the context of the complaints 
facility, the same issues arise. In addition, the responsibility to ascertain the 
independence of the mediator is also allocated the operator. In the case of 
‘evaluative mediation’ the independence of the mediator takes on an even higher 
value because parties are reliant on the impartiality of the mediator and their 
knowledge and expertise of the matters requiring resolution. The connection of 
the mediator to the operator compromises the ethical duty of impartiality, even if 
only in the perception of the resident. These conditions make the process 
potentially unfavourable and unattractive to the resident.  
 
If an operator has previously used a mediator in a village dispute this also 
compromises the independence of the mediator and the role itself. Residents 
usually go into DR processes knowing much less about the process and the DR 
professional than the operator which places them immediately in a disadvantaged 
position. While it may not be possible to avoid this totally, having residents 
choose the mediator may go some way in avoiding what can be seen as an 
unbalanced and unacceptable starting point in attempts to resolve a dispute.  
 
Most significantly, the lack of independence of the process also impacts of the 
principle of fair and proper process. By not considering how authority placed 
with the operator to set up the process might seem from the resident’s perspective, 
the principle of fairness of process has been disregarded. This omission has 
illuminated the lack of synchronization in the Act model with context and 
culture/age of residents who are key participants in any DR processes.  
 
Timeliness, cost and accessibility: It may be that not all trained and/or accredited 
mediators would meet the skill requirements implicated in the statements of 
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principle. Shortage of skills usually equates with time delays which in turn can 
push up costs. We have no way of knowing at this point, what the supply and 
demand for suitably qualified mediators is in the retirement village sector. If we 
use the information supplied by members of RVANZ,371 the demand is extremely 
low, but come the implementation of the Code of Practice later in 2007 containing 
resident focussed requirements, the situation may change. Time, experience and 
credible evaluation will eventually tell. Timeliness, cost and accessibility therefore 
could be an issue if parties knew what they wanted and needed from a mediator 
and the supply of mediators to meet that ‘ideal’ was not as great as many 
professional bodies would hope.  
 
Advocacy could be a mechanism by which residents’ vulnerability may be reduced 
in a retirement village dispute. Having an advocate available to coach a resident 
prior to a mediation and if necessary act as the resident’s representative372 at the 
mediation has similarities to the concept of union involvement in employment 
disputes. Advocates would be partisan; qualified and experienced conflict 
specialists whose role would be incorporated within the process pluralism 
principle. They would be accountable to the resident and their own professional 
body and act as an extension of the resident’s right to self-determination. Cost 
covering for this role may require policy initiatives.   
 
5.3.2 Partnering 
 
I have included partnering because of its dual features; it is both a dispute 
avoidance and resolution process. Partnering is used informally in many business 
and other relationships to avoid problems. It involves parties meeting and 
deciding by agreement to follow consistent and agreed steps in communication 
when relationships are working well and also when issues arise.373 The idea is to 
                                                 
371 In October 2006 three RVANZ members responded to a request by RVANZ for information 
about the use of mediation in their villages.   
372 Acting as a non-legal advocate for an aged and distressed resident is a potentially radical move 
away from a third party neutral role. It offers promise for those residents who have legitimate 
issues with operators but lack the support or personal capability to follow through on a complaint 
action. Under the Act s 49 states “Resident’s rights may be exercised by personal representative 
and s 67 (4) covers representation at a disputes hearing; residents can be represented at their own 
cost in the context of ‘rights’ and ‘disputes’.  Mayer’s concept of advocacy is not limited to 
representation only.  
373 Sourdin, T Alternative Dispute Resolution (2nd ed,  2005) 2.230. 
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make explicit particular ground rules to aid open communication about all aspects 
of the relationships and ‘normalise’ conflict as a predicable consequence of 
human relationships. It requires those involved to act in good faith and fair 
dealing with others in the partnership, and often involves consensual decisions 
about strategies to avoid future problems: it develops unique incremental 
communication building blocks particular to unique sets of relationships. It seeks 
collaboration on defining mutual objectives and will often include ways parties 
might deal with more formal problem-solving and include specific DR 
strategies.374 Its strength lies in its objective to set clear problem-solving strategies 
in place when relationships are first formed; when issues arise those involved in 
the partnership can deal with the issues according to their pre-arranged strategies 
and void disputes. The Employment Relations Act 2000 through its objective to 
build mutually trusting and productive working relationships is an example of 
partnering that will be discussed in Chapter Six.  
 
I make the following points in relation to the statements of principles; 
 
• The concept of ‘partnering’ in a retirement village setting could hold 
appeal if it forms part of the resident’s entry contract and has been vetted 
by the resident’s legal adviser. This may overcome the problem 
surrounding operators and residents not communicating their expectations 
to each other at the time contracts establishing relationships are being 
negotiated.375 Fairness and effectiveness are implicated here. Also 
timeliness as it would be an immediate contract. Should problems arise, 
one or other of the ‘facilitated’ processes could be utilised. As long as the 
resident’s rights were known to the facilitator and not compromised during 
any facilitated process, the process would maintain integrity. 
                                                 
374 Ibid, 2.230.  Sourdin includes the Australian National Alternative Dispute Resolution Advisory 
Council (NADRAC) description; “Partnering involves the development of a “charter based on the 
parties” [sic] need to act in good faith and with fair dealing with one another. The partnering 
process focuses on the definition of mutual objectives, improved communication, the identification 
of likely problems and development of formal problem-solving and dispute resolution strategies”. 
375 Keogh, J Bradley, P “The Potential for Contractual Disputes in Retirement Village Living: An 
Examination of Recent Litigation Arising from Resident Contract Disputes in NSW Retirement 
Villages” (2002) paper presented at Pacific Rim Real Estate Society 8th Annual Conference, 
January 21-24, Christchurch, New Zealand.       
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• The independence of the process of agreeing to a partnering contract is 
one aspect that would need to be ascertained; no duress, no coercion and 
legal advice could enhance independence. 
• Timeliness and accessibility could be covered in the partnering contract 
and costs should not be an issue unless parties are paying for 
independent legal advice. If legal advice is used (presumably in drawing 
up the partnering contract) then it should fall on the operator to cover 
this cost and not pass it on to residents.  
• Fairness of process could be enhanced by the involvement of the village 
residents’ committee, which from 25th September 2007 will be a 
compulsory component of every retirement village, unless the village has 
an exemption. The process would only be fair if residents’ rights were 
not at risk through the process.  
• Additionally the concept of partnering has the potential to become a 
process of morality: it would address conflict avoidance and resolution 
and possibly shore up power imbalance between resident and operator. 
Partnerships necessarily require the good will of all parties in order to 
maintain mutual objectives and in some instances according to Sourdin 
“help parties handle unresolved problems efficiently using a nominated 
facilitator”.376 The option of a facilitator is not precluded by partnering. 
 
 
5.3.3 Facilitation and facilitated negotiation 
 
While the term facilitation can apply to situations such as chairing a meeting or 
acting as a Master of Ceremonies, in ADR the facilitator plays a different role. 
According to Sourdin; 
The facilitator is generally an impartial person whose role is to assist parties to 
clarify issues in a dispute and move matters to a pre-stated conclusion (for 
example an outcome – not specified – is to be reached) with the assistance of an 
agenda. Facilitators may also assist parties to develop options and suggest the 
inclusion of other ADR processes where appropriate.377 
 
                                                 
376 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, cited in Sourdin 2.230, 25. 
377 Ibid, 220, 24. 
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In relation to residents, the process of facilitation provides an opportunity for a 
residents’ committee to meet with management to work through issues that may 
be of concern to either residents or management; 
 
• Independence would most likely be achieved if both/all parties were 
involved in the choice of the facilitator; any conflicts were revealed and 
openly discussed and the option of another facilitator freely accepted if 
any party was uncomfortable with the initial choice.   
 
• It would be accessible because there are adequate numbers of 
appropriately trained and qualified dispute resolution professionals 
available in New Zealand to fill the role of facilitator. Depending on the 
location of the parties it is unlikely the process would be held up 
unreasonably due to a shortage or unavailability of facilitators.  
 
• The principle of fair and proper process means viewing processes from 
the perspective of process pluralism. This can be achieved by the 
facilitator when assisting parties to develop options which may include 
other DR processes, consequently facilitators must have a 
comprehensive knowledge about all DR processes. Fairness can be 
achieved through the impartiality and independence of the facilitator and 
their skills in managing the process. Fairness would be compromised 
however, if power imbalance was affecting a party’s ability to participate 
at an effective level. It would then be the responsibility of the facilitator 
to make a judgement on whether or not to proceed in these 
circumstances. Fairness and integrity of the process could also be 
compromised if the resident’s rights where drawn into the negotiation 
and the resident was not aware of these rights. The facilitator would need 
to be aware of the rights of residents prior to the commencement of the 
negotiation and a principled approach would be taken in order to 
privilege these rights in the process of negotiation.    
 
• It could be a timely process. Locating an experienced facilitator should 
not mean delays. LEADR and AMINZ both have lists of qualified and 
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experienced facilitators in most centres in New Zealand. The unknown 
factor is whether the available facilitators are knowledgeable and well 
trained in identifying situations where power imbalance is a factor and 
what interventions would be required to balance this. In some cases this 
could mean putting an end to the process.378    
 
• Should facilitated negotiation be the chosen method for dispute 
resolution, it is likely the cost would be met by the operator. In the case 
of the Retirement Villages Act, it would be in the operator’s interest to 
resolve the issues and avoid a dispute notice being issued which would 
result in greater cost to the operator and possibly negative publicity since 
dispute hearings are public and publishable unless special circumstances 
deem otherwise. 
 
5.3.4 Disputes panels 
 
The Retirement Villages Act refers to a ‘disputes panel’ reflecting the New 
Zealand reality; an increasingly large number of bodies with a wide variety of 
powers, set up for the purposes of dispute resolution are afforded different titles; 
tribunals, authorities, committees and boards being amongst these.  
The Law Commission Report suggests “that the term tribunal is used to describe a 
statutory body…”379 with specific characteristics. The characteristics that relate to 
the disputes panel set out in the Act include; independence from the 
administration which in this case is the Department of Building and Housing; 
impartiality between the parties; ability to reach a binding decision; set up to deal 
with particular types of cases or a number of closely related types of cases; 
members do not often serve full time, are not professional judges and do not have 
to be lawyers (seven of the eight RVA panellists initially approved are 
experienced lawyers used to dealing with situations of power imbalance. The 
                                                 
378 The concern here is some facilitators/mediators follow a non-interventionist style believing it is 
up to the parties to negotiate for themselves. They would possibly see the parties’ skills or lack of 
as the ‘reality’ of the situation and not intervene. Rather than create a contrived situation with too 
much intervention which could then impact on their impartiality, these facilitators are likely to 
allow the process and the parties to determine the balance – even if it is weighted significantly 
more on one side. 
379 Law Commission Report, “Delivering Justice for All”, 2004, 7.1, 6, 286. 
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eighth is an experienced professional adjudicator/arbitrator); procedure will be 
similar to, but more flexible and simpler than a court of law.  
 
The areas of dissimilarity cover the characteristics identified in the Law 
Commission report concerning “panels” of adjudicators or more than one 
adjudicator holding permanent positions. There is a high likelihood that one 
member panel will be the norm for retirement village disputes and the 
‘approvals’380 are not permanent but for a specified duration, namely five years. 
Other points of difference are; the retirement village panellists have set their own 
rate at $300 per hour plus gst and costs381 and will operate on a contract for 
services with an operator for each dispute; they have received no specialised 
training for the role they have been selected to fill and lack a ‘senior’ Principal 
Disputes Panel member to mentor and lead members. These points of difference 
set the Retirement Village disputes panel apart from most statutory panels where 
training is provided and performance is often monitored, making this system a 
subject of debate and speculation.  
 
5.3.5 First disputes: Initial impressions 
 
The first disputes hearing under the New Zealand Act took place near Wellington 
in late February this year.382 The village management was legally represented and 
the resident represented himself. It was evident the resident nearing 80 years of 
age was unfamiliar with some legal terms and unclear about how the process 
would unfold. The lawyer on the other hand acted as a legally trained person 
operating from his legal habitus using his symbolic capital to defend his client at 
every opportunity.  
 
At the conclusion of the hearing counsel for the owner commented to observers 
that the process resembled a “Kangaroo Court”. He also described the resident and 
his witness as “red necks”. These comments can also be seen as acts of symbolic 
                                                 
380 The Retirement Commissioner ‘approves’ the panellists and the operators ‘appoint’ once a 
disputes notice has been issued.  
381 This information is available from the Retirement Commission website 
<www.retirement.org.nz> on the page where disputes panel members are listed. 
382 The hearing was on 26th February 2007. The second disputes panel hearing took place in 
Auckland on the 3rd April and the third on the 8th June in Wellington. The decisions for these 
hearings are available on the Retirement Commission website <www.retirement.org.nz>. 
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violence. Through a self-centred view of his habitus in the legal world and 
possession of specific intellectual capital, the counsel failed to assess the situation 
as one that could reflect badly on him as a member of a particular ‘class’. 
Hopefully this example is an exception rather than the rule, in terms of 
professional legal behaviour. 
  
At the time of writing, three determinations under the RVA have been made by 
disputes panels; all were brought by residents, one male and two female; one 
resident was represented by her attorney/son. The other male and female residents 
represented themselves. The operators in the two disputes involving large 
business corporates were legally represented. Two female and one male panellist 
have provided determinations; all are legally trained. In the second dispute, the 
resident was given a choice from a list of panellists available in the region. This is 
a sensible and fair way to manage the selection process when criticisms have been 
aimed at operators having the key selection role when a party in the dispute.    
 
At this time there has been no evaluation of the residents’ experiences of the 
process although my observation at the first dispute and communication with the 
resident Ian Brown will be included. I shall attempt to apply ‘statements of 
principle’ from Chapter Three using his experience, the two written decisions 
issued in March and April 2007 and communication with dispute panellists. My 
perspective remains; the principles that ought to inform methods and models of 
DR, should attempt to balance the power relations between participants in such as 
way that the powerlessness ought to be recognised and reflected in the experience 
of the participants.  
 
Equality before the law: The statement of principle equality before the law 
requires amongst other things that age, gender, and lack of legal representation be 
considered and not cause difficulties in dealings with the disputes panel. The first 
dispute involved a male resident who, during his working life, had developed 
skills in formal communication including written communications and had some 
understanding of formal processes (not necessarily legal), organisational systems 
and generally had a good understanding of the way business should be conducted. 
He was articulate, capable and showed concern for the residents in his village and 
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those who had left the village. He took the case on behalf of others being someone 
who may be ‘affected’ by any decision of an operator.383  
 
In spite of his previous experience and language capability he struggled to 
understand legal terminology. He did not feel the process was sufficiently flexible 
or user friendly to prevent frustration during the pre-hearing meeting, in 
correspondence and at the hearing.  He felt too much time was taken up by legal 
counsel for the operator. He did not feel able to participate fully because he did 
not understand the process and some of the procedural language.384 He was 
prevented from cross-examining or rebutting counsel by the disputes panel and 
has remaining concerns about this ruling in spite of the decision being favourable 
to him. He sometimes did not understand what happened in the process and why; 
he did not feel equal before the law mainly due to the adversarial manner of 
counsel.385 It seemed to him a “one-sided” process which reinforced his feelings 
of disadvantage when up against legal counsel in the context of a hearing.386  
 
Section 67 (4) of the RVA states “The disputes panel may allow 1 or more parties 
to be represented, whether by counsel or otherwise, and to question the other 
party…” The Disputes Tribunals of New Zealand do not allow legal 
representation; parties represent themselves and the tribunal member manages the 
process according to the rules associated with fair and proper process. This raises 
the question of whether in the context of the RVA, the panellist considered 
disallowing legal representation for the operator. In addition it raises a bigger 
question about whether representation actually equalises existing power 
imbalance. There are a number of arguments that impact on this question 
including for example having the resources to employ experienced counsel versus 
using legal aid or Community Law Centres.   
                                                 
383 Section 53 (1) RVA 2003. 
384 The process issues also occurred at the pre-hearing meeting. Due to the language of counsel, 
who was Brown’s adversary, Brown felt pressure to ‘do things properly’ having been challenged 
by counsel when he used incorrect terminology or did not understand some of the legal 
requirements. This upset Brown who found the pre-hearing preparation particularly stressful and 
time consuming.  He felt severely disempowered and disadvantaged during the pre-hearing period 
in spite of his thoroughness and competent presentation of written submissions. 
385 The time taken up by counsel and being prevented from challenging what he determined to be 
misrepresentation about the way contracts were handled by management frustrated him and 
provoked loss of faith in the fairness of the process.     
386 Email communication from Ian Brown dated 8th March 2007.  
 130
 
The second dispute proceeded without legal representation of either party. It was 
clear from the remedies sought by the female resident that she did not understand 
the purpose of the process, what could reasonably be achieved from the process or 
what she was required to provide in order for the adjudicator to fairly consider her 
dispute issues. Actions taken by the village manager were found to have breached 
the resident’s rights and numerous other matters were found not to be within the 
jurisdiction of the panel. Also, the panel lacked authority to make certain orders 
but authority aside, it was willing to comment on practices and make 
recommendations to prevent certain matters reaching dispute proportion in future. 
It seems these recommendations were accepted by the operator. 
 
Adherence to the rule of law is questioned by Brown who remains concerned 
about why he was not permitted to cross examine or rebut counsel. Consequently 
he questions the even handedness and flexibility of the adjudicator. Both disputes 
produced reasoned decisions and both contained ‘right to appeal’ statements. 
• Fair and proper process: In both disputes it is clear that both sides were 
able to present their cases and these were properly considered by the 
adjudicators. In Brown’s case there is a grievance felt about his ability to 
fully participate when cross-examination was refused by the adjudicator. 
This impacted on his sense of fairness of process. The outcomes in both 
cases387  were morally appropriate and not contested; outcomes took 
account of the law and substantial merits and justice of the case. In both 
instances, the processes were conducted in a timely and efficient manner.   
• Independent adjudication: The disputes panel under the Act achieves 
some level of independence through the approval, management and 
monitoring functions carried out by the Retirement Commissioner. It has 
proven to be accessible to parties in the first two disputes under the Act. 
The tenure of office has been set at “not longer than 5 years”; institutional 
support is not provided. The selection and payment of adjudicators is not 
neutral with the Act determining this should be undertaken by the 
operator. This is not thought to have impacted adversely on the 
                                                 
387 Refer to discussion on pages immediately following. 
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adjudicator’s compliance with the rules of natural justice; hearing both 
sides including the evidence of witnesses and making a determination 
according to the law and merits of the case. Whether flexibility of process 
was practised by the adjudicator in the first dispute would seem to be 
dependent on the participants’ experience of the process.  
The disputes panel process appears to be accessible and has proven to be 
timely. However fairness of process may be compromised when residents 
lack representation or are beyond carrying out the research required for 
self-representation.388 Costs are met by the operators though this can be 
passed on to residents in cases where it is not ruled out within the 
resident’s occupation right agreement.   
The effectiveness of the process in delivering a moral outcome has been   
demonstrated by the first two determinations and appeals have been ruled 
out in both cases. The first dispute decision was delivered four weeks 
after the hearing; five months after the resident’s complaint was first 
lodged.389 In the second dispute the resident first made a complaint to 
management in mid 2006 prior to the dispute provisions coming into 
force. A dispute notice was issued at the end of February 2007 and a 
hearing held on the 3rd April 2007. Compared with the time-frames 
involved in the NSW and Queensland consumer tribunals, the first New 
Zealand disputes have been determined in a very much shorter period. 
The full implementation of all aspects of the Act including the Code of 
Practice when in force in September 2007 should eliminate the delay in 
the second dispute between the initial complaint and the hearing. 
The fact that the residents did not engage legal counsel and succeeded to 
win on matters of law and also morality in the second case, provides 
additional evidence of independent adjudication. In Brown’s case it could 
be reasonably argued the adjudicative process was a fairer process than 
any facilitated process could have been, given the nature of the dispute 
which involved the residents’ rights, the law and money.  
                                                 
388 The experience of the first NZ resident to issue a dispute notice under the Act and experiences 
reported from NSW and Queensland, suggest considerable skill and support is required for 
residents to be able to represent themselves at a tribunal hearing.    
389 Christmas intervened which meant delays were experienced. 
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• Process pluralism: The principle process pluralism in Brown’s case 
would have allowed him to utilize the collective voice of residents at his 
village because all would be affected by any decisions. Fortunately in his 
case section 53 (1) of the Act covered residents’ rights to give dispute 
notices concerning operators’ decisions “affecting the resident’s 
occupation right or right to access services or facilities”. This was a 
refurbishment issue affecting him though he was not leaving the village 
at the time. The Act does not provide for ‘class’ or group actions that do 
not fit within the provisions in section 53 (1).  
The second dispute involved issues that would have been best dealt with 
by utilizing the principle process pluralism when applied to the spectrum 
of processes available. Had the disputes panel been able to vary its role 
and operate as a triage390; refer matters to facilitative, advisory or 
determinative processes or conduct those processes itself, the unresolved 
issues could have been resolved with opportunity for participants to 
exercise self-determination within the context of a number of processes.   
• Advocacy : The role of advocacy in the first two disputes had the 
potential to reduce the stress and frustration of the residents and 
provided specialist knowledge about conflict and helpful ways of dealing 
with it. This would have provided the residents with a sounding board to 
clarify their issues in a safe environment and validate their resolve to do 
something about an injustice or other issue, also, understand the issues 
involved at a deeper level, and learn something about themselves and the 
process they were going through. Then, having negotiated the essential 
stages that precede readiness to take action, their opportunity to 
strategise the next steps and raise the conflict to a level that would 
engage the source or sources of the conflict would have been achieved. 
Helping residents to pursue conflict effectively and constructively would 
mean residents could then positively experience the impact of their own 
resourcefulness; they would feel empowered at least at a personal level 
                                                 
390 An email communication from Professor Tania Sourdin 23rd January 2007 explained, triage “in 
this sense 1. Facilitative would mean – mediation (ordinarily small numbers of parties), facilitation 
(large scale disputes) 2. Advisory – case evaluation, expert appraisal (using an expert eg medical 
to comment on a particular aspect of a dispute) 3. Determinative – as per industry based schemes – 
binding on the facility”.  
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and possibly at a socio-political level such as contributing to a greater 
social cause.  
In the second dispute, advocacy would have clarified for the resident the 
spectrum of processes available to deal with her issues and possibly 
prevented her taking issues and seeking remedies that were inappropriate 
in the context of the disputes panel hearing. 
The residents involved in the first two disputes have been described as 
articulate and strong characters391; both fall into the under 80 age 
category. This puts them in a category characterised by higher autonomy 
and therefore more likely to challenge what they perceive as injustice 
within the management or practices within their villages.392 Advocacy 
should be accessible to all residents particularly those who are aged and 
frail who have issues they wish to have addressed. Advocacy in their 
case could mean non-legal representation which could also be an 
empowering experience for the resident or groups of residents. 
   
5.4  Summary 
 
In this chapter I have used the principles and ‘statements of principle’ that 
emerged from Chapter Four to examine the DR processes of mediation, 
partnering, facilitation and facilitated negotiation, and disputes panels. These 
statements when applied to the processes show what might be evident when a 
principle is present in the process.  I have highlighted the disadvantages of 
mediation for older people, particularly older women, suggesting mediation 
may not be a suitable or fair process for retirement village disputes; advocacy 
could provide additional strength to a resident in mediation. I have concluded 
that negotiation (or mediation) where a settlement is the anticipated outcome 
from a resident’s complaint should be facilitated negotiation with settlements 
vetted by counsel acting for the resident. I have suggested partnering may be 
an advantageous approach to initial contractual contexts in retirement villages. 
 
                                                 
391 Having not met the second disputant, I have relied on others’ descriptions. 
392 Streib, C Folts, W La Greca, “Autonomy Power and Decision Making” The Gerontologis, 25, 
4, 1985, 403-409. The data from this study is quoted in Chapter Two. 
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In relation to the statements of principle I have undertaken a preliminary and 
limited evaluation of the first two disputes taken under the Act. I found in the 
first dispute, the process was stressful and onerous on the unrepresented 
resident and the adjudicator’s perceived inflexibility of process surrounding 
rebuttal, caused the resident to experience the process as one-sided and 
dominated by counsel for the operator. The favourable outcome for the 
resident has not altered his views on the process yet clearly the adjudicator 
complied with the principles equality before the law, independent adjudication 
and adherence to the rule of law. The second dispute, due lack of legal 
involvement prior to and during the hearing highlighted the adjudicator’s 
flexibility and an appropriate outcome appears to have resulted. It was 
however, a heavyweight process for relatively lightweight issues; advocacy 
and process pluralism would have provided more effective and appropriate 
alternatives. In the exemplar disputes, the application of the principles process 
pluralism and advocacy could have balanced the imbalance between resident 
and operator. The principle process pluralism requires that all those affected 
by decisions be involved in any process concerning those decisions. In 
Brown’s dispute, all residents were affected. The correct application of the 
principle would have meant a residents’ committee would rightfully 
participate in a decision-making forum such as a disputes panel hearing.      
 
I have found the involvement of operators in the selection and payment of 
adjudicators to seriously compromise the principle of independent 
adjudication even when the adjudicator meets all ethical and legal 
requirements; the perception of independence being as important as the reality 
to residents.   
 
The next chapter will consider a range of statutory and one private dispute 
resolution process to ascertain how principles or fairness and independence 
operate in the contexts examined.  It will also consider how macrosystem 
influences such as ideology and class impact on less powerful groups through 
state endorsement via exosystem processes.     
 135
 
Chapter 6 Statutory and Private Dispute 
Resolution: issues of independence 
and fairness of process  
 
6.1  Introduction  
 
This thesis sets out to answer key questions concerning the principles of 
independence and fairness of process as they apply to the Retirement Villages Act 
2003. To assist in this task I will examine a range of circumstances in which 
mediators, conciliators and adjudicators practise and the different rules that apply 
when appointments are made from within statutory organizations compared with 
private contexts. The tensions between mediating and adjudicating privately and 
undertaking these roles within a statutory legal framework will be explored in the 
search to uncover how the principles are applied in a number of different contexts. 
Fairness and lack of fairness will be demonstrated in the examples selected and 
the role of ideology, hegemony, class, and cultural capital will be illuminated to 
show how class domination can occur in statutory contexts; essentially the macro 
system impacts on the microsystem through exosystem decision-making which is 
based on ideology supported by the dominant class.393 People   experience the 
consequences of those decisions through the silent force of hegemony. If 
dissatisfied with exosystem outcomes the less powerful class  has to negotiate 
their way through a process  set up by the dominant class  to review the decisions 
of the systems instituted by that class.  Systems that contain  concepts or 
processes that may be usefully applied to retirement village disputes will be 
identified and offered later to strengthen the situation of residents in dispute with 
operators. 
 
In order to appreciate and evaluate the processes contained in the Retirement 
Villages Act 2003, I will first provide a perspective on statutory dispute resolution 
and its application to the growing industry of retirement villages. This discussion 
covers the increasing trend to include mediation and conciliation in statutory 
contexts, and the issues this raises.  
                                                 
393 The dominant class being the ‘educated’ middle class who occupy positions within the state 
bureaucracy. 
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Second, the innovative dispute resolution processes contained in the Employment 
Relations Act 2000 will be discussed and unique features identified. This will be 
followed by The Injury Prevention Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 2001; 
the third example. I will include a critical examination of the Accident 
Compensation Corporation’s processes for dispute resolution and the use of 
Dispute Resolution Services Limited, an organization owned and directed by the 
Corporation. 
 
Fourth, an evaluation of the Australian National Native Title Tribunal will be 
included providing an example of the impact of ideology on the way Tribunals 
emphasize (or de-emphasize) certain dispute resolution processes and the 
outcomes that result.  
 
The fifth area of discussion looks at the work of Tribunals, their role in 
administrative decision-making and issues surrounding independence of the 
tribunals from the entities whose decisions they are reviewing. The sixth example, 
the Health and Disability Commissioner considers the role of an 
Ombuds/Commissioner in administrative justice and two private Ombudsman 
schemes; banking and insurance and savings. Finally, the complaints process of 
the New Zealand Press Council is included, providing an example of an internal 
private sector model for dealing with complaints.  
 
 
6.2 Statutory dispute resolution: a socio-legal perspective 
 
Viewing dispute resolution at a macro level allows us to make sense of the 
breadth of potential positive influence that legislation which supports informal 
mechanisms for resolving disputes may have on social cohesion and economic 
stability. For example, legislation that specifically includes mediation such as the 
Family Proceedings Act 1980; Residential Tenancies Act 1986; Human Rights 
Act 1993 and the Employment Relations Act 2000 provide opportunities for 
aggrieved parties to meet aided by a neutral third party (mediator) for the express 
purpose of attempting to resolve whatever issues are put forward as part of a 
dispute. Mediation has previously been considered a voluntary and consensual 
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process, yet under the exemplar jurisdictions mediation is a non-voluntary part of 
the dispute resolution process. In spite of the apparent contradiction, it is possible 
to imagine that resolution of conflict can have positive flow-on effects.  
 
For example, resolution of family conflict can positively impact on family (and 
work) life including the well-being of dependent children. Resolving tenancy 
issues can impact on personal lives and economic viability both from the point of 
view of the tenant and the landlord. Human rights issues may have a pervasive 
effect in undermining cultural and personal values along with a person’s ability to 
identify as a valued member of society, therefore resolution of these issues is 
desirable. Employment issues strike at the heart of class relations with stand-offs 
and protracted legal battles escalating class conflict (eg National Distribution 
Worker’s Union members lock-out by Progressive Enterprises, the supermarket 
giant, during September 2006). This lock-out no doubt resulted in a detrimental 
economic impact on both parties but it also achieved a level of public 
conscientisation394 about the impact of multi-national global strategies on low- 
paid workers. This is likely to have reflected badly on the employer while 
provoking public sympathy for the workers; in this case, higher hourly rates 
resulted.   
 
At a micro level, the private lives of citizens can be seen as reflected within the 
institutions that support constitutional values such as individual rights and access 
to justice. It has long been held that the Court system is a ‘backstop’ available to 
determine disputes between citizens and between citizens and the state.395 It is 
only in the past fifteen-twenty years that serious efforts have been taken to 
establish alternative mechanisms for dealing with conflict and disputes in the vast 
array of settings that give rise to differences, conflict and outright hostility.  
                                                 
394 Conscientisation is a term used to describe a liberating process advanced by the educator Paulo 
Friere in his book “Pedagogy of the Oppressed” (1972). Friere’s insights into illiteracy among vast 
numbers of Brazil’s poorest peasants during the 1960 and 1970’s led to a movement promoting 
group efforts to make people aware of themselves and their situations; ie becoming conscious 
beings.  Theoretically, in order for this conscientisation to occur they (the peasants) first had to 
become aware of the world and their place in it, in order to act upon it. The central feature of this 
action-reflection model is praxis; people act, then reflect upon their actions, mobilize the parties 
(the illiterate masses) to achieve liberation by transforming  personal troubles into public issues. 
This is the basis of conscientisation.  In the case of the National Distributions workers ‘lock out’ 
by Progressive Enterprises, the media, the public and politicians began to pick up on the ‘public 
issue’ of low pay and worker exploitation.  
395“Delivering Justice for All”, Report 85, Law Commission, 2004  
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Dispute resolution in the context of retirement villages raises particular issues, not 
least the average age and potential vulnerability of the residents in relation to the 
power developers/operators/managers can exercise, and in a number of cases have 
exercised, to the disadvantage of residents or potential residents. It has often been 
stated that the way to measure a society’s humanity is to ascertain how well it 
cares for its most vulnerable members. For many older people, choosing a 
retirement village as a place to live in later years means investing most of their life 
savings. Complex legal transactions need to be executed in the most ethical 
manner, after which conditions of contract must be complied with fairly in order 
that residents can live their lives free from the worry of unexpected costs or major 
changes to their contractual arrangements.  
 
 
6.3 Statutory mediation and conciliation  
 
Observing mediation and conciliation as statutory procedures requires a different 
lens through which to view the processes. This comes about because of the legal 
context in which the processes previously seen as informal and flexible, fall under 
the shadow of the law where different rules apply. The principal is the rule of 
natural justice which disallows a judge (or adjudicator) from hearing one party in 
private without the other party being present .This is underpinned by the principle 
of a fair, proper and accountable process. Whether mediation, this formerly 
private, consensual and neutral process is compatible with the rule of law has 
become the subject of significant legal and academic debate. Some authors see 
state endorsement of mediation as intensifying debate about mediator standards 
and accreditation and call for a more principled approach to the enactment of 
statutory models of mediation and conciliation.396 Others such as the former Chief 
Justice of New South Wales Sir Laurence Street have spoken strongly in 
opposition to the notion of incorporating mediation within the judicial institution. 
One expects the procedures to be operated fairly, but the principles of natural 
justice simply have no relevance in a mediation: the process does not involve the 
imposition of any decision affecting the rights or interests of any of the 
disputants. Natural justice or due process have no more relevance to the 
                                                 
396 Bayliss, C and  Carroll, R “The Nature and Importance of Mechanisms for Addressing Power 
Differences in Statutory Mediation”, [2002] 14, BLR 317; Sourdin, T “Alternative Dispute 
Resolution” (2nd ed 2005). 
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mediation of a dispute than they have to the mediating of any other commercial 
deal …397  
The greater use of state endorsed mediation in recent times has come about 
through legislation and private contractual arrangements both in Australia and 
New Zealand. In spite of strong opposition and promotion of the “incompatibility 
principle”398 which in Australia takes its lead from the Australian Constitution; 
Judges are acting as mediators, tribunal members are engaging in facilitative 
methods and mediators are involved in directed mediation and decision making399 
in efforts to resolve disputes and avoid litigation. Thus, opposing views in both 
jurisdictions have been overtaken by practice.400  
 
Whatever position ADR practitioners and writers hold, it is increasingly evident 
that mediation and conciliation are now established within state machinery. This 
is partly because conventional court processes are viewed increasingly in non-
adversarial terms and ADR has become a preferred, legitimate and credible 
option.401 However, the key legitimising principles of mediation; consensus, 
neutrality and confidentiality remain contestable when examined within a 
statutory framework. Lack of definition of ADR processes in statutory contexts 
has added to confusion and debate.402  
 
The terms ‘mediator’ and ‘conciliator’ also cause difficulties when encompassed 
in statute. Writers have drawn attention to practices that appear to compromise the 
fundamental principles of these processes especially when the functions and 
duties of mediators include giving advice, making suggestions and 
recommendations and doing “such things as they think right and proper for 
                                                 
397 Street,  L “Mediation and the Judicial Institution” [1997] ALJ 71, 795.  
398 The incompatibility principle is connected to Chapter three of the Australian Constitution 
which relates to a situation that may arise “in the performance of non-judicial functions of such a 
nature that the capacity of a judge to perform his or her judicial functions with integrity is 
compromised or impaired”. (Moore cited in Sourdin, 2005, 113). 
399 For example the Employment Relations Act 2000, s150; Residential Tenancies Act 1986; 
Family Proceedings Act 2000; Health and Disability Commissioner Act 1994. 
400 Green, P Employment Dispute Resolution (2002); Sourdin,  T Alternative Dispute Resolution 
(2nd ed 2005). 
401 Baylis, C “Statutory Mediators and Conciliators: Towards a Principled Approach” [2002] 
NZULR, 20, 1, 101-131. 
402 Spiller, P and Hooper, S “Dispute Resolution in a Statutory Context”, in Spiller, P (ed) Dispute 
Resolution in New Zealand (1999). 
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inducing parties to come to a fair and amicable settlement”.403 Power of this type 
afforded mediators in human rights and tenancy disputes for example can be seen 
to confuse terminology, compromise neutrality and according to some, raise 
serious questions about the integrity of the mediation process implicit and explicit 
in some statutory models.  
 
 
6.4 Exploring unique opportunities – the Employment 
Relations Act 2000 
 
Moving from retirement village relations to employment relations provides 
opportunity to consider the mechanisms available to resolve disputes between an 
employee and employer. The Employment Relations Act 2000 (ERA) contains a 
hierarchy of mechanisms to deal with employment relations issues. These are 
mediation, the Employment Relations Authority and the Employment Court. I will 
focus on mediation because in the context of this study it is the process that is 
likely to have most relevance to the context of disputes in retirement villages.   
 
The Employment Relations Act has been described as a “leading edge” approach 
to employment relationship problems; its philosophy of low level consensual 
decision making is encapsulated within its objective to build mutually trusting and 
productive working relationships in all aspects of the employment environment.404 
These are seen to exist within the relatively complex arrangement of processes, 
procedures and rules operating within each of its three institutions. Its features 
include encouragement of the “active” management of mediation; covering 
disputes involving both state and private sector employees and more recently, 
work related relationships such as independent-contractor/principal relationships, 
also ensuring the operations of the Employment Relations Authority are 
independent of Court intervention into its processes.405  
 
                                                 
403 Human Rights Act 1993, s76(2)(c). The Residential Tenancies Act 1986 s76(5)(b); 
Employment Relations Act 2000, s144 (2) and the Family Proceedings Act 2000, s14(2)(a)(b) 
implicate mediators in unspecified powers to try to obtain agreement and settlement.  
404 Employment Relations Act 2000, Part 1, s3 (a). 
405 Employment Relations Act 2000, s144, (2) (a). 
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6.4.1 Dispute Resolution under ERA 2000 
 
The Department of Labour through its professional and specialist services 
reported that between December 2002 and December 2005, approximately 32,250 
applications for mediation by Mediation Services were received and 80 per cent 
were resolved. According to the Department this figure proves mediation has been 
“extremely successful” in resolving employment disputes.406  Mediation Services 
is the term used to describe the Department of Labour’s mediation service (a 
permanent body of mediators) established under the Employment Relations Act 
2000 (ERA). The Employment Relations Amendment Act (no.2) (ERAA) made 
changes to the ERA providing for a fast and effective mediation process that could 
ensure finality in employment disputes without redress to higher authorities such 
as the Employment Relations Authority.407  
 
The policy intent behind the changes is linked to the Act’s statutory objective408 
and effective resolution of employment relationship issues. Mediation under the 
Act covers both private mediation and mediation provided by the Department of 
Labour’s Mediation Service. It is the role of the department’s chief executive to 
administer the Act and the requirement to employ or engage mediators whether 
within the department’s Mediation Service or privately (in specialist roles if 
required) is mandatory.409 
 
 
6.4.2 Mediation and independence of Mediation Services 
personnel 
 
Section 144 of the Act requires that mediators appointed under the Act by the 
chief executive “act independently and are independent of any parties to whom 
                                                 
406 Hicks, C “Employment Mediation – Getting the Best Results from Mediation” [2005] ELB 44; 
Scott-Howman, A “Employment Institutions – A Practioner’s Perspective” [2005] ELB 
42;Quivooy, M “Employment Relations Service mediations – statistics and analysis” [2006] ELB 
(2) 45. 
407 The Employment Relations Amendment Act (no2), 2004 came into force on the 1st December 
2004.  
408 The ERA requires good faith and collective bargaining. The Retirement Villages Acts in NSW 
and Queensland recognize a similar concept through ‘Residents’ Committees’ and their ability to 
take cases to the state Commercial and Consumer Tribunals. The New Zealand Retirement 
Villages Act does not recognize or give power to Residents’ Committees in this way. 
409 Section 144(1) 
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the mediation services relate”.410 However, unlike conventional mediation where 
mediators usually determine the parameters and processes involved in their 
practice – frequently in consultation with their clients – mediators operating under 
the Act can be given “general instructions” by the chief executive. These “general 
instructions”411 relate to the Act’s statutory objectives (promotion of good faith, 
collective bargaining etc).  
 
Given the overlap of the chief executive’s obligations under the Act and the role 
of the Mediation Service mediators, it is apparent a major shift in dispute 
resolution procedure has occurred. Mediation is now the paramount process for 
resolving employment disputes and its use has been given a high level of 
legislated emphasis.412  Mediation in the employment context provides different 
options and methods for resolving employment relations disputes than has 
traditionally been the available.413  It does so through the Act’s  statutory 
objectives that  extend the role of the mediator operating within the department’s 
Mediation Service to that of ‘information provider’ covering employment rights 
and obligations; information about availability of services to individuals, unions 
other body corporate experiencing employment relationship problems and “other 
services”.414 The Act, including the “fast track” mediation amendments clearly 
recognise the need for supportive facilities such as prompt and expert problem-
solving, information and assistance when employment relationships falter.  
 
To effectively resolve problems and maintain productive working relationships a 
comprehensive and relatively radical approach was instituted via the 2004 
amendments. This has had the effect of stretching the capacity of mediators in 
ways not previously experienced in New Zealand. The amendments provided 
disincentives for seeking legal representation. It did this through promotion of 
unionism and removing “legalism” from procedures within the Employment 
                                                 
410 Green, P  Employment Dispute Resolution (2002) 65. 
411 Section 153(2)(3)  
412 Green, supra n 410 (xi). 
413 Mediation is not a statutory requirement under the Retirement Villages Act 2003; it is 
implicated within the “complaints facility”, Part 4 s (51) of the Act and is part the RVANZ’s 
internal process.  
414 The “other services” cover a range of employment circumstances including promoting smooth 
conduct of employment relationships, assisting with prompt and effective resolution of 
employment relationship problems including fixing of new terms and conditions of employment. 
This is covered in section 144 (2). 
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Relations Authority.415  Rather than deal with issues in an adversarial manner the 
emphasis of the specialist employment institutions is to support employment 
relationships.  Experts can provide supportive assistance at short notice on an 
informal and flexible basis. If resolution is not reached, the Employment 
Relations Authority can make prompt decisions on employment matters.416  
 
The option of resolving disputes through union representation and the 
disincentives for seeking legal representation may be useful in the context of a 
retirement village dispute. Throughout this thesis, reference is made to the age and 
potential vulnerability of residents especially in the context of a dispute with a 
more powerful operator. The concept of union representation is one that has been 
followed in the NSW and Queensland Retirement Village legislation; residents’ 
committees can activate dispute proceedings and represent residents in legal 
disputes. This avoids individual residents having to ‘take on’ operators and 
provides support to residents who would otherwise be overwhelmed by the power 
imbalance they face. If disincentives for legal representation were extended to the 
disputes panels under the RVA, the effects of power imbalance could be further 
mitigated.  
  
6.4.3 The Employment Court and the mediation process 
 
Based as it is on the notion of resolving employment problems at the lowest 
possible level, mediation is the lowest level mechanism. Therefore, any matter 
coming before the Authority or the Court will be examined to ascertain whether 
mediation has been attempted. If not, the requirements to consider mediation are 
likely to apply, especially proceedings founded in tort resulting from a strike or 
lockout where mediation has not been attempted, and also some matters of law.417 
While mediation is attempted, Court proceedings are suspended.418  
                                                 
415 Roth, P  “Recent Institutional Developments in Employment Law” [2005] ELB 3, 37.  
416 Ibid. The intention of the Act is to focus responsibility on the parties and the specialist 
institutions to resolve the problems at hand with the assistance of union representation. The idea of 
the Court reviewing how the lower level institutions dealt with a problem previously is not part of 
the scheme.   
417 Green, supra n 410 at 157. There are some exceptions to the requirement to mediate but the 
high priority given to attempts in ‘good faith’ to reach a mediated settlement is contained in  
s 188(3) of the Act. If a matter reaches the Employment Court it is likely close attention will be 
given to whether the parties should be refereed to mediation or even back to mediation if it has 
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The Retirement Villages Act does not contain a mediation clause; its first step is a 
‘complaints facility’ which from the 25th September 2007 requires operators to set 
up a procedure for making and acknowledging complaints by residents.419 It is 
anticipated mediation will be the preferred process for resolving complaints that 
cannot be settled through communication or negotiation. In any event, the notion 
of an unsupported aged resident negotiating with an operator is the antithesis of 
the principle of fair and proper process.  In the context of employment relations 
disputes both the Employment Relations Authority and the Employment Court 
can refer parties back to mediation. The second dispute under the RVA involved 
numerous matters that would have been more appropriately dealt with in a 
supported mediation.420 Having a disputes panel refer parties to mediation for all 
or part of their issues would be outside their current jurisdiction but an interesting 
concept to consider.     
 
 
6.5 The Injury Prevention Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 
2001  
 
The year 2001 saw the introduction of a renamed accident compensation Act - the 
Injury Prevention Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 2001 (IPRC Act) came 
into force. This followed a number of changes both in ideology and policy within 
the government and the Accident Compensation Corporation over a period of 
some twenty years. From 2001 there was to be a concentrated focus on accident 
prevention and rehabilitation. This required ACC to work in a partnership with 
claimants in a way not experienced under the accident insurer relationships of the 
past. As a result of this ‘partnership’ relationship, a code of rights for claimants 
was instituted. The purpose of the Code of ACC Claimant’s Rights was “to meet 
the reasonable expectations of claimants about how the Accident Compensation 
Corporation should deal with them”.421 The internal complaints system is 
                                                                                                                                     
been attempted. Parties must comply with a direction to mediation from the Court and they must 
also act in ‘good faith’ to try to resolve the employment issue. 
418 Ibid, 157. 
419 Cl 31 Retirement Villages Code of Practice 2006. 
420 I mean by “supported mediation”, the resident could choose to have an advocate present during 
the process. The advocate would have good knowledge of the issues and know the legal rights of 
the resident. A representative of a residents’ committee could fill that role once the committees are 
established and have the necessary information to support a resident following the making of a 
complaint.   
421 Rennie, D  “The Laws of New Zealand” (2002) 31. 
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completely separate from the Corporation’s dispute processes and covers only 
breaches of the code by the Corporation.422 
 
6.5.1 Dispute Resolution: Seeking a review 
 
Part 5 of the Act covers Dispute Resolution. A claimant or employer of a claimant 
wishing to have any decisions relating to their claims reviewed can make 
application for a review within three months of the Corporation’s decision on their 
cover or entitlements. It is the Corporation’s duty to secure independence of a 
reviewer 423 and it does this through a company it owns, Dispute Resolution 
Services Ltd (DRSL). ACC delegates the appointment of reviewers to DRSL.  
DRSL was set up to provide a review service to any or all of the companies that 
were expected to enter the market following the part privatisation of accident 
insurance. There were 2 foundation shareholders; ACC and Farmers Mutual 
Group. There are [currently] 23 reviewers.424 
 
DRSL was set up initially by ACC as a response to the partial privatisation of 
accident insurance during 1998. Initially employees of ACC were involved as 
reviewers. However the later requirement for reviewers to be engaged on 
contracts for services  inevitably led to reviewers resigning from their positions 
within ACC to become part of the DRSL team of reviewers and mediators 
involved in claimants’ (or employers’) disputes with ACC. Others with no prior 
working relationship with ACC joined the DRSL team; reviewers around the 
country are almost all legally trained. The review process is deemed to be 
investigatory, informal and non-adversarial.425 Hearings are presumed to be part 
of that process. By consent of the parties, sometimes a hearing with parties in 
attendance is not held; then the reviewer will conduct the hearing on the basis of 
                                                 
422 The code of ACC Claimants Rights covers complaints made from 1st February 2003. Section 40 
of the Act deals with the Purpose of the Code which amongst other things, provides for “the 
procedure for lodging and dealing with complaints about breaches of the Code by the 
Corporation”(sec 40(1)(b). 
423 Injury Prevention, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 2001 s 139 (1)(2)(3)(4). 
424 This information was provided by the Manager,  Client & Business Development, Dispute 
Resolution Services Ltd in an email communication dated 16th February 2007. It is the duty of a 
reviewer to act independently when conducting a review. Hearings must be held within three 
months of the review application. It is intended that reviews are independent of the Corporation 
and the reviewers have had no previous involvement with the claim other than as a reviewer (s 138 
(1) (2)). 
425 IPRC Act 2001, s 138 & 140.  Section 140 covers general principles for conducting a review. 
This includes complying with the principles of natural justice (c ) and  (e) adopting an 
investigative approach with a view to conducting the review in an informal, timely, and practical 
manner. 
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the papers submitted which include the claimant’s full ACC file and any other 
relevant documents. In the event of a full hearing parties attend usually without 
legal representation and this has been identified as an issue in the current review 
climate.  
 
6.5.2 Reviews - User friendly? 
 
It was recently stated that “unaided claimants are no longer well served by the 
review process”.426   This view relates to what Mackinnon terms “institutional 
facts” which are those facts that rely on a legal system of rules that alter the facts’ 
original state from a “brute” state (stated as it happened) to institutional state 
(stated as it was transformed by legal rules in a particular institutional setting after 
the event). He found the opinion of UK writers Logie and Watchman who wrote 
about Social Security Appeal Tribunals “equally applicable to ACC reviews”. 
These writers found: 
Claimants do not necessarily realise what they have to prove and how they have 
to prove it, what documents to bring with them and what the function of the 
tribunal is.427 
Mackinnon’s review of the history of the various ACC schemes operating in New 
Zealand since the introduction of the first no fault accident insurance scheme in 
1972, notes some influential parallel changes that occurred within the review 
processes and the powers delegated to the independent reviewers.428 It was at this 
point, Mackinnon contends, the process moved from inquisitorial to adversarial. 
He writes: 
It is no coincidence that all the reviewers appointed in recent years have law 
degrees, though there is no statutory requirement for that nor was it the case 
under earlier legislation.429 
 
                                                 
426 Mackinnon, K, “Redefining the Facts; changing the process” (2006). Paper presented at the 9th 
Annual AIJA Tribunals Conference, 2006, 19. 
427 Logie, G and Watchman, P cited in Mackinnon, 2006, 19. 
428 Changes that occurred from 1992 included the removal of powers under the Commission of 
Inquiry Act 1908 and the focus of investigation by the reviewer was replaced with emphasis on an 
oral hearing. These changes impacted on the powers of the reviewer and concomitantly the public 
(claimants) were affected by alterations to the eligibility and entitlement criteria, having the 
overall effect of reducing both. ACC then became a “party” to a review which took the form of a 
hearing. 
429 Mackinnon,  Ibid, 20. 
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The current Injury Prevention Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 2001, section 
140 allows the reviewer to “conduct the review in any manner he or she thinks fit” 
having regard to the other sections of the Act and its regulations.430  
 
6.5.3 DRSL View from the inside out 
 
A DRSL manager interviewed for this research confirmed the company’s 
awareness of the “independence argument” that can be raised in relation to the 
ownership by ACC of its reviewing agency. He said it was “a small minority of 
people” who raised the issue with them and the New Zealand Law Society has a 
designated ACC sub-committee with an interest in the independence issue.431 
King’s experience in the management of the organisation has led him to believe 
“no-one has been able to prove bias and there is no evidence of a reviewer being 
biased”.432  He emphasised that the reviewers were aware they are constrained by 
the law and added that they and the organisation subscribe to the law. For those 
who question the link between ACC and DRSL, he said the organisation’s 
response is “experience us and see”. He did not allude to any constraints felt by 
reviewers in light of the adversarial nature of the process: i.e. once a review is 
underway the “partnership” relationship between ACC and its client becomes 
client v ACC. 433    
 
He explained the hierarchical process of review for ACC claimants; the first being 
an approach to ACC; the second, an independent review and third, the District 
Court which ACC also funds.434 The District Court, he reports, overturned 10% of 
DSRL review decisions at de novo hearings. This small percentage King says is 
possibly attributable to information that was not available to the reviewer prior to 
the claimant obtaining legal representation for the Court hearing. It seemed he was 
suggesting the reviewer may have come to a different decision had they been in 
                                                 
430 These include compliance with s138 duty to act independently; (c) complying with the 
principles of natural justice; (d) exercising due diligence and (e) “adopting an investigative 
approach with a view to conducting the review in an informal timely and practical manner”.   
431 Several attempts to obtain comment from the person designated to this role by the Law Society 
were unsuccessful. 
432 Paul King, DRSL phone interview 12th October 2006 
433 Mackinnon, supra n 426.  
434 The District Court recovers costs every year from ACC under s 164 (a) (b). These involve 
“reasonable administrative costs” of appeals and “reasonable costs” of appeals.  
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receipt of the complete (medico-legal) picture. One possible interpretation of this 
is legally unrepresented claimants are more vulnerable to a decision going against 
them at review than those represented. If this is the case, then ACC clients whose 
cases are reviewed on papers only, may be at even greater risk of having a review 
go against them than those who attend a review hearing.  
 
6.5.4 Mediation 
 
Mediation as a discrete process is not mandated within the Act. However DRSL 
undertake the vast majority of ACC reviews and have three means of referring 
cases to mediation facilitated by DRSL mediators. 
1. DSRL staff screening files may see mediation as an appropriate option 
at which point management will offer mediation. 
2. ACC may identify a mediation opportunity and inform DRSL that they 
are in dispute with a client and mediation may assist to resolve the 
issues. 
3. Claimants will approach DRSL about mediation, more so when 
involved with a lawyer. 
 
Attending mediation does not alter the review right of the parties and reportedly 
some 90% of the disputes referred to mediation are resolved at mediation.  
Referrals to mediation have doubled every six months over the past three years 
with 1,000 occurring this financial year out of a total of 5,000 review applications. 
435 
Over the last year ACC has been running a voluntary436 mediation trial with 
DSRL in Hamilton and Invercargill for ACC claimants in dispute with ACC.  
ACC has been the prime mover in this trial.437 The mediation “trial”, we can 
assume, has come about because it is viewed as the preferred process for resolving 
disputes by DRSL (and perhaps ACC): their “high resolution rate” and an 
increasing number of claimants annually agreeing to attend mediation would seem 
to support this. There is a question however around whether some ACC disputes 
should be mediated. Presumably some disputes are more amenable to mediation 
                                                 
435 Paul King, DSRL phone interview 12th October 2006 
436 The trial is voluntary because mediation is not enshrined in law. 
437 Paul King, DSRL email communication 16th February 2007. 
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than others; e.g. rehabilitation plans are, but being entitled to cover for an accident 
is a right that should not be able to be negotiated. How ACC is selecting cases for 
mediation and how mediators are ‘practising’ mediation when ‘rights’ are 
concerned438 is unknown. Recently DSRL became “uncertain whether mediation 
is always the best option for ACC and parties”439 and has embarked on a three 
month trial using a more “targeted approach” offering additional DR processes. Its 
approach may be in line with process pluralism which if clients have advocates or 
representation and know their rights, may provide better safeguards for them. 
Resolving disputes quickly, professionally and cheaply must be in the best 
interests of any business involved in the dispute resolution industry: DRSL is no 
doubt actively engaged in the business of dispute resolution through offering 
advisory services “to everyone” (not only ACC) and charging in an “even-handed 
way”.440  
 
One of the positive features of mediation is its capacity to allow parties to deal 
with their issues face to face and come to their own resolution without the 
influence of legal input.  If, as Mackinnon states “unaided clients are no longer 
well served by the review process” then it is perhaps self evident that for some 
whose cases rely on ‘brute facts’, mediation may be either the saviour or the devil 
depending on the knowledge and skills of the mediator and their ability to manage 
power imbalance in something other than an “even-handed” way.  
 
A negative side of mediation and facilitation is that citizens may not know their 
rights and when negotiating with a statutory agency, the outcome focus of 
‘resolution’ and getting it over with441  may place them unwittingly in a position 
of giving up their rights and settling for considerably less than they are entitled. 
Should this be the reality for some claimants, then mediators and those practising 
hybrid combinations of ADR must be required to understand ‘principled 
approaches’ to mediation and be aware of emerging knowledge (and theory) that 
                                                 
438 A principled approach to mediation would make explicit, claimants rights and keep these rights 
active and transparent during mediation.  
439 Pullen, D “ADR in a statutory adjudication scheme – a New Zealand experiment” (2007, May)  
Adjust (Newsletter of the Council of Tribunals).  
440 Paul King, DSRL phone interview 12th October 2006. 
441 A standard form of meeting and greeting by mediators to parties as they begin mediation, 
involves the mediator complimenting the parties for their commitment to finding resolution and 
putting the conflict behind them.  
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raises questions about the notions of ‘impartiality’ and ‘fairness of process’ being 
consistent within the statutory context.442 Mediation in such a context intensifies 
debates about mediator standards and accreditation, as will hybrid processes.  
  
6.5.5 Interpreting statistics: the ideology of success  
 
The ACC website under a heading “Working Towards Sustainable Development” 
includes comment on the organisation’s commitment to social responsibility 
which includes “a fair go for all” and “claimant satisfaction”.  ACC has this to 
say; 
Claimant satisfaction with ACC has risen to a high of 80%. We register 
1.6million claims each year. Only about 400 of these cases are referred to the 
Courts each year to settle disputes between ACC and claimants, and about 70% 
of decisions are made in ACC’s favour.443 
 
The 30% of decisions made in the claimants’ favour according to these figures 
means 120 claimants have been through at least the review process (if not 
mediation) and had that determination overturned. In these cases, possibly the 
reviewer simply got it wrong - which is the reality of the adjudication process. 
A check to verify the ACC figures has revealed “that the figure of 400 is in 
addition to the mediation undertaken by DRSL”.444 Added to this, DSRL reports 
5,000 review applications in the same year.  ACC is therefore incorrect in 
claiming the 400 claimants going to Court are the ‘dissatisfied clients’. The 5,000 
review applications must also be included as ‘dissatisfied clients’ making the 
percentage of satisfaction considerably less than the 80% claimed by ACC.445  
 
                                                 
442 According to Baylis and Carroll a “principled approach” to mediation would involve more 
explicit recognition of likely power differentials in process design and closer attention to the 
potential impact of statutory mechanisms on the integrity of the process. Baylis, C & Carroll, R 
The Nature and Importance of Mechanisms for Addressing Power Differences in Statutory 
Mediation [2002] Bond LR. 14, 317. 
443 ACC Sustainable Development Report 2005 “Working Towards Sustainable Development”, 
obtained from ACC website <www.acc.co.nz> August 2006.  
444 Chief Advisor, Marketing and Communications, ACC email dated 27th October 2006.  
445 Paul King, Manager Client and Business Development, DSRL has provided figures for the first 
7 months of the financial year (July 06 to Jan 07) reviewers issued 1809 decisions; 905 review 
applications were withdrawn and 422 mediations have been completed. It appears approximately 
half the review applications were withdrawn and we can assume the 422 mediations formed part of 
the withdrawn reviews leading to the possible conclusion that mediations also should be added to 
any figures ACC provides on client satisfaction. If this is the case, the 80% satisfaction claimed by 
ACC in 2005 is significantly overestimated.  
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Presenting a more favourable picture of ‘satisfaction’ than the figures of ACC and 
DRSL actually reveal, is a topic that will be canvassed later under the banner of 
retirement village resident satisfaction surveys conducted in New Zealand and 
Australia. For some reason, the subject of dispute and conflict resolution does not 
seem compatible with ‘satisfaction’ surveys (or analysis) as will be demonstrated.  
 
6.5.6 ACC, Independence & the Crown Entities Act 2004. 
 
When exploring the question of independence surrounding statutory dispute 
resolution, consideration of the legislation covering Crown entities provides some 
clarification. Under the Act, the Accident Compensation Corporation is an Agent 
of the Crown and falls into the category having the highest level of government 
influence. In its role as the state insurer for all accidents and injuries it also has a 
predictably high number of claims made against its decisions. 
 
The Act sets out three levels of statutory entities and their proximity to 
government policy. Section 7 sets out the meaning of Crown entity and the 
categories of Crown entities. The different types are listed as: 
Crown agents (which must give effect to government policy when directed by 
the responsible minister). These are named in Part 1 of Schedule 1 
Autonomous Crown entities (which must have regard to government policy 
when directed by the responsible Minister). These are named in Part 2 of 
Schedule 1 
Independent Crown entities (which are generally independent of government 
policy). These are named in Part 3 of Schedule 1 
 
ACC owns DRSL and maintains a directorship of personnel appointed at its 
discretion. This is consistent with the provisions of the Crown Entities Act. The 
previous Chair was also on the board of ACC. This link has apparently not been 
questioned in such a way as to alter the arrangement as far as claimants in dispute 
with ACC are concerned. The belief of the manager interviewed is that the 
reviewers appointed are compelled by law to act independently and the 
organisation fully supports the law. We are led to assume any links between the 
board and ACC and the board and the reviewers is unaffected by the status of 
ACC being a Crown agent.  Its reviewers are either employed or contracted by 
DRSL; they are to act independently and like judges are paid for all decisions 
whatever their outcome.  
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6.5.7 Systemic realities 
 
ACC as the owner can remove and appoint directors from DRSL. This can be seen 
as indicative of its interest in the governance of the organization; it is not an   
“arm’s length” relationship with its responsible minister but more one of “hands 
on”.  It would seem to follow that the agency set up to deal with a “hands on” 
Crown agent’s disputes could be more susceptible than it is aware, to be 
influenced by prevailing government ideology  and the policies and practices that 
flow from that.  
 
Viewed systemically, macrosystem influences such as ideology can be seen to 
exist within the law and regulations of a state or country. The governance 
frameworks, management practices and performance targets of organisations and 
individual employees who carry out the roles that support the political and legal 
infrastructure, are also set up to respond to the prevailing ideological 
determinants. None is independent of the other; rather an interdependent dynamic 
results with organisational policy becoming the driver of individual ‘outputs’ 
which in turn impact on the lives of citizens.446  
 
The interview with the DRSL manager indicated DRSL ‘outputs’ are open to 
public scrutiny and therefore can be measured against the ‘owner’ organisation’s 
business goals. Without knowing precisely what DRSL and ACC business goals 
might be, at the most basic level it could be assumed that ACC would want to 
minimise its costs in terms of dispute resolution processes and therefore minimise 
the opportunity for successful claims against its decisions. DRSL possibly carries 
one of the highest workloads of any dispute resolution business in the country 
with reviews for ACC alone numbering 5000 per year; a significant proportion of 
these reportedly resolved at mediation.  The figures provided by King for the first 
seven months of this financial year (July 06-January 07) show reviewers have 
issued 1809 decisions and conducted 422 mediations.447 
 
                                                 
446 Bronfenbrenner,  U The Ecology of Human Development, 1979. 
447 Email communication from Paul King, 16th February 2007. 
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ACC as a Crown agent is the principal corporate under the Injury Prevention 
Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 2001. The Act defines the parameters 
within which citizens are able to make claims for compensation and have their 
cases reviewed when dissatisfied with ACC decisions. DRSL, the Corporation’s 
legitimate reviewing and dispute resolution service, must give effect to the law 
when conducting reviews448 “not government policy”.449  
 
Unconscious contradiction is evident in King’s experience of DSRL’s role with 
ACC however. P.King  has been willing to be involved in the mediation trial in 
Hamilton and Invercargill as a result of ACC policy; whether or not DSRL sees 
this as being involved in “government policy” is a moot point. The fact that ACC 
has, according to King, been the “prime mover” in the mediation trial which 
DSRL took up, provides evidence of DRSL’s willingness to follow ACC 
policy.450 Linked to the context of reviews perhaps it is not surprising that the 
results of reviews are in the majority of cases in ACC’s favour. It seems that 
ideology is present in DRSL’s business whether it is recognised or not. Perhaps 
for DRSL, ideology is like power and until recognition occurs, its influence will 
not be resisted.451 
 
Can we expect the reviewers will deal with reviews in ways that are professionally 
principled and statutorily compliant while at the same time acknowledge ideology 
that may unfairly alter outcomes for unrepresented clients seeking reviews of 
ACC decisions?  Whether this is actually possible would depend on the skills and 
knowledge of the reviewers. This would include their ability to apply a political 
analysis to illuminate the inevitable underlying ideology pervading their role and 
the regulations that govern it.  There remain unanswered questions beyond the 
scope of this study which are nevertheless critical, when considering the issue of 
                                                 
448 Paul King reports that “the legislation is very clear, the reviewer must put aside ACC policy” 
when conducting a review. Email, 16th February 2007.  
449 King refers to s 139 (3) which states “The Corporation must not include in the reviewer’s 
contract any term or condition that could have the effect, directly or indirectly, of influencing the 
reviewer, when conducting a review, in favour of the Corporation”.  
450 Chapter 4 of this thesis cites a NZ study surrounding ‘participation and control’ in retirement 
villages. The author Mary Simpson introduces the work of Lukes to illuminate how it is that 
residents of a retirement village are apparently so easily controlled by a staff member. Her finding 
was consistent with Lukes’ thesis “that power cannot be resisted until it is recognised”.   
451 Lukes, cited in Simpson, M “Participation and control in retirement villages: Implications for 
customer service” Conference paper presented at 10th Annual Waikato Management Student 
Research Conference, University of Waikato, 20th October 2006, 8-9. 
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the independence of DRSL from ACC.  The example of DRSL raises questions 
about independence from entity (ACC) and fairness of process for clients of ACC. 
It particularly highlights the difficulties in recognising how ideology can impact 
on the way operations are viewed, especially for those looking from the ‘inside’ 
out.  In relation to the RVA disputes panel and perceptions of lack of 
independence surrounding their selection by operators, ACC reviewers could be 
seen as joined at the hip of ACC.  This situation is ripe for review from the 
outside in.   
     
 
6.6 Australia – National Native Title Tribunal 
 
The matter of how effectively statutory processes fairly, impartially and 
independently deal with claimants, is further illuminated in a study conducted on 
the workings of the National Native Title Tribunal of Australia. The writer, a PhD 
candidate researching Commonwealth indigenous policy argues: 
National Native Title Tribunal (NNTT) presents a façade of indigenous 
advocacy via its ‘outcome and output framework’ which it uses to report and 
measure its performance in accordance with Commonwealth requirements. The 
framework implies that all of the Tribunal’s ‘outputs’ contribute to its sole stated 
‘outcome’; ‘the recognition and protection of native title’…It is shown that the 
NNTT tends to rule in favour of non-indigenous interests when making 
arbitration decisions. The façade conceals the reality that when arbitrating 
between indigenous and non-indigenous parties competing for valuable 
resources the Tribunal tends to rule in favour of the latter party.452 
 
The formation of the NNTT was a legislative response to the watershed Mabo 
decision from the High Court of Australia in 1992. This decision followed 
Aboriginal Australian Eddie Mabo’s ten year litigation battle to achieve 
recognition (four months after his death) of the right to land ownership “by virtue 
of occupation rather than conferral of rights by government”.453 Corbett uses the 
NNTT’s 2004-2005 annual report as a way to demonstrate how its processes 
disadvantage those seeking native title. The report proclaims the Tribunal’s main 
role as assisting people to resolve native title issues. It does this through 
agreement making. Arbitration, by tending to favour non-indigenous parties also 
                                                 
452 Corbett, T “The National Native Title Tribunal’s Façade of Indigenous Advocacy” [2006] 
Social Alternatives,  25, 2, 37; Corbett, T and O’Faircheallaigh, C “Unmasking the Politics of 
Native Title: The National Native Title Tribunal’s Application of the Arbitration Provisions” 
UWALR [2006] Nov, 33. 1. 
453 Pearson, N (1994) and French, R (2003) cited in Corbett 2006, 37.  
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has the effect of reducing the bargaining position of indigenous people: the 
disadvantage then is two-fold. 
 
The Native Title Act 1993 provides a dispute resolution system that can occur at 
the same time native title applications are being resolved. This apparently avoids 
the years of struggle occurring in Mabo. The process is called the “future acts 
process”. It allows claimants to negotiate some proposed developments, although 
the right to negotiate is not a right to stop a project going ahead, and it is usually 
only applicable in certain types of cases.454  The right to negotiate (RTN) is 
“triggered” by the government advertising its intention to approve a future act. 
The media advertising and notification to claimants and their representative 
bodies allows claimants the opportunity to exercise their right to have a say on 
how the development might proceed.455  
 
Section 32 of the Act includes the “expedited procedure” where the right to 
negotiate can be bypassed for reasons of “low impact” and unlikely disturbance of 
community and social activities and without disturbance to land or waters. Native 
title parties can object and invoke an arbitration which if found in the applicants’ 
favour is limited to having their right to negotiate observed: however, if found 
against the applicant native title holders “the act may be done”.456  In this context, 
the cliché damned if you do and damned if you don’t appears true. 
 
Corbett makes further points: in contrast to expedited procedure arbitrations, 
future act arbitrations are rare and have “never” resulted in the Tribunal ruling 
“that the act must not be done” a determination available under section 38(1) and 
further, the Tribunal has been “reluctant to attach conditions that could be viewed 
as onerous”.457   This tendency of the Tribunal according to Corbett…  
To rule in favour of non-indigenous parties in future act arbitration has 
important political implications for both the outcomes for indigenous people 
                                                 
454 This would include mining that may occur on the claimants land. 
455 This is part of a “good faith” opportunity to negotiate an agreement on how the planned 
development will take place. Either party can request mediation and have six months to endeavour 
to find agreement, after which either party can approach the Tribunal  to arbitrate “on whether the 
development should proceed, and if and what conditions should be attached” (Corbett 2006, 39).  
456 Corbett, supra n 452 at 40. 
457 Ibid. 
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from agreements, and the dynamics of mediation and/or negotiations that occur 
prior to reaching them. From this perspective the Tribunal’s arbitration 
activities, which it de-emphasises, are more significant than its mediation and 
agreement making activities which it emphasises. The different emphases reflect 
an ideological view that agreements are inherently beneficial to all parties and 
suggests they do not occur as a result of political processes that are dependent on 
bargaining positions.458 
 
The Tribunal’s 2004-2005 Annual Report comments on performance for future 
act determination with regard to 27 mining tenements where 15 out of 19 
applications were finalised by consent rather than through arbitration. The report  
cites its previous reporting period reaching similar conclusions and determines 
that this “reflects the climate of cooperation and negotiation fostered by the 
Tribunal”.459  
The Tribunal does not appear to consider that the low occurrence of arbitration 
may actually be the result of strategic avoidance by indigenous parties because 
of their awareness of the low probability of a ruling in their favour, rather than a 
‘climate of cooperation’.460    
 
Corbett’s thesis can be found in his analysis of the way the Tribunal achieved its 
data which concludes that most disputes are resolved at mediation and few cases 
now move on to arbitration.461 The emphasis on mediation falsely, according to 
Corbett, promotes a climate of co-operation through the process of mediation.462 
This is a very disturbing claim and one that mediators operating within this 
system should take seriously if they are sincerely open to ethical challenges and 
want to practice mediation with morality and integrity. 463  These writers have 
                                                 
458 Ibid. 
459 NNTT 2005, 75 cited in Corbett, 2006, 40. 
460 Ibid. 
461 Corbett notes “...importantly the Tribunal has used the raw score of ‘arbitration decisions on 
objections to the expedited procedure’ as an ‘output’ which contributed to the recognition and 
protection of native title, regardless of whether the objection is upheld or not (NNTT 2003a, 78-
82). In other words the tribunal includes determinations regardless of  who won each case and in 
doing so uses cases where the RTN is by passed as a performance indicator for the recognition and 
protection of native title” 2006, 40.   
462 Corbett’s comments on mediation are consistent with Nader’s view  (cited in Menkel-Meadow 
2003,xiv at n 330) coercive pushes towards participatory processes result in a sense of “false 
harmony” and may be as unjust as conventional institutions.  
463 A later study undertaken by Corbett and O’Faircheallaigh examines the NNTT’s application of 
arbitration provisions on the Native Title Act 1993 between 1994 and 2006. They argue two 
points; (1) the Tribunal’s arbitration function does not follow accepted rules such as parties’ 
willingness to agree (in advance) to arbitration or the rule of natural justice which addresses 
procedural fairness providing each party the opportunity to be heard, to ask questions and 
contradict the evidence of the other party and (2); the NNTT is not an independent judicial body 
but is part of the executive. In this case the executive has the power to override tribunal decisions. 
Members are not on fixed term appointments and a government minister determines appointments 
and renewals. A government priority is to facilitate development of Australia’s mineral resources   
a factor likely to be reflected in tribunal members’ determinations and one that “privileges the 
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‘unmasked’ a lack of both fairness of process and independence particularly in the 
application of the arbitration provisions of the Native Titles Act.  The tribunals 
approach is said to be “inconsistent with the Act’s objectives and systematically 
disadvantages native title parties and can deny them the RTN [right to 
negotiate]”.464   
 
The inequitable conditions under which Aboriginal Australians are compelled to 
negotiate and resolve disputes about land and resources seem a long way from 
retirement village residents in dispute with operators. The reduction in the 
bargaining position of indigenous people through the promotion of mediation is 
rarely so clearly illuminated. Proponents of mediation portray a sense of faith in 
the process that mediation in some situations does not live up to. This seems 
especially so in contexts where power imbalance is strikingly obvious and 
valuable or limited resources are at stake. Where ‘settlements’ are the expected 
outcome, the inequity is increased. In this thesis, mediation is not promoted as an 
ideal process for unrepresented residents or situations where resident rights 
become part of a contestation.   
 
In contrast to the strategic avoidance of arbitration by indigenous parties, early 
indications are that the disputes panel will be favoured by residents as the process 
for dispute determination. At the time of completing this thesis, three disputes 
have been determined in the first nine months of the RVA implementation; none 
have gone to mediation. The ability of the disputes panel to act  independently, 
without recourse to political influence other than the ideology implicit in the Act 
seems at this point, to be sustained. The age and ability of residents to prepare for 
and represent themselves at a hearing if they have no family members available or 
cannot afford representation, remains an issue.           
 
 
6.7 Tribunals in Aotearoa/New Zealand 
 
                                                                                                                                     
interests of resource developers over those of native title parties”. Corbett, T and O’Faircheallaigh, 
C “Unmasking the Politics of Native Title: The National Native Title Tribunal’s Application  of 
the NTA’s Arbitration Provisions” [2006] UWALR 33, 1, 155. 
464 Ibid, 176.  
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Chapter Four considered enduring principles contained in the 1957 Franks Report. 
These include general and closely linked characteristics that should be reflected in 
tribunal procedures. These characteristics, seen to reside under the umbrella of 
natural justice are; openness, fairness and impartiality. The Franks Committee 
also emphasised independence as a key principle of tribunals as they carry out 
their role as adjudicators designated by parliament. Tribunals therefore should not 
be part of the machinery of administration and therefore provide adjudication 
outside and independent of the Department concerned.  The Law Commission 
Report 85, “Delivering Justice for all” recommended for most of New Zealand’s 
tribunals, a unified tribunal structure headed by a “President” who is a primary 
Civil Court judge465. Other recommendations included; future tribunals should be 
established only in accordance with principle and in conformity with fixed 
guidelines466; the structure should build up a core of experienced tribunal 
members who should sit in more than one of the constituent tribunals467 and 
perhaps of greatest significance: 
To ensure independence exists and is seen to exist, the Ministry of Justice should 
administer all the tribunals in the unified structure.468  
 
6.7.1 The current situation 
 
The Law Commission found that tribunals in New Zealand have often been 
created as ad hoc responses to a variety of situations and in response to specific 
needs. The report identifies “a lack of any coherent framework or settled pattern” 
and an “unnecessary jungle of different jurisdictions”469 as problems that have 
developed mostly over the past fifty years. Added to this the Commission 
observes there is no clear entry point for ordinary citizens seeking assistance and 
the wide variations in process for no principled reason adds to the lack of 
coherence.470 Encompassed in the general lack of cohesion the Commission  
found inconsistency in a number of areas including public use of some tribunals; 
                                                 
465 Recommendation 139, Law Commission, Delivering Justice for All,  Report 85, 2004. 
466 Ibid, R138. 
467 Ibid, R141. 
468 Ibid, R142. 
469 Ibid, 7.1. 
470 Ibid, 7.1, 2. 
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personnel experience and skills level of tribunal members raises concerns about 
standing, authority and competence.471  
 
The New Zealand Royal Commission on the Courts472 defined independence as 
“a state of affairs where (decision makers) are free to do justice in their 
communities, protected from the power and influence of the state and also made 
as immune as possible from all other influences that may affect their 
impartiality”.473 The Commission’s interpretation of independence when applied 
to the many tribunals, authorities and commissions that currently exist within our 
state infrastructure, may not be sustained. The Commission’s definition of 
independence could be considered an ‘ideal’ in a statutory context. Tribunals and 
adjudicators being “as immune as possible from all other influences” suggests an 
acceptance of a level of “other” influence. This possibly indicates a realistic 
appreciation of the tensions that are likely to be present in a statutory decision- 
making context and the adequacy of protection from external influences, 
especially the Executive government.  
 
Administrative decision-making is an area of law that will always attract 
detractors who challenge the independence of the adjudicators and reviewers. The 
proximity of the reviewer, adjudicator or mediator to the entity will inevitably 
generate challenge and debate. In spite of this, organisations such as DRSL and 
the NNTT of Australia474 hold the view that they have the transparency, 
                                                 
471 A further concern is the number of tribunals that are housed and resourced by the departments 
they serve, putting their independence in question. The Commission acknowledges these types of 
issues arise wherever tribunal justice exists and its recommendation is that New Zealand should 
follow the example of England, Wales and many parts of Australia in integrating “all but the 
largest and most prominent tribunals within a single tribunal framework, led by members of the 
judiciary” (LCR 85, 2002, 7.1, 5).  
472 Beattie, D S Royal Commission on the Courts, 1978. 
473 Report of the Royal Commission on the Courts, quoted in McConnell, P “Tribunal 
independence: challenges and limitations”, Master Paper, 2005. 
474 A code of conduct for members of the NNTT states in clause 1.1 “in carrying out the functions 
and duties of a member of the National Native Title Tribunal, a member must: (v) “comply with 
any lawful and reasonable direction given by the President in accordance with the responsibilities 
of the President under the Native Title Act ”. Section 123 concerns “Arrangement of business” and 
includes (ii) “provide assistance in making or negotiating agreement under this Act or (iii) conduct 
a review under this Act”. Also consider Cl 1.2 (b) “it is acknowledged that directions cannot be 
given to members about decisions they are empowered to make where they are specifically 
appointed to carry out functions under the Native Title Act 1993 (e.g in the conduct of the right to 
negotiate inquiry and any decision made in respect thereto”. The tribunal’s code of conduct also 
states 1.2.(b) “A member must at all times behave in a way that upholds the integrity and good 
 160
professional ethics and training within their organisation to avoid partiality or co-
option by, and collusion with, the entity whose decisions they review.  
 
The theses of Corbett in the case of the NNTT and Mackinnon and ACC draw 
conclusions that have derived from a critical analysis of the systems the statutory 
organisations use to measure and assess performance outcomes (NNTT) and 
analyse and interpret types of facts (ACC). Both contexts involve ideological 
factors that have measurably influenced organisational outcomes. In the case of 
ACC Mackinnon found that legislative changes, underpinned by an identifiable 
ideological shift from inquisitorial to adversarial process, impacted negatively on 
the review outcomes for ACC claimants.  
 
In Corbett’s analysis, the ideological position taken by the NNTT held that 
agreements were inherently beneficial to all parties and negatively impacted on 
(indigenous) claimants. Ideology in these instances can be viewed as neither a 
neutral nor impartial concept in law: it reflects the dominant culture’s worldview 
and vicariously imposes all this encompasses on the professionals carrying out the 
roles the state has determined will resolve disputes and compensate victims of 
harm or injustice. In both examples, legislative changes influenced the outcome 
possibilities for claimants and actually enhanced a result that would favour the 
entities goals’ and disadvantage the claimants.  
 
A stunning commentary on administrative justice delivered by the Australian 
Chief Justice Gleeson two decades ago remains relevant in the context of this 
discussion. 
…Very few people seem to have noticed that the only independence which some 
of these tribunals enjoy is the freedom to do whatever the government of the day 
wants them to do, and that they operate in practice as a method of distancing 
potentially unpopular decision-making from those who should take 
responsibility for it… 
                                                                                                                                     
reputation of the National Native Title Tribunal”.  The integrity of the NNTT concept of mediation 
and arbitration may not be compatible with the notion of integrity of process expected  by an 
independent professional body such as LEADR or AMINZ in NZ. Another question to be 
considered  is whether tribunal members belong to a recognised professional body, and whether 
the code of that body would find the practice of mediation and arbitration within the context of 
NNTT would meet the required standards of integrity of process. The problem of unrecognised 
collusion is always a possibility in an administrative context.  
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…We have in this country a proliferation of decision-making tribunals which are 
represented to the public as being ‘independent’. I cannot believe that much 
more time will be allowed to elapse before the correctness of that representation 
is made subject to close public examination…475 
 
Gleeson’s commentary provides an example of how state ideology is transferred 
through the process of hegemony (manufactured consent) into laws and policy 
which are then applied to citizens through the decision-making power of tribunals. 
Examining independence within some of the organisations responsible for 
resolving disputes within or for, statutory organisations, can seem as though 
‘business success’ or achieving resolution, means following with charismatic 
inclination, the ideas and ‘speak’ of the prevailing political ideology. Ensuring 
those in power stay in power requires many conscious and unconscious acts of 
oppression over many years. In the case of aboriginal Australians, the weight of 
these Acts is appallingly clear.   
 
A very different approach to individual rights and systemic failure can be viewed 
through the role of the Health and Disability Commissioner in New Zealand. 
 
 
6.8 The Ombudsman/Commissioner role in New Zealand 
 
I have chosen the role of the Health and Disability Commissioner (HDC) to 
illustrate how patient protection has been dealt with in New Zealand and how 
complaints from consumers of the health system are investigated and dealt with 
by the Commissioner. I will also include the two private New Zealand 
Ombudsmen; the Banking Ombudsman and the Insurance and Savings 
Ombudsman to show how privately funded schemes operate and claim 
independence from their funding bodies. 
  
The role of the HDC arose out of the Health and Disability Act 1996 enactment of 
the Code of Patients’ Rights. The main enforcement mechanism for complaints is 
an independent advocate or the Health and Disability Commissioner. Complex 
and serious cases involving multiple providers or broader systemic issues can be 
                                                 
475 Chief Justice Gleeson, quoted in Tracey R “Administrative Tribunals – Some Emerging Issues” 
A paper given by Richard Tracey at the ABA Conference, July 1990. 
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investigated and this can involve calling of witnesses; reviewing patient records 
and  
...where the appropriate standard of care is an issue, expert independent clinical 
advice is obtained. Although formal mediation is a resolution option, most 
investigations end in a written report from the commissioner to the parties and, 
where the provider is found to have breached the code, censure and formal 
recommendations [follow].476 
 
These might include that a medical centre must review its policy and practice in 
relation to prescribing certain medications or in the most serious cases the health 
provider must undergo a formal competence review by peers and/or be subjected 
to a disciplinary process.  
 
The New Zealand Health and Disability Commission’s (HDC) role is focused on 
investigation and advocacy. The HDC looks at systemic issues and has the 
responsibility to investigate complaints. The HDC Act also complements and has 
some overlap with the Health Practitioners Competence Assurance Act 2003 and 
an independent Director of Proceedings can also take prosecutions providing 
different ways to address both problems with individual practitioners and systemic 
issues as well as giving individual redress.   
 
The HDC is required to “promote, by education and publicity, respect for and 
observance of the rights of health consumers” and “to make public statements and 
publish reports in relation to any matters affecting the rights of health 
consumers”.477 The educative role and “making of public statements” includes the 
Commissioner using “investigative reports for educational purposes and for 
underpinning systemic advocacy on behalf of health care consumers”.478 A typical 
example of such a report is for the commissioner to frame the case and the issues 
within a case study that does not name individuals but does name organizations 
                                                 
476 “This law established a mechanism whereby complaints of malpractice or mistreatment could 
be lodged with an independent ombudsman, who has the authority to investigate, recommend 
changes in provider practices, and serve as the ‘gatekeeper’ for professional discipline. 
Significantly, although this structure was designed to provide consumers with a means to resolve 
individual complaints, it was also intended to serve as a catalyst for quality improvement 
throughout New Zealand’s health care system” (Paterson, R, “The Patients Complaints System in 
New Zealand” [2002] Health Affairs, 21, 3, 74).  
477 The Health and Disability Commissioner Act 1994, sec 14 (1) (c ) (d) quoted in Paterson, R 
[2002] 75.  
478 Paterson, R  ibid, 75. 
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and locations; the Gisborne Hospital Report being one example.479 The advent of 
the health and disability ombudsman has meant that trend analysis obtained from 
resolution of individual complaints can be used to advocate in the health care 
system on behalf of public consumers.480 
 
One of the advantages of the type of advocacy role is the ability to approach 
issues at both micro and macro levels. While dealing with the individual 
complaints of consumers, the commissioner also uses examples of individual 
problems to “drive systemic changes for all consumers”.481 In addition, research 
conducted during 2005 in the health sector concluded “The relatively low 
propensity to complain among patients who are elderly...suggests troubling 
disparities in access to and utilization of complaints processes”.482 This is a 
situation I believe also exists in retirement villages.  
 
The broad term Commissioner indicates independence from policy making and 
the government system. When Parliament decides to appoint a Commissioner, it 
also decides what particular Commissioners do and what level of involvement 
will be prescribed. For example the Human Rights Commissioner like the HDC 
has a policy monitoring role as well as investigating complaints. The 
Parliamentary Ombudsman on the other hand has a narrower complaints focus. 
When Commissioners exercise both functions the term ‘ombudsman’ appears to 
be used interchangeably.483  
 
                                                 
479 The Gisborne Hospital investigation began in 2000 following a complaint to the Minister of 
Health and contact with the media by the New Zealand Nurses Organisation about concerns from 
nurses employed at the hospital at the time.  The commissioner’s report included 34 
recommendations relating to incident reporting and complaints handling within the hospital 
system. The Ministry of Health later audited the hospital and confirmed the recommendations had 
been implemented.  
480 Ibid, 76. Paterson reports “For this to occur, the independence and accountability of 
ombudsman programmes need to be fostered through statutory authority, dedicated funding, and a 
requirement for reporting to the legislature and the public. As an independent statutory agency 
separate from the political and policy decision-making process, an ombudsman is well placed to 
advance consumers’ interests and to have a major influence in shaping the public policy debate”. 
481 Ibid. 
482 Bismark M, Brennan T, Paterson R, Davis P & Studdert D, “Relationship between complaints 
and quality of care in New Zealand: a descriptive analysis of complainants and non-complainants 
following adverse events”, [2006], QSHC 15, 17-22. 
483 See Prologue by editor in Paterson, R “The Patients Complaints System in New Zealand”, 
Health Affairs [2002] 21, 3, 70-79.  
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The Ombudsmen role is usually seen as bringing “to account the actions of the 
domestic New Zealand executive, that is, the public sector in the name of the 
individual citizen”.484  In a non-Government sector such as banking, the role 
remains the same, but the cost is levied from within the sector. In the case of a 
Commissioner, costs come from Ministerial allocations. The Parliamentary 
Ombudsman however has an investigative and recommendatory role in terms of 
complaints and does recommend financial compensation. Recommendations are 
almost always followed by erring government/local government agencies; only in 
“extremely rare” circumstances have further steps been required such as reporting 
to the Prime Minister.485  
 
Taking the ombudsman role into the private sector has been effected successfully 
in New Zealand; from 1992 with the advent of the Banking Ombudsman and 1995 
the Insurance and Savings Ombudsman. Both schemes offer free, independent 
opinions on complaints and disputes with the relevant sector. Both are funded by 
the participating sector groups and both are “manifestly” independent of the 
sectors, providing impartial decisions, deciding each complaint on merit.486 Both 
secure independence through Commissions; the Banking Ombudsman 
Commission and the Insurance and Savings Ombudsman Commission. In each 
case it is the Commission’s function to appoint the Ombudsmen. In the case of the 
Banking Ombudsman the Code of Banking Practice incorporating Customer 
Rights preceded the appointment of the Ombudsman. The Consumer Guarantees 
Act 1993 added to those rights. The principle of rights determining dispute 
resolution mechanisms is therefore recognised.   
 
 Mutually agreed settlements are often reached and the Banking Ombudsman has 
the power to award compensation to cover “direct financial loss or damage up to 
$200,000 and to compensate for inconveniences up to $6,000”.487 A binding 
                                                 
484 The Ombudsman Concept and Human Rights Protection [1999] VUWL Rev 6. 1-7. 
485 Tollemache, N “Taking the Ombudsman Concept into the Private Sector: Notes on the Banking 
Ombudsman Scheme in New Zealand” [1996] VUWLR 26, 243. 
486 Ibid, 238 and also information obtained from the websites of the Banking Ombudsman 
<www.bankombudsman.org.nz> and the Insurance and Savings Ombudsmen 
<www.iombudsman.org.nz> May  2007. 
487 Facts sheet “How We can help you” obtained from website,  <www.bankombudsman.org.nz>   
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award can be made against a bank.488 The Insurance and Savings Ombudsman 
provides reasoned opinions on disputes and companies are bound by the ISO’s 
decisions.489 The ISO cannot award compensation or order a company to pay any 
money outside of the terms of the policy.  However the decisions of the ISO are 
confidential to the parties and this lack of transparency was recently criticised by 
the popular TV programme “Fair Go”.490  
 
6.9 Recapping to this point 
 
The discussion to this point has considered four areas of dispute resolution; the 
larger public domains of employment (ERA); tribunals including the Australian 
NNTT; no-fault accident compensation ACC and the ombudsman facilities 
provided through the Health and Disability Commissioner, the Banking and 
Insurance and Savings Ombudsmen. 
 
The employment area distinguishes itself through its statutory objectives to 
promote good faith and collective bargaining; its hierarchy of DR processes; and 
the way in which mediation is used as the primary process for resolving 
employment relations disputes. In this context mediators carry out a number of 
roles in order to maximize opportunity for resolution without legal involvement 
and take general instructions from the chief executive; a unique factor in 
employment mediation.  
 
Dispute resolution under the Injury Prevention Rehabilitation and Compensations 
Act 2001 has a two tiered system; one which deals internally with complaints 
concerning breaches of the code of claimants rights by the Accident 
Compensation Corporation and the other surrounds disputes between claimants or 
employers about the Corporation’s decisions. The distinguishing features of the 
ACC disputes context surround the use of the Corporation’s company DSRL to 
conduct reviews and mediation on behalf of the Corporation. In both contexts 
unrepresented clients are considered to be disadvantaged and independence in 
                                                 
488 Ibid. 
489 Fact sheet “What we do” obtained from website <www.iombudsman.org.nz> 
490 T.V One,  “Fair Go”  18th June 2007.  
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both contexts is questioned.  If measured against the principle of independence in 
Chapter Four requiring certainty about DRSL reviewers’ independence from the 
entity (ACC) whose decisions they are reviewing, it is unlikely DSRL reviewers 
and mediators would attain that certainty: fairness of process is also contested in 
this example. 
 
 Statutory tribunals are governed by the principles of natural justice and 
independence   providing adjudication outside government administration. In the 
case of the Australian NNTT its distinguishing features are its lack of 
independence from the executive in terms of its decisions and the involvement of 
a government minister in appointments and renewals. These features together 
create an inconsistency incompatible with the Act’s objectives, and also 
disadvantage native title parties. Statutory tribunals in New Zealand have been 
reviewed and recommendations favour clearer differentiation from the 
administration through placement of the majority of tribunals into a unified 
structure under the umbrella of the Ministry of Justice. The perception and actual 
independence of some tribunals in New Zealand is not necessarily clear given the 
ad hoc manner in which many have been founded.  
 
The Ombudsman/Commissioner role deals with disputes and client protection and 
operates in statutory and private domains. Investigation and recommendation are 
the functions of the Parliamentary Ombudsman; the HDC has an investigative and 
advocacy role with the ability to influence systemic change. Independence is 
achieved in these statutory roles through their establishment as independent 
statutory agencies. In the case of the private ombudsmen, independence is 
achieved through Commissions; all ombudsmen operate under the principle of 
natural justice.  
 
 
6.10  Dispute Resolution in the private sector 
 
6.10.1 New Zealand Press Council 
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The New Zealand Press Council was established in 1972 by newspaper publishers 
and journalists. It is funded by the industry and deals with independence through 
its five public members, and an independent chair. Five further members represent 
the journalists’ union and the NZ Amalgamated Engineering Printing and 
Manufacturing Union (EPMU). The intention was “to provide the public with an 
independent forum for resolution of complaints against the press”.  While 
complaint resolution is its core work it also promotes freedom and maintenance of 
the press “in accordance with the highest of professional standards”.491 The 
Council’s mission  
…is to provide a full service to the public in regard to newspapers, magazines or 
periodicals published in New Zealand (including their websites) regardless of 
whether the publisher belongs to an organisation affiliated with the Council. If 
the publication challenges the jurisdiction of the Council to handle the 
complaint, or for any other reason does not cooperate, the Council will 
nevertheless proceed to make a decision as best it is able in the circumstances.492 
 
The Press Council’s complaints process has been set up by the industry to try to 
present and maintain a high standard of journalism and ethical propriety in the 
media and the community. At the same time it defends freedom of speech and 
maintenance of the press. It could therefore be seen to be arbiter of its members 
and through the enforcement of printed determinations when editors err, it can 
also be seen to dispense its own sanctions.  
 
The complaints procedure requires complainants to first deal with the 
editor/publisher they are complaining about within three months of the publication 
or non-publication of an item.493  If the Council upholds a complaint in full or in 
part, the publication “must publish the essence of the adjudication, giving it fair 
prominence”. If a complaint fails, the publication “may” publish a shortened 
                                                 
491 NZPC Principles obtained from website <www.presscouncil.org.nz> 13th January 2007.  
492 NZPC Complain obtained from website <www.presscouncil.org.nz> 7th February 2007. 
493 This is a similar process to the complaints facility contained in the Retirement Villages Act; the 
first step in attempting to resolve an issue without external involvement. If there is no satisfaction 
with the response or no response, a letter must then be written to the Press Council: a formula is 
provided. There are no time periods given to cover these actions. The terms “reasonable interval” 
and “promptly” are stated. It is therefore at the discretion of the complainant to interpret what this 
means. However once the Press Council has received the written complaint the Council copies the 
complaint to the editor who must respond in 14 days. The editor’s response is forwarded to the 
complainant by the Council. If the complainant is satisfied with the editor’s response, no further 
action is taken. If the complainant wants to make further comment this is then passed on via the 
Council to the editor who has a further 14 days to respond.  
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version of the decision.494 A Council “adjudication” cannot be appealed but the 
Council is prepared to re-examine a decision in certain circumstances. The 
Council has protected itself from being used as a “trial run” for litigation by 
insisting on a written undertaking that if the Council takes up a matter, 
complainants “will not take or continue proceedings against the publication or 
journalist concerned”.495   
 
The lack of specific timeframes is something that may be problematic in a legal 
context but in a private context should be examined according to criteria of 
fairness, impartiality and effectiveness.  In the context of this broader thesis and in 
spite of half the Council comprising public representatives, it may not necessarily 
be considered an independent process due to its ‘internal’ nature.  It would also be 
useful to know how ‘consumers’ of its complaints process have experienced its 
effectiveness. However, the Council publishes its ‘rulings’ on a website and 
names the Council members who have made the rulings.  This seems a fair and 
open process; it certainly ensures transparency. In addition, it provides an 
accountability mechanism which can be easily accessed and it makes no secret of 
the issues it considers, the positions of the parties and the reasons it has come to 
the ‘rulings’ it  publishes.  
 
The Council operates as an adjudication panel and uses terms such as “adjudicate” 
and “rulings” suggesting borrowed legal terminology. If legal purists however 
critiqued its processes from a definitional angle, some inconsistencies may be 
found and rules used in legal adjudication may not be present. It provides a 
mechanism for the public to complain about matters from grammatical irritations 
to more serious issues of discrimination and the publishing of names and 
background information of family members of those convicted of serious drugs 
charges.496  When linked to the retirement village context, the question could be 
asked of RVANZ; would the Association consider taking action against member 
                                                 
494 NZPC Complain, 2. 
495 Ibid 
496 See case number 1059 Complaint against the Dominion Post <www.presscouncil.org.nz>. This 
case ‘ruling’ shows how the Council operates as a panel with not all members agreeing; a ‘split’ 
decision occurred in this case over some aspects of the complaint. The case was taken on a breach 
of privacy principle and upheld on the basis of a majority decision by six to five. The names of the 
eleven Council members and how they voted is published at the conclusion. 
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organisations that breach any part of the Act including the Retirement Villages 
Code of Practice and the Code of Residents’ Rights, and publish the results? 
  
 
6.11  Summary 
 
In this chapter I have examined statutory models for dispute resolution which 
have raised questions about whether these models satisfy principles of equality 
before the law, independent adjudication and fair and proper process.  I have 
demonstrated through the work of Mackinnon how policy changes occurring 
within ACC in 1992 caused a move away from an inquisitorial approach to 
adversarial ‘hearings’ resulting in disadvantage to uninformed claimants.  
 
A case has been made to show DSRL’s connection to government policy and by 
association, ideology, highlighting its lack of independence and its susceptibility 
to influences that may affect its partiality. 
 
Using Corbett’s work I have shown how the Australian Native Titles Tribunal is 
influenced by its proximity to the entity whose decisions it is reviewing, 
compromising its independence and impartiality and significantly disadvantaging 
native title claimants. This has encroached on the principles equality before the 
law, adherence to the rule of law, fair and proper process and independent 
adjudication.  Its processes are not truly independent; impartiality is compromised 
and the influence of ideology on the dispute professionals involved and the 
process outcomes can be seen to have compromised the integrity of both.    
 
Using the example of the Employment Relations Act 2003, I have shown how 
mediation in this statutory context is unique, providing a fast track response to 
employment disputes effectively allowing for power balancing between employer 
and employee.  Mediation is compulsory and preferred over the two higher 
institutions who can refer parties back to mediation; mediators give directions, 
legal input is prohibited and unions usurp individual autonomy demonstrating 
how the objectives of the Act covering productive employment relationships 
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through promotion of mutual trust and confidence, work. The ERA example 
demonstrates resistance to hegemonic influences through working class capital in 
the form of strong union organisation and representation; strategies of ‘good faith’ 
and ‘collective bargaining’; and rejection of legal culture.  Metaphorically 
speaking, this has been achieved by strengthening the tail of the dog (the 
mesosystem) and the dog (the macrosystem) taking its direction from the wagging 
tail.  
 
I have covered the Health and Disability Commissioner role which appears to 
ideally meet the communities’ needs for advocacy, investigation and exposure of 
systemic issues as well as providing individual redress. I have identified the 
problem of translating patients’ rights “from slogans into regulatory levers for 
improving the quality of health”.497 I have included the private sector ombudsman 
schemes in banking and insurance and savings to demonstrate the differences in 
funding and the application of decisions either through recommendation in the 
case of the Parliamentary Ombudsman or a binding determination in the case of 
the two private schemes. In a private context, I have reviewed the transparent and 
accessible complaints process of the New Zealand Press Council and identified 
some areas that raise questions about precision of its processes which may impact 
on equality before the law and fair and proper process.  
 
The right of citizens to seek redress through complaints and disputes facilities is 
central to a democratic society. This chapter has covered a range of statutory DR 
processes and one private process. Equality before the law498, independent 
adjudication, fair and proper process are the principles most often compromised 
in some of these examples.  
 
The following chapter will examine retirement village DR processes in NSW and 
Queensland and compare these with the New Zealand process. Key differences 
that have relevance to resident protection will be sought.  
                                                 
497 Paterson, R, “The Patients Complaints System in New Zealand” [2002] Health Affairs, 21, 3, 
78. 
498 The principle equality before the law has been adapted to fit the contexts being examined.  
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Chapter 7 The Australian retirement village 
comparison  
 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter considers the retirement village industry in Australia and New 
Zealand. I will first discuss the need for regulation in both countries following 
rapid growth in the sector. Second, I will focus on the key areas of difference 
between Australian state retirement village legislation and New Zealand 
legislation as it impacts on residents in dispute with operators; the Australian 
states being NSW and Queensland. Third, I will contextualize the sector in both 
states; relative to this is the potential size of problems in the sector from the 
perspective of resident groups. Fourth, I will consider aspects of both state Acts 
and include the DR processes of the Queensland Commercial and Consumer 
Tribunal (CCT) including the views of the Executive Officer. Fifth, the issue of 
residents’ committees and the New Zealand Act will be contrasted with the 
Australian situation. Sixth, the realities of age and financial capital in relation to 
disputing will be highlighted and linked to the role of ‘counsel for the child’ in the 
Family Court context.  
 
 
7.2 The growth of an industry and its issues  
 
Australia and New Zealand have experienced the booming retirement village 
industry over the past three decades and found some of those operating within the 
industry wanting. An examination of tribunal decisions in several states in 
Australia reveals problems are not limited to the for-profit sector.499 From the 
mid-1980’s to the late 1990’s all Australian states and the Northern Territory 
introduced legislation to regulate and protect retirement village residents and their 
assets500 and New Zealand followed in 2003. Tasmania’s Retirement Villages Act 
                                                 
499 For example refer to Residents of Wishart Christian Village v Wishart Christian Village 
Association [2004] QCCTRV 5 (24 May).  
500 Victoria’s Retirement Villages Act 1986 now incorporates amendments following a 
Government initiated review in mid 2002. Full consultation was undertaken with stakeholders and 
residents and included the for-profit and not-for-profit sectors. The major findings which were 
incorporated in the amendments to the Act surrounded the need for improved mechanisms for 
“solving a wide range of problems…[which] will make villages better for residents, now and into 
the future. The amendments deliver important reforms in the areas of contracts, disclosure. 
statements, dispute resolution and exit arrangements”. In addition a Residents’ Association to 
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came into force in July 2005. Consistent with most other settings in society, the 
retirement village sector is not immune from dishonest and opportunistic 
developers and operators. 
 
New South Wales with approximately 700 retirement villages, private and not-for-
profit, has evolved a legislated system which results in the Government working 
with several mechanisms to monitor the conduct of retirement village owners and 
operators. A compliance programme undertaken by the Office of Fair Trading 
(OFT) has investigation powers under the Retirement Villages Act 1999 and is 
focussed on village owners and operators through the monitoring of industry 
publications, resident complaints and other market information.501 The NSW 
Consumer, Trader and Tenancy Tribunal which deals with retirement village 
disputes can refer matters to OFT for investigation. Retirement Village legislation 
in most states in Australia incorporates residents’ committees which can take and 
defend matters before a relevant consumer and trade tribunal on behalf of some or 
all residents. Retirement Villages in Australia are in the same situation as New 
Zealand villages; they are independent of Government and operate within the 
private sector; in both countries governments have deemed the age and 
vulnerability of the residents entitles them to legislative protection from the 
vagaries of the market and the possibility of unscrupulous operators. 
 
In the New Zealand context there is no evidence to suggest dispute resolution 
processes set up to protect the interests of retirement village residents will not be 
used any less frequently than they are across the Tasman. 
 
 
7.3 NSW and Queensland in the beginning 
 
One of the unspoken principles by which people conduct their lives in the 
commercial world must surely be: leave yourself open to exploitation by others and 
that exploitation will inevitably take place. Elderly people have become greater 
targets for exploitation over the years it is generally acknowledged……….The 
                                                                                                                                     
“provide a collective voice for retirement village residents” was recommended  (Reported by 
Consumer Affairs Victoria on website <www.consumer.vic.gov.au>  under Laws applying to 
Retirement Villages.  The state of NSW is currently undergoing a review of its Retirement 
Villages Act with the aim of “strengthening the rights and security of residents as well as cutting 
red tape for village operators”. (News Release Minister Fair Trading, Diane Beamer 23 November 
2006). The Retirement Villages Amendment Bill 2006 can be viewed on the Fair Trading website 
<www.fairtrading.nsw.gov.au> accessed February 2007. 
501 CHOICE Australian Consumers’ Association website <www.choice.com.au>and  
<www.fairtrading.nsw.gov.au> accessed  9th September 2006. 
 173
oppressive nature of the [retirement village] system on the individual cannot be 
overstated.502 
 
Queensland, from this side of the Tasman is often viewed as the home of 
corporate body living arrangements. Possibly this has something to do with the 
climate and the way New Zealanders perceive the popular apartment style holiday 
accommodation on the sunny Queensland coast. A July 2001 review conducted by 
the Office of Fair Trading found 190 retirement villages in Queensland, 35% 
being operated by non-profit organisations.  By 2006 the ARQRV reported 246 
registered retirement villages in Queensland.503 At that time around 700 
retirement villages were operating in New South Wales with approximately 15% 
being much larger for-profit villages; numbers of villages do not equate with 
numbers of residents living in a particular village, this depends on the number and 
size of units in each village.504 Nevertheless, the Retirement Village Association 
Ltd of Australia 505 in its opening statement provides some idea of the industry’s 
burgeoning popularity. 
…Through professional collaboration and dedicated industry leadership,  the 
RVA strives to deliver the support that our members and their residents deserve 
by working closely with government bodies to meet the challenges of the fastest 
growing industry in Australia.506 [emphasis added] 
 
There is no doubt Australia like many Western countries is bracing itself for the 
surge of baby boomers now reaching 60 set to double in the next two decades. 
These cohorts will consider their housing options and include retirement villages 
as an option. Last year in her opening address to the Association’s regional 
conference, the Western Australia Minister of Consumer Protection, Michelle 
Roberts forewarned; “baby boomers are sophisticated, confident and 
demanding”.507 But it will be another 18 years before they reach the current 
average entry age to retirement villages. 
 
                                                 
502 This is a quote used by Keogh and Bradley 2002, 7  to demonstrate “comparable meekness” as 
perceived by a resident in King v Tasman Securities Pty Ltd 96024970, Residential Tribunal of 
NSW 1996. 
503 Email communication from the secretary of the Association of Residents’ of Queensland 
Retirement Villages 23rd November 2006. The Association reports it has 7000 members.  
504 This information was obtained from the website of the Australian Consumers’ Association 
<www.choice.com.au>  9th September 2006.  
505 The Retirement Villages Association is a national owner/operator group. 
506 <www.retirementvillagesaust.com.au>  
507 Hon Michelle Roberts, Minister Consumer Affairs, Opening address to the Retirement Village 
Association Ltd 2006 WA Regional Conference, Friday 4th August 2006.  
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Both NSW and Queensland had new retirement village legislation in 1999. Both 
states consider their legislation will help to close some of the most obviously 
exploitable gaps from which unscrupulous or lax operators can gain advantage. 
The Minister for Fair Trading in NSW at the time, saw the Act as “one of the most 
important social justice reforms ever made in the fair trading area”. The 1999 
(NSW) Act represented “a complete overhaul of all legislation and codes of 
practice governing the conduct of retirement villages in New South Wales”.508  
 
The New Zealand Law Commission in a report on Retirement Villages published 
in 1999 made the following observation; 
The solution proposed by the Law Commission is that there be enacted a 
Retirement Villages Act tailored to the situation of retirement villages. There is 
proposed provision for disclosure, continuing prudential supervision, swift and 
informal dispute resolution and the overruling of unconscionable contract terms. 
This would be a very light-handed regulation. The New South Wales 
Department of Fair Trading published in June the exposure draft of a Retirement 
Villages Bill that seems to regulate every facet of the operation of retirement 
villages in minute and petty detail. Perhaps they have more under-arm bowlers 
in that jurisdiction. We have not reached the stage in New Zealand where that 
degree of protection is needed. When and if we do, the New South Wales 
legislation will be available as a model to law-makers.509 
 
The experiences of NSW (and Queensland) residents outlined in Chapter Two do 
not necessarily indicate a proliferation of under-arm bowlers but their experiences 
of their Act and Tribunal dispute resolution process do not give assurance that the 
system necessarily protects residents in some situations; for example when 
contracts are over-ruled due to wrong-doing by operators. The reality of this 
action imposed by the Tribunal is the resident loses the place they have called 
home.  
 
A resident who courageously pursues – and wins - a dispute (usually about fees 
and charges) and the Tribunal finds in their favour, paradoxically finds the table 
has turned against them with the Tribunal setting aside their ‘residence contract’. 
The resident then has to move on leaving the operator undisturbed: though 
financially compensated for their loss, residents are also forced to leave their 
home and familiar people and surroundings. Both the Queensland and NSW state 
residents’ associations see this as a huge injustice.  
                                                 
508 Keogh, J Bradley, P “The potential for contractual disputes in retirement village living: an 
examination of recent litigation arising from resident contract disputes in NSW retirement 
villages”, paper presented at Pacific Rim Real Estate Society 8th Annual Conference, January 21-
24, 2002, Christchurch, New Zealand. 
509 Dugdale, D F “Retirement Villages”, The Law Commission, 1999. 
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They also have concerns about older women and their vulnerability when 
operators want to increase charges. According to Residents’ Committees in New 
South Wales and Queensland, older women residents either succumb to pressure 
from operators to pay unjustifiable fees or they welcome the support of the more 
business or professionally experienced male members of their village committees 
and their state Residents’ Association. The office holders of the state residents’ 
associations are mostly men, some with considerable experience in business, the 
professions and government bureaucracies.   
...The generation mainly consists of women who were home makers and family 
rearers. They sold their family home to go into a retirement village. The cost of a 
unit is generally less than the price of a suburban home. Many could afford to 
move into a village with a reasonable sum of money in the bank….most do not 
question the operator’s figures for fees even when a resident might say that the 
operator is charging residents for items of expenditure for which the company is 
responsible.  They have never been in a trade union and dislike what they have 
heard over the years about strikes and industrial action. They compare the work 
of the RVRA with the industrial action and many think we are radical and 
trouble makers… 
…There is a lot of good theory in the Act. Especially when residents can go to 
the CTTT510 under section 123 to have your contracts re-written. I cannot see 
how a resident could handle that without expert legal assistance and even if the 
resident won at the Tribunal, the decision would undoubtedly be appealed to a 
higher court and who knows where it would finish.  The saving grace for the 
residents could be that if the matter attracted media interest, the operator could 
back off because the reporting of it could damage his business prospects…511 
 
The NSW Act is currently under review.  
 
7.3.1 Retirement Villages Act 1999 Queensland : Steps in 
the DR process. 
 
Legislation in Queensland covering the corporate body accommodation sector was 
first instituted in the 1970’s: it now includes retirement villages.  The Retirement 
Villages Act 1999 covers all Queensland retirement villages. Disputes involving 
retirement village residents and operators come under the jurisdiction of the 
Commercial and Consumer Tribunal of Queensland (CCT).  Both mediation and 
adjudication in the form of a Tribunal hearing is undertaken by the Tribunal with 
separate professional groups involved in each process: both require applicants to 
have attempted to resolve the dispute through negotiation within the village prior 
                                                 
510 CTTT refers to the Consumer Trader and Tenancy Tribunal (NSW). 
511 Email communication from the secretary NSW Residents’ Association 22nd November 2006. 
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to making an application to the Tribunal. Approved forms and an application fee 
of $56 must be submitted to the Registrar in both contexts.512  
 
In the case of a resident’s ‘residence contract’ being terminated by an operator, 
the dispute notice must be given within 4 months after the payment of the former 
residents exit entitlement. A party may be represented at mediation by a lawyer or 
an agent.  Mediation is private and attendance at mediation is not enforceable. 
Any notes taken by the mediator are destroyed. Any agreements reached are 
recorded by the mediator and signed by the parties with a copy of the signed 
agreement going to the registrar.513 
 
7.3.2 Tribunal hearing 
 
A party to a retirement village dispute may apply to the tribunal for a hearing if;   
(a) The parties to the dispute can not reach a mediation agreement 
to the dispute; or 
(b) a party to the dispute does not attend the mediation conference 
for the dispute; or 
(c) the dispute is not settled within 4 months after the dispute 
notice is given to the registrar; or  
(d) the party claims that another party to a mediation agreement 
has not complied with the agreement within the time specified 
in it or, if no time specified, within two months after the 
agreement is signed.514  
  
In addition, residents have a right to apply for an order for a tribunal hearing if 
threatened with removal, deprivation or restriction of use of land by operators; if 
residents are given false or misleading documents or are materially prejudiced by 
the contravention. In the above circumstances the resident may also apply for an 
order to have their residence contract set aside. A former resident who has not 
received their exit entitlement may also apply to the tribunal for an order that the 
operator pay the exit fee.515  
                                                 
512 Information supplied by the Executive Officer, Commercial and Consumer Tribunal, Tribunal 
Registry, Brisbane, 19th July 2006.  
513 Ibid. 
514 Part 10, Division 2, s67 (a ) (b) (c) (d) Retirement Villages Act 1999 (Queensland). 
515 Part 10, Division 3, s170 (1) (a) (b) and (2); s171 (1 ) (a ) (b) and (2) Retirement Villages Act 
1999 (Queensland).  
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The Executive Officer of the Queensland Commercial and Consumer Tribunal 
recognises power imbalance can be an issue in both mediation and tribunal 
hearings when operators use legal counsel and residents are unable to afford the 
same assistance. She described the playing field as not level in these 
circumstances.516 Residents’ associations in both Queensland and NSW report 
this imbalance occurring and the Tribunal has the say as to whether lawyers can 
be present.517 At this time they are unaware of operators being prevented from 
using legal representation at mediation and hearings. The fact that legal 
representation is not always available to residents is possibly why some residents’ 
committees and state residents’ associations (Queensland and NSW) have gained 
expertise in the law affecting retirement villages and why they are seen as a thorn 
in the side of operators and others who have a different view on the relative power 
discrepancy between operators and residents. New Zealand has followed the NSW 
and Queensland Acts in regard to use of counsel. Section 67 (4) of the RVA  
applies and was not invoked in the first NZ dispute when a resident represented 
himself against the largest corporate operator Metlifecare. The day a represented 
resident faces an unrepresented operator is apparently yet to come.  
   
7.3.3 Group applications 
 
One of the outstanding differences between the Australian and New Zealand 
legislation is the provision in the various state retirement village legislation is for 
a group of residents within a retirement village to apply jointly to the tribunal 
about a matter arising from the same or similar facts or circumstances.518 Actions 
taken by residents and residents’ groups have not always been seen as fair by 
some writers who report under a heading “Dispute Resolution and over-zealous 
consumerism” 
…There is an increasing trend in most states and territories to impose a judicial 
overlay on the relevant legislation to expand the rights of residents in retirement 
villages. This is particularly evident in these areas: 
 
• the operator’s entitlement to departure fees being invalidated 
                                                 
516 Executive Officer, Commercial and Consumer Tribunal Registry, Brisbane, 19th July 2006. 
517 Section 67 (4) of the New Zealand RVA has the same effect. 
518 Part 10, Division 4, s173 RVAQ.  A search of decisions under the various tribunals handling 
retirement village disputes provides evidence that resident groups have been successful in 
overturning financial decisions made by operators including non-profit religious based villages.  
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• the operator being made liable for some items of repairs, maintenance 
and other user-pays village outgoings 
• the liability to make automatic refunds extended beyond the scope of the 
original legislation which has already been discussed… 
 
…Many consumer advocacy groups and state consumer protection agencies have 
shown a ready willingness to fund test cases in these areas which has the 
potential to bankrupt smaller operators of retirement villages… 
 
In many retirement villages, there often exists one or several activists who 
provide a catalyst for this type of litigation. It is important for village 
management to be resident-friendly and responsive and for management to be 
vigilant in identifying and responding positively to these types of situations.519  
 
The conclusions of these writers are consistent with the Keogh and Bradley520 
study which emphasised the importance of good communication between 
operators and residents, especially at the critical time of entering into residency 
contracts.521  Residency contracts have been the starting point of some of the most 
prejudicial actions taken by operators against residents.  
 
 
7.4 Comparing apples: eating versus cooking  
 
Unlike Australia, New Zealand has no equivalent of the state residents’ 
associations representing retirement village residents. Now the proposed variation 
to the Code of Practice setting refurbishment standards appears to be the catalyst 
for collective resident action in New Zealand. Seeing little in the Act that offers 
benefit to residents other than clause 49.1 (e)522 residents are incensed that moves 
                                                 
 519 Vinden, G and Shailer, J “Legal Challenges for the Industry” in Stimson, R J(Ed) (2002) The 
Retirement Village Industry in Australia: Evolution, Prospects, Challenges (Brisbane: Queensland 
University Press, 2002, 123). 
520 Keogh & Bradley, supra n 508.   
521 Good communication means being able to talk about difficult issues and attempting to see 
others’ point of view. This is a skill that requires tolerance and an ability to actively listen. As a 
conflict avoidance strategy it must be in the interests of operators and staff of retirement villages to 
the basic elements of these skills; it being unlikely the same can be expected of residents in their 
80’s although residents’ committees have been known to deal firmly with errant members if 
behaviour slips and offends others’.  A residents’ committee in New Zealand has reportedly 
devised a system where feedback is given to residents whose attitudes and behaviour towards other 
residents, staff and manager are deemed inappropriate. This seems an effective self-monitoring 
system set up by residents to promote harmony and respect in their village. 
522 This clause refers to the Retirement Villages Code of Practice effective from the 25th September 
2007 and the clause replacing terms such as “pristine condition” and “as new” which feature 
currently in occupation right agreements. The new clause; “e. State the residential unit is to be 
refurbished to no more than the condition of the unit when the resident entered it, less fair wear 
and tear” offers what residents’ see as a reasonable standard. 
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to vary this clause are underway.523 To date reports of owner/manager resistance 
to the concept of residents’ committees has hampered progress in spite of the new 
legislative climate supporting a residents committee in every village.524 Under the 
Act, the only way an operator can prevent formation of a residents’ committee is 
to formally apply for an exemption. Exemptions are intended to cover special 
circumstances that would take account of the type of village (including legal 
status) and capacity of residents to engage in committee activities. It is likely this 
will be a rare exception to the rule in New Zealand due to the resident’s right to 
have a personal representative.525 However, residents’ committees have no legal 
standing in the disputes context. 
 
In Brisbane there are a number of avenues available for residents or concerned 
others to seek help. The Office of the Adult Guardian covers retirement villages in 
Queensland for cases where there is concern about the treatment of vulnerable 
adults. Also, the legal recognition of residents’ committees526 and the existence of 
organised state residents’ associations in NSW and Queensland bring a presence 
and consumer ‘watchdog’ factor into the political climate of the sector.527   In 
addition, the Act provides further protection to residents through section 75 (4);  
The operator must not prevent or hinder the attendance of an investigator at a 
meeting of the residents if the residents at the meeting consent to the 
investigator’s presence.528   
 
Also section 66 (e) requires the operator  
must use his or her best endeavours to ensure that each resident lives in an 
environment free from harassment and intimidation. 
 
 
These provisions are in stark contrast to the threat RVANZ seems to believe is 
posed by resident harassment. Though the New Zealand Act now extends the role 
of the statutory supervisor and allows resident’s to take complaints directly to 
                                                 
523 Personal communications from residents during April and May 2007 have drawn attention to 
this variation. 
524 Telephone interview with Grey Power Retirement Villages representative, 18th November 
2006.  
525 Section 49 RVA 2003. 
526 This legal recognition gives the committees the right to take or defend matters before the 
Consumer, Trader and Tenancy Tribunal in NSW and the Commercial and Consumer Tribunal in 
Brisbane. 
527 As at September 2006, 50,000 residents occupy 700 retirement villages in NSW posing an 
effective mass lobby. (Figure obtained from Office of Fair Trading, Parramatta, NSW, 20th 
September 2006).  
528 Section 75 Retirement Villages Act 1999 (NSW). 
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their village statutory supervisor, the perceived lack of independence of that role 
will mean many residents will be sceptical about  this option. 
 
 
7.5 Waiting for God – the realities of age 
 
During the course of this research, I came into contact with a number of residents 
in Australia and New Zealand experiencing serious life-threatening illnesses or 
age associated medical conditions. These people were heavily involved in 
assisting other residents in setting up residents’ committees; keeping residents 
informed about their rights and obligations and doing administrative work for 
their village committees and state associations. One active state office-holder, an 
‘expert’ on retirement village legal issues, died suddenly at Christmas time 2006. 
This brought to the forefront a number of factors; the first surrounds the age of 
entry to retirement villages. This has increased over the past decade from 68 to 
78529 years which has consequently increased the average age of residents to 
around 83 years.530 Based on these figures it will be another eighteen years before 
the first ‘stroppy’ baby-boomers enter retirement villages as residents.  The 
second factor is retirement village residents are now often living out their final 
few years. In New Zealand, NSW and Queensland, the  legislation in place and 
the various regulations supporting the Acts’, offer forms of ‘protection’ but none 
include representation other than through residents’ committees in Queensland 
and NSW; the New Zealand Act does not include that potential support.  
 
In relation to this, the Retirement Commission survey revealed 61% of New 
Zealand residents rely solely or mostly on NZ Superannuation.531 On average we 
are considering the needs of a group sometimes described as very ‘elderly’ or the 
old ‘old’532 on low incomes. Since it has been established that disputes usually 
                                                 
529 This was confirmed at a presentation Wellington, 14th March 2007 and is a trend also  reported 
by the NSW Residents’ Association.  
530 Retirement Commission, Retirement Villages Survey 2006 showed the average age of entry to 
a retirement village is around 78 years; 73% of residents are 80 years or over, only 7% are under 
70 years and 12% are over 90 years of age. Statistics NZ at 30th March 2004 found, based on 
mortality in 2000-2002, a newborn girl can expect to live 81.1 years and a new-born boy 76.3 
years. Our current ‘villagers’ born in different times have probably already lived longer than many 
of their age cohorts. Australian data shows a similar gradual increase in age (Stimson, 2002).  
531 58% state their total assets as $400,000 and 7% estimate their current assets as being over 
$600,000.  
532 The way to describe this older group of residents was discussed at a presentation in Wellington 
14th March 2007. Operators, managers and residents attending used the term ‘old old’ when 
describing their residents. An Australian study described 84 yrs as the top level of “middle-old 
aged” and 85+yrs as “old-old age” (Stimson & McGovern, 2002, 1).  
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surround fees and charges, not only do some residents face problems paying extra 
charges but they have no ability to pay for legal representation if they are in 
dispute with an operator. Added to this, the older the age of the resident, the more 
likely the resident will be female and the less likely she will be to ‘take on’ an 
operator. This scenario is covered in Queensland and NSW through representation 
by residents’ committees in mediation and in the state tribunals. From a moral and 
ethical point of view, this could be considered the minimum advocacy 
requirement for people on average at the end stage of their lives, yet New Zealand 
residents have been deprived of even that level of support.  
 
When set alongside ‘protective’ legislation for children, an argument can be made 
that similar consideration should be given to people at the end stage of life when  
financial assets are tied up in accommodation they cannot leave for reasons 
including financial and physical.  
 
Residents in retirement villages and rest home care should be protected from 
rogue operators, unscrupulous business practices and intimidation by staff or 
operators just as children are from abuse and damaging parental relations. 
Appointment of ‘Counsel for the child’ is usual practice in the Family Court; 
appointment of ‘Advocate for the aged’ may offer similar oversight for elders in 
rest home care, retirement villages and their own homes.  
 
The issues implicated in this proposition will be considered in the following 
chapter.  
  
 
7.6 Summary  
 
In this chapter I have discussed the growth of the retirement village industry and 
its consequent problems. I have identified key areas of difference surrounding 
resident support between the state legislation of NSW and Queensland and the 
New Zealand legislation, these being; the role of the Adult Guardian in Brisbane; 
provisions in the legislation for residents’ committee autonomy including the right 
to involve investigators to attend meetings in the village and protection from 
exploitation and harassment from operators. The representative role of residents’ 
committees in both mediation and at hearings and the involvement of residents’ 
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committees and support of state associations overall is an enhancement to 
residents’ relative power imbalance, especially for female residents. The ability of 
residents’ to take class actions in Queensland and NSW is a significant 
development. I have found the age of residents, their socioeconomic status and 
age related health issues provide adequate reason for some form of ‘protective’ 
representation. I have included all ‘old’ people within this analysis, not only those 
in retirement villages.   
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Chapter 8  Seeking an appropriate solution 
 
 
8.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter is primarily concerned with the problems faced by residents in 
dispute with operators and how these problems could best be overcome. I will first 
summarise the needs and issues of residents that have emerged from previous 
chapters. Second, I will consider which processes discussed in this thesis might 
offer some enhancement to the disadvantaged position of residents in dispute with 
operators. This will be done in conjunction with application of the statements of 
principle from Chapter Three. From this, an ideal process will emerge and third, I 
will offer suggestions for its implementation.  
 
 
8.2 The sum of issues 
 
Chapter Two identified the following issues surrounding residents 
• legal representation 
• advocacy  
• ability to take class actions 
• attitudes of operators, sector representatives, legal counsel  
• legal recognition of residents’ committees  
• education surrounding power and control dynamics   
Chapter Four produced areas that residents would need to be aware of or avoid 
• coercion to mediate 
• negotiating without representation 
• mediation and confidentiality issues 
• allowing issues to be decided on papers only  
• ideology and impact of policy 
• caution around “success” claims 
• consider proximity of agency to mechanism (e.g. tribunals) to Minister 
• consensual processes and “false harmony”  
• independence of process 
• fairness of process 
• transparency of process 
• prejudicial treatment 
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Chapter Five has added to the list  
• age 
• gender – including process appropriateness   
• money – low income 
• lack of knowledge about legal process 
• fair process – inclusive of rights, accessibility in terms of written 
requirements and understanding 
• format of decisions – legalistic and meaning of decision perhaps not 
accessible to residents 
• inflexibility of process 
• inappropriateness of process for dispute 
• mediation – mediator perspective; lack of transparency; gender issues; 
power imbalance  
 
Chapter Six raises further issues 
• lack of autonomy and leadership of panel adjudicators 
• morality of outcomes 
• power imbalance 
• operator control in all areas of  DR 
• ambiguous and conflicted role of statutory supervisor 
• RVANZ promotion of Review Authority and the lack of transparency of 
this role 
• RVANZ’s process for operators to make complaints about residents  
 
And Chapter Seven 
• lack of national residents’ body 
• being an activist to the end; average age of residents; shortage of 
experienced men and confident women; health issues in later life 
 
This is a daunting list of issues when considered together. Devising a process 
that takes account of all the data will be assisted through the use of the 
statements of principle from Chapter Three. I now return to the processes from 
Chapter Four offering components that may be suitable for inclusion in the ideal 
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model. Following discussion of each process I will utilize the relevant statements 
of principle from Chapter Three, adapting them to fit the context.   
 
 
8.3 What do other statutory processes have to offer? 
 
8.3.1 The Employment Relations Act 2000  
 
I have identified two components of The Employment Relations Act 2000 which 
could be useful for dispute avoidance and dispute resolution in retirement villages. 
These are the concepts of “good faith’ and “collective bargaining”. In addition to 
these two concepts, I would include the facilitative dispute resolution process 
partnering533 which would take the form of a relationship contract between the 
resident and the operator and the residents’ committee and the operator at the time 
a new resident entered a village.534 An appropriately worded standard contract 
could apply. 
 
‘Partnering’ is inclusive of the notion of ‘good faith’. Having a residents’ 
committee involved would mean a collective voice to assist a resident with 
representation. While “collective bargaining” in the ERA context is about 
negotiating a new contract in the context of a retirement village, the meaning 
would have more to do with collective support and collective involvement. The 
residents’ committee would be involved in the partnering “charter” which is based 
on the need to act in good faith and fair dealing with one another – residents and 
operator.535 The partnering process focuses on defining mutual objectives, 
improved communication and identification of likely problems. It has the effect of 
formalising problem-solving and dispute resolution strategies. This could offer a 
proactive option prior to the use of complaints facilities and the disputes panel.  
 
Equality before the law and fair and proper process: These principles would be 
evident if parties were engaged in respectful communication and demonstrated 
willingness to share information and concerns in open and honest exchanges; 
when operators accepted residents’ committee involvement as a legitimate activity 
in the relationship contract and when an environment encouraging the expression 
                                                 
533 See Chapter Five p115 for T. Sourdin,  2005, 20  “Process Map”.  
534 Using partnering at this point may alleviate some of the problems identified in the Keogh and 
Bradley study (2002).  
535 NADRAC in Sourdin, T Alternative Dispute Resolution (2nd Ed, 2005) 2.230. 
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of concerns and reciprocal engagement to find acceptable remedies was evident. 
The principle of process pluralism would be evident through the involvement of 
representatives of all parties affected by any decisions; when conflict was 
understood and accepted as a necessary and positive side to village living and 
issues were overt and explicit ensuring recognition and attention. This also 
includes the advocacy principle.    
 
8.3.2 Tribunals  
 
It has been suggested the work of the Retirement Villages Act Disputes Panel 
should come under the jurisdiction of the proposed unified tribunal structure 
administered by the Ministry of Justice.536 While this would bring greater 
credibility and independence to the process the same concerns that exists with the 
disputes panel apply; concerns such as residents’ capability to take a case to the 
tribunal or use a representative with the personal attributes and knowledge 
required to engage in an adversarial legal process on behalf of the resident. The 
possibility of a tribunal with the power to allow a residents’ group or regional 
group to bring a claim on behalf of a resident, has also been considered and may 
offer an alternative that could work for residents.537 Disallowing legal 
representation would reduce the impact of legal formalities and language and the 
type of intimidation experienced during the first dispute process. Attention would 
need to be given to the experience and quality of adjudicators and their ability to 
provide authoritative decisions in this specialised area.538  
 
The acknowledgement from the Health and Disability Commissioner that older 
people do not readily complain539 suggests processes are too daunting for many to 
                                                 
536 Trish McConnell, the Chief Adjudicator under the new Weathertight Homes Resolution 
Services Act 2006 has mooted this idea which is consistent with the Law Commission report 
Delivering Justice for All. See 4.10 and recommendation R141, p284 also “The Future of 
Tribunals in New Zealand” presented by Trish McConnell 5th April 2006 at the International 
Tribunals Workshop, Centre for International and Public Law, ANU College of Law.  
537 Patricia McConnell, Chief Adjudicator for the Weathertight Homes Tribunal confirms “the 
Disputes Tribunal does not allow parties to be represented but others such as Tenancy do if the 
amount of the dispute is over $3000, the issues are legally complex or due to the imbalance of 
power…In some tribunals there is also the facility for group or representative claims to be 
filed….if for example Retirement Villages went to the Disputes Tribunal it could include specific 
provisions to allow for either lay or legal representation or could even allow for a group or 
representative action on behalf of a group of villages or by  village committees” (Personal email 
communication received 7th June 2007).    
538 Delivering Justice (7.1, 3, p 284) raises issues about “unsupported tribunals that have little 
opportunity to gain experience in their tribunal role” saying this raises concerns about “standing 
authority and competence”.  
539 See Bismark M, Brennan T, Paterson  R, Davis, P and Studdert, D supra n 482. 
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consider. Another possibility may relate to the perceived risk of consequence in 
the aftermath of a complaint.540  No matter what the chosen process, if operator 
costs can be passed on to residents as Greenwood and Burke confirm,541 residents 
who cause the fees of other residents to increase may be affected by negative 
response. The data on residents collected for this study, confirms older people 
enter retirement villages seeking stability and security, not conflict. It is therefore 
possible some residents may isolate others with legitimate issues with operators. It 
is important therefore that residents and operators promote behaviour that is 
consistent with good partnerships and encourage a climate that supports open 
engagement with conflict through the principle advocacy.   
 
In the context of a statutory tribunal, equality before the law, adherence to the 
rule of law and fair and proper process would be present when the resident felt 
able to take part in the hearing in a manner that allowed questions to be asked and 
concerns expressed in such a way that the resident felt heard, had concerns 
acknowledged and responses provided so that the resident felt empowered. In the 
event of the case going against the resident, the resident would be provided with 
an easily understood explanation about appeal rights. The resident would 
experience independent adjudication through the use of adjudicators appointed by 
the Ministry of Justice receiving payment through the Ministry and have decisions 
and practices monitored by the Ministry. Process pluralism would be experienced 
by the resident through the chosen involvement or representation by the residents’ 
committee of the resident’s village.  Advocacy could also be expressed through 
representation by the residents’ committee.   
 
8.4 Ombudsman/ Commissioner: the ideal model for residents 
8.4.1 Why this is so 
 
Demographic predictors indicate the certainty of a burgeoning retirement village 
industry over the next two decades and beyond, ensuring continuing disputes over 
fees and charges. Analysis of data has shown an increase in the age on entry into 
                                                 
540 The first NZ Disputes Hearing saw Counsel for Metlifekapiti Ltd raise the matter of increased 
fees for all villagers because of Ian Brown’s complaint action; Greenwood and Burke, 2007, 1, 
confirm operators can pass on costs where residents initiate disputes. 
541 Greenwood, J and Burke,  M “Retirement Villages – the full impact of the Act” New Zealand 
Law Society, March 2007, 1.  
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retirement villages in Australia and New Zealand over the past decade542 and the 
unlikelihood of the elderly to complain has been established by Paterson, the 
current Health and Disability Commissioner.543 Altogether, this profile paints a 
picture of needs well beyond self-representation. The data provided by NSW and 
Queensland state residents’ associations adds to the overall impression that a 
proportion of residents in their final years are preoccupied with the stressful task 
of ensuring they and their members are not being exploited by operators keen to 
pass on charges. There is no reason to suspect the situation will be any different in 
New Zealand as the industry burgeons.  
 
The established increase in the number of older citizens requiring varied housing 
options over the next three decades indicates also, a heightened need for a facility 
offering advocacy and protection to all older people. Problems of elder abuse have 
been identified within families544 and in residential care facilities in New 
Zealand.545 When these situations come to light in residential care, publicity has 
resulted in investigation and at times, caused closure.546 In these instances a 
number of agencies step in to deal with problems surrounding care and breach of 
patient rights but it likely many are unreported. Retirement Villages also provide 
contexts for opportunistic exploitation and abuse of power. Because retirement 
villages involve private financial arrangements between residents and operators 
and residents are generally able to care for themselves, oversight and advocacy 
has not been promoted other than through the ‘protective’ components of the new 
Act and role of the statutory supervisor.547  
 
                                                 
542  See Grant, 2006; Greenwood & Marks 2004 in Chapter One. The studies of Stimson and his 
colleagues show the “old-old”, those 85+yrs can increasingly be found in retirement villages in 
Australia (Stimson, 2002). In addition, a survey undertaken by RVANZ in 1999 put the age of 
retirement village residents as 68-88 yrs.  By 2006 the Retirement Commission survey (p3) shows 
the average age of entry as 78 yrs with 73% aged over 80 years. Only 7% are under 70 years and 
12% are over 90 years.  
543 See Bismark, Brennan, Paterson, Davis and Studdert, 2006, supra  n 482  for verification.  
544 In the private domain of the family, elders are found to be particularly at risk of abuse of 
money. This comes in the form of relatives gaining access to their elders superannuation payments 
and savings and sometimes even depriving the older person of necessities such as regular healthy 
food, visits to the doctor and social engagement with others. This form of abuse was discussed at a 
Senior Citizens meeting in Hamilton on the 22nd September 2006. 
545 Age Concern New Zealand Incorporated has promoted elder abuse awareness and taken an 
advisory role in this area. See website <www.ageconcern.org.nz>  
546 The Director General of Health closed the Pacifika Centre and Hospital in April 2006 due to 
substandard care and neglect of residents.  The Centre had been the focus of attention by health 
authorities for over a year prior to the closure. Opportunity to improve facilities and quality of care 
over that period, failed to prevent closure.    
547 New Zealand Law Society Seminar Retirement Villages, Greenwood  J and  Marks S , 2004.    
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I have established the vast majority of retirement village disputes surround 
payment of fees, on-going charges and disagreements about refurbishing 
requirements. This all adds up to money, claimed by operators to be paid by 
residents. The Ombuds/Commissioner model where investigation is carried out 
without the need for party representation, appears the least disturbing process for 
the aged; it is certainly a well proven, transparent and independent process in the 
New Zealand DR context. The process would need to be timely; I suggest within a 
four month time frame. There is always the possibility an aged person taking a 
dispute would be emotionally affected, become ill and die before a matter is 
resolved or simply die because there life came to an end; age being a determining 
factor.  
 
The model of the Ombuds/Health and Disability Commissioner would be a fair 
and responsive process to meet the needs of retirement village residents whose 
age and vulnerability places them in a very limited position in terms of 
representing themselves. The Act includes a Code of Residents’ Rights,548 making 
residents’ circumstances similar to patients’ within the health system and the 
private banking scheme. 
 
This model could capture all aged New Zealanders including those in their own 
homes, rest home care and those living with relatives.   
 
Using the Ombuds/Commissioner role would result in reduced stress to residents 
because they would not have to enter an adversarial process with operators, 
prepare for a hearing or have someone do that for them. It would be a free process 
releasing them from anxiety about cost.  The ‘statement of principle’ Equality 
before the law would be evident through the established processes of the 
ombudsman role, adherence to the rule of law would be demonstrated through the 
inquisitorial procedures of the office which is based on the principle of natural 
justice. Accountability would be achieved through annual reporting to the 
Commission having responsibility for the appointment. The principle of fair and 
proper process would be demonstrated through the Ombudsman’s ability to attend 
to the older person’s issues in a sensitive and professional manner, operating at all 
times from a position that follows the rules of procedural justice. The experience 
                                                 
548 The Code of Residents Rights came into force on the 1st May 2007. 
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of the older person would be reflected in their sense of satisfaction in the manner 
their issues had been received and confidence that the process would deliver a fair 
outcome whether or not it was favourable to them.  
 
The principle independent adjudication would be demonstrated through the 
Ombudsman’s lack of connection in any way with the operator. Payment of fees 
and administrative base would be unequivocally neutral; issues about selection 
would be redundant in this context. The principle of process pluralism would 
apply and be demonstrated when a residents’ committee instigated a dispute 
action and the Ombudsman heard the collective voice of residents’ and 
investigated a matter on the residents’ behalf and possibly later provided advice to 
relevant authorities. In this way, the Ombudsman would be acting as an advocate 
in terms of their ability to practice make recommendations where this was felt 
necessary and offer policy recommendations at a systemic level. Advocacy would 
be achieved through the involvement of residents’ committees with the 
Ombudsman.  
   
8.4.2 Village people and everyone else: an inclusive 
advocacy ideal 
 
An especially designated Ombuds/Commissioner with a systemic role to 
investigate and determine complaints and recommend changes in industry and 
provider practices would provide an optimal model for dispute resolution in 
retirement villages.   
 
In addition, I propose the Ombuds/Commissioner role as the ideal model for DR 
involving all older people whose circumstances provide opportunity for 
exploitation and abuse by others. The imminent spectacular population growth of 
people in this older age category warrants specific attention, whatever their living 
context might be.549   
 
I believe there are several possible locations for this role. This is not the most 
important factor. The role must be an independent agency of government; an 
Independent Crown Entity with complaints and advisory capacity.  
                                                 
549 Ministry of Social Development “Positive Ageing in New Zealand” (2001) 8. 
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Chapter 9 Conclusions and recommendations 
 
 
9.1  Suggestions for improvement and reform 
 
 
In this thesis I have uncovered a number of factors and systemic influences that 
impact on the wellbeing and right to fair and independent processes for residents 
in dispute with operators of New Zealand retirement villages. This has been 
achieved partly through comparison with the situation of residents in Queensland 
and NSW; through the examination of law, regulations and codes pertaining to 
retirement villages in both countries; and the Tribunal DR mechanism in NSW 
and Queensland. I have specifically focussed on the dispute resolution aspects of 
the Retirement Villages Act 2003 and considered the New Zealand provisions 
alongside DR processes in other statutes and different jurisdictions. From this 
examination and analysis, I have proposed an ideal dispute resolution model for 
retirement village residents and all other aged New Zealanders. 
 
By using the conceptual ideas in the ecology of human development and 
incorporating ideology and the concept of hegemony, it has been possible to 
critically examine how the Retirement Villages Act 2003 was shaped. The 
powerlessness of aged residents compared to the power held by operators has 
been illuminated through assessment of macro and exosystem influences on the 
way responsibility has been allocated for selection and payment of the three key 
DR roles. By allocating to operators, the responsibility for selection of the roles of 
mediator, disputes panel and statutory supervisor and not giving statutory 
recognition to residents’ committees, the operator ‘class’ is assured of continuing   
domination of the aged in the disputes context. On the one hand, the provisions of 
the Act appear to have been (paternalistically) constructed to avoid resident 
involvement in the logistics of setting up DR facilities and on the other, seeing 
residents as capable of managing and participating unrepresented550 in an 
adversarial disputes process. By weighting the DR responsibilities so heavily with 
the operators; not including a code of practice for statutory supervisors; and 
ensuring residents stand alone in a dispute if unable to afford representation, runs 
                                                 
550 None of the residents in the first three disputes under the RVA were legally represented. 
Affordability is likely to have been the determining factor.  
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counter to the objectives of “protective legislation” and therefore must be seen as 
unfair to residents.  
 
In the event the Ombuds/Commissioner model is not accepted I propose the 
following remedies to address the existing unacceptable situation. Firstly the 
position of residents needs to be strengthened through the legal recognition of 
residents’ committees to act on behalf of residents in dispute with operators. This 
should apply in mediation and disputes panel hearings and also to prevent 
unrepresented or unsupported residents being compelled to mediate on their 
own.551  In this regard, residents involved in processes that may include settlement 
or a determination, should not be without legal representation or an experienced 
lay advocate.  
 
Second, the responsibility for monitoring and assessment of the role of statutory 
supervisor should be undertaken by the Department of Building and Housing or 
the Retirement Commission. This would include training and ensuring the 
establishment of a code of conduct for all statutory supervisors of retirement 
villages. Third the payment of the disputes panel and the statutory supervisors 
should come from levies on operators administered by the Department of Building 
and Housing or another statutory body. This would remedy the perception (and 
possible reality) that operators selecting and paying for the disputes panel 
compromise the independence of the role. Fourth, a principal disputes panellist 
should be appointed to mentor and allocate panellists to disputes. This would also 
enhance the independence of the disputes panel.552  
 
Finally, a disputes avoidance strategy based on good faith, incorporating a 
‘partnering agreement’ should be initiated at the time of setting up an occupation 
right agreement between residents and operators.   
 
9.1.1 Research  
 
From this study, I have identified areas where further qualitative research is 
needed.   
                                                 
551 If mediation is used in the complaints facility, operators should not select mediators; AMINZ 
and LEADR could assist with lists and residents or their representatives could be involved in the 
selection process. 
552 The disputes panel group may also act as a ‘triage’ body requiring for itself quality control; 
training relevant to the needs of office; peer support and supervision. 
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• Further research is required to identify suitable processes for dealing with 
conflict involving people in the ‘old-old’ age group – especially women.  
• We need to understand and know why so few older people complain.553  
• Age is absent from dispute resolution literature; race, ethnicity, gender, 
socioeconomic status and disability are included. What are the reasons for 
this omission? 
• What are the reasons residents leave retirement villages? 
• How can we ‘normalise’ conflict in retirement villages in order to 
effectively engage in its resolution?554 
• Elder abuse is a recognised and growing concern of age care groups. What 
is the extent and scope of this abuse in New Zealand and what are the most 
effective preventative and remedial responses?    
                                                 
553 RVANZ reported last year knowing of only two mediations in recent years and the 
Association’s Review Authority had provided one determination. The Health and Disability 
Commissioner has established the under representation of older people in complaints.  
554 Stuart Hampshire’s thesis that “justice is conflict” makes this endeavour all the more important 
(Hampshire, S 2000). 
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